An Abridgment of Mr. Locke's essay concerning human understanding

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ABRIDGMENT

O F

Mr. L O C K E's

ESSAY

CONCERNING

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

The Seventh Edition.

G L A S G 0 JVt

TAINTED AND SOLD BY ROBERT AND ANDREW FOVLJS

MDCCLII.

TO THE MUCH ESTEEMED

MRJOHN LOCKE-

Honoured Sir.

I Send you this imperfect draught of your
excellent Effay concerning Human Under-
funding ; which, I mufr confefs, falls as much
fliort of the Perfection, as it does of the
length of the original. Neverthelefs, as I
lately intimated to you (and you were
pleafed to think, that what I propos'd in re-
ference to this Defign, would not be wholly
loft Labour) I am not without Hopes, that
it may in this contracted Form, prove in fome
Meafure ferviceable to that noble End, which
you have fo fuccefsfully aimed at in it, viz.
The Advancement of Real and ufeful Kno-xledge.
The Inducement which moved me to think
of abridging it, was a Confideration purely
extrinfical to the Work itfelf ; and in effect
no other than this ; that it would be better
fuited to the Eafe and Convenience of fome
fort of Readers, when reduced into this nar-
row Compafs. In order to this, I thought
the Fir/} Book, which is employed in refuting
the common Opinion of Innate Notions and

Ideas jiriight be beft fpared in this Abridg-
A 2

DEDICATION.
ment ; cfpecially, fince the Reader may be
convinced by what he fhall find here, that
fuch a Suppofitionisat leaft needlefs, in re-
gard he may attain to all the Knowledge he
has, or finds himfelf capable of, without the
help of any fuch Innate Ideas. Befides this,
I have retrench'd mofl of the larger Expli-
cations ; and fome ufeful Hints, and in-
ftructive Theories, I have wholly omitted j
not becaufe they are lefs confiderable in
themfelves, but becaufe they feemed not fo
neceffary to be infifted on in this Abridgment)
confidered as a previous Inftrument, and
preparatory Help, to guide and conducl:
the Mind in its Search after Truth and Know-
ledge. I did particularly pafs by that ac-
curate Difcourfe, concerning the Freedom
and Determination of the Will, contained in
Cap. 21. L. 2. becaufe I found it too long
to beinferted here at large, and too weighty
and momentous to be but flightly and im-
perfectly reprefented. This, I hope, will
prove no prejudice to the EJ'ay it felf, fince
none, I prefume, will think it reafonable to
form a Judgment of the whole Work from
this Abridgment of it : and I perfwade my
felf, that few Readers will be content with

DEDICATION.
this Epitome, who can conveniently furnilh
themfelves with the EJfay at large. How-
ever, I am apt to think, that this alone will
fervetomake the Way to Knowledge fome-
what more plain and eafie ; and afford fuch
Helps for the Improvement of Reafon, as
are perhaps in vain fought after in thofe
Books, which profefs to teach the Art ofRea~
fining. But neverthelefs, whether you mail
think fit to let it come abroad under the
Difadvantages that attend it in this Form, I
rnuft leave you to judge. I mall only add,
that I think my own Pains abundantly re-
compenc'd by the agreeable, as well as in-
ftru&ive Entertainment, which this nearer
View, and clofer Infpe£tion into your EJfay t
afforded me : and I am not a little pleafed,
that it has given me this Opportunity of
expreffing the jult Value andEfteemlhave
for it, as well as the Honovir and Refpect
I have for its Author. I am,

Honoured S IRt

Oxon. Ap. 17, Tour very humble,

1695. and obliged Servant }

John Wynne,

( 7 )

THE

INTRODUCTION,

I. r~i I N C E it is the Under ft anding that fets man
>J above the reft of fenfible beings, and gives
him all the advantage and dominion which he
has over them; it is certainly a fubjecT:, even for
its noblenefs, worth the enquiring into.

2. My purpofe therefore is to enquire into the
Original, Certainty, and Extent of human know-
ledge; together with the grounds and degrees of
Belief, Opinion, and AJJent, which I (hall do in the
following method:

3. Firfl, I fhall enquire into the Original of
ihofc Ideas or notions, which a man obferves,
and is confeious to himlelf he has in his mind, and
the Ways whereby the underftanding comes to be
furnifhed with them.

Secondly, what Knowledge the underftanding
hath by thofc ideas ; and the certainty, evidence,
aud extent of it.

Thirdly, I mall make fume enquiry into the na-
ture and grounds of Fait I) and Opinion.

4. If by this enquiiy into the nature of the
underftanding, I can difcovcr the powers thereof,
how far they reach, and where they fail us, it may
be of ufe to prevail with the bufie mind of man

( 3 )

to be more cautious in meddling with things ex-
ceeding its comprehenfion, to ftop when it is at
theutmoft extent of its tether, and to fit down in
a quiet ignorance of thofe things, which upon ex-
amination are found to be beyond the reach of our
capacities. We fhould not then perhaps be fo for-
ward out of an affectation oiUnlverJal Knowledge,
to perplex our felves with difputes about things to
which our underlbndings are not fuited; and of
which we cannot frame in our minds any clear or
diftinct perceptions, or whereof (as it has perhaps
too often happened) we have not any notions at
all : but fhould learn to content our felves with
what is attainable by us in this ftatc.

c. For though the Comprehenfion of our under-
flanding conies exceeding fhort of the vaft extent
of things ; yet we fhall have caufe enough to mag-
nifie the bountiful Author of our being, for that
portion and degree of knowledge he has beftowed
on us fo far above all the reft of the Inhabitants of
this our manfion. Men have reafon to be well fa-
tisfied with what God hath thought fit for them,
fince he has given them (as St. Peter fays, IT«k-
ra. -Trfoz \av\i £ vJaiQeiay) whalfocver is necefTary
for the conveniences of Life, and information
of Virtue; and has put within the reach of their
difcovery, the comfortable provifion for this life,
and the way that leads to a better. How fhort
foever their knowledge may come of anuniverfaJ,

( 9 )
or'perfeft comprehenfion.of whatfocver Is, it yet
fecures their great concernments, that they have
light enough to Jead them to the knowledge of
their Maker, and the fight of their own duties.
Men may find matter fufiicient to bufie their heads,
and employ their hands with variety, delight, and
fatisfad'rion •, if they will not boldly quarrel with
their own confiitution, and throw away the blef-
fings their hands are filled with, becaufe they are
not big enough to grafp every thing. We (hall not
have much reafon to complain of thenarrownefsof
our minds, if we will but employ them about what
may be of ufe to us-, for of that they are very ca-
pable : and it will be an unpardonable, as well as
cliildifli peevifhnefs, if we undervalue the advan-
tages of our knowledge, and neglect to improve it
to the ends for which it was given us, becaufe there
are fume things that are fet out of the reach of it.
It will be no excufe to an idle and untoward fer-
vant, who would not attend his bufinels by candle-
light, to plead that he had not broad fun-lhine.
The candle that is fet up in us, fhines bright c-
nough for all our purpofes. The difcoveries we can
make with this, ought to fatisfie us. And we fhall
then ufe our underltandings right, when we enter-
tain all objects in that way and proportion, that
they are fuited to our faculties; and upon thofe
grounds they are capable of being propofed to us ;
and not peremptorily or intemperately require
B

( io )

}ration, and demand certainty, where proba-
bility only is to be had, and which is fufHcient to
govern all our concernments. If we will disbelieve
every tiling, becnufc we cannot certainly know
all things ; we (hall do much-what as wifely as he
who would not ufe his legs, but fit ftill and pcrifh
becaufe he had no wings to fly.

6. When we know our own Jlrenglh, wc fhall
the better know what to undertake with hopes of
fuccefs. And when we have well furvey'd the pow-
ers of our ownminds,we (hall not beenclin'd either

-to fit (till, and not fetour thoughts on work at all,
in defpair ofknowing any thing; nor on tlie other
fide, queftion every thing, and difclaim all know-
ledge, becaufe fome things are not to be under-
ftood. Our Bufutefs here, is not to know all things,
but thofe things which concern our conduct, if
we can find out thofe meafures whereby a ration-
al creature, put into that ftate which man is in,
in this world, may and ought to govern his opini-
ons and actions depending thereon, we need not
be troubled that fome other things fcape our know-
ledge.

7. This was that which gave the firft rife to
this effay concerning the underftanding. For I
thought tint thefird (tep towards fnisfying feveral
enquiries the mind of man was very apt to run in-
to, wns to take a furvey of our Underjlandings, ex-
amine our own powers, and fee to what things

( M )

they were adapted. Till that was done, I fufpec-
ted we began at the wrong end, and in vain fought
for fatisfaclion in a quiet and fecure poffeifion of
truths that molt concern'd us, whilft we let loofc
our thoughts in the vaft ocean of being, as if all
that boundlefs extent were the natural and un-
duubted poffeffions of our understandings; where-
in there was nothing exempt from its decifions,
or that efcaped its comprehenfion. Thus men
extending their enquiries beyond their capacities,
and letting their thoughts wander into thofc depths
where they can find no fure footing, it is no won-
der that they raile auejiions and multiply difputts,
which never coming to any clear refolution, are
proper only to continue and increafe their doubts,
and to confirm them at laft in perfect fcepticifm.
Whereas were the capacities of our underltandings
well confidered, the extent of our knowledge once
difcovered, and the horizon found, which fets
bounds between the cnlightned and dark parts of
things, between what is, and what is not compre-
henfible by us, men would perhaps with lefs fcruple
acquicfee in theavow'J ignorance of the one, and
imploy their thoughts and difcourfe, with more ad-
vantage and fatisfaclion in the other.

B 2

( *4 )

BOOK II.

C II A P. I.
Of Ideas in General, and their Original ,

BY the term idea, I mean whatever is the object
of the underitanding, when a man thinks ;
or whatever it is which the mind can be employ'd
about in thinking.

I prefumc it will beeafily granted me, that there
are fuch ideas in mens minds: every one is con-
fcious of them in himfelf; and mens words and
actions will fatisfie him that they are in others.
onxfirjl inquiry then (hall be, how they come into
the mind.

It is an eltabliih'd opinion amongft fome men,
that there are in the underftanJing certain innate
principles, fome primary notions, n/ioivxj ivveictf')
characters, as it were ftampt upon the mind of
man, which the foul receives in its veryfirft being,
and brings into the world with it.

This opinion is accurately difcufs'd, and refut-
ed in the firjt book of this effay, to which I fhall
refer the reader, thatdefires fatisfaclion in this par.
ticular.

It fhall be fufflcient here to fhew, how men bare-
ly by the ufe of their natural faculties, may attain
to all the knowledge they have, without the help

( 13 )

of any innate impreflions ; and may arrive at cer-
tainty without any fuch original notions or princi^
pies. For I imagine, any one will eafily grant,
that it would be impertinent to fuppofe the ideas
of colours innate in a creature to whom God hath
given fight, and a power to receive them by the
eyes from external objects. I fhall (hew by what
ways and degrees all other ideas come into the
mind •, for which I fhall appeal to every one's own
experience and obfervation.

Let us then fuppofe the mind to be, as we fay
white paper, void of all characters, without any
ideas : how comesit to b e furnifhed I whence has
it all the materials of rcafon and knowledge? to
this I anfwer, in one word, from experience and ob-
fervation. This, when employ'd about external
fenfible objects, we may cz\\ fenfation : by this we
have the ideas of bitter, fweet, yellow, hard, fac.
which arc commonly caii'd fenfible qualities, be-
caufe convey'd into the minJ by xhefenfes. The
fame experience, when employ'd about the internal
operations of the mind, perceiv'd, and reflected on
by us, we may call reflection. Hence we have the
ideas of perception, thinking, doubting, willing, rea-
joning, &c.

Thefe two, viz. external material things, as the
objects offenfation; and the operations of our own
minds, as the objects of reflection, are to me the
only originals from whence all our ideas take their

( 14 )
beginnings. The underftanding feems not to have
the lead glimmering of ideas, which it doth not
receive from one of thefe two four ces. Thefe,
when we have taken a full furvey of them, and
their feveral modes and compofitions, we (hall find
to contain our whole (lock, of ideas; and that we
have nothing in our minds which did not come
in one of thefe two ways.

'Tis evident that children come by degrees to
be furnifh'd with ideas from the objects they are
converfant with. They arc fo funounded with
bodies that perpetually and diverfly affect them,
that fome ideas will (whether they will or no) be
imprinted on their minds. Light and colours,
founds, and tangible qualities, do continually folli-
cite their proper fenfes , and force an entrance into
the mind. 'Tis late commonly before children
come to have ideas of the operation of their minds;
and fome men have not any very clear or perfect
ideas of the greateft part of them all their lives,
Becaufe, tho' they pafs there continually ; yet,
like floating vifions, they make not deep impref-
fions enough to leave in the mind clear and Jad-
ing ideas, till the underftanding turns inward up-
on its felf, and refecJs on its own operations, and
makes them the objects of its own contemplation.

When a man/r/? perceives, then he may be
faid to have ideas ; having ideas, and perception,
fignifying the fame thing. It is an opinion mainr

< *5 )

tain'd by fomc, that xhtfoul always thinks, and
that it always has the actual perception of ideas
as long as it exifts : and that aBual thinking is as
infeparable from the foul, as atfual extenjion is from
the body. But I cannot conceive it any more
neceflary for the foul always to think, than for the
body always to move ; the perception of ideas be-
ing (as I conceive) to the foul, what motion is to
the body, not its efience, but one of its operations :
and therefore, though thinking be never fb much
the proper action of the foul, yet it is not necelTary
to fuppofe, that it mould always think, always be
in action. That perhaps is the privilcdge of the
infinite author and preferver of all things, who ne-
ver [lumbers nor Jleeps ; but is not competent to
any finite being. We know certainly by experi-
ence, that we fometimes think ; and thence draw
this infallible confequence, that there is fbmething
in us that has a power to think, but whether that
fubftance perpetually thinks or no, we can be no
farther affuredthan experience informs us.

I would be glad to learn from thofe men, who
fo confidently pronounce, that the human foul al-
ways thinks, how they come to know it: nay,
how they come to know that they themfelves
think, when they themfelves do not perceive it.
The molt that can be faid of it, is, that 'tis poffible
the foul may always think ; but not always retain
it in memory : and, I fay, it is as poffible the foul

( I« )

may not always think ; and much more probable
that it mould fometimes not think, than that it
mould often think, and that a long while together,
and not be confeious to it felf the next moment
after that it had thought.

I fee no reafon therefore to believe, that the
foul thinks before the fenfes havefurnilh'd it with
ideas to think on ; and as thofe are increased and
rctain'd, fo it comes by exercife to improve its fa-
culty of thinking, in the feveral parts of it •, as
well as afterwards by compounding thofe ideas, and
reflecting on its own operations,it increafes its/lock,
as well as facility in rcmembring, imagining, rca-
loning, and other modes of thinking.

CHAP. II.

Of Simple Ideas.

OF ideas fbme are fimple, others complex. A
fimple idea, is one uniform appearance or
conception in the mind, which is not diilinguifh-
able into different ideas, fuch are the ideas of/en-
fible qualities, which though they are in the things
themfelves fo united and blended, that there is no
reparation, no diftance between them ; yet the
ideas they produce in the mind, enter by the fen-
fes fimple and unmix'd. Thus, tho' the hand
keh/oftnefs and warmth in the fame piece of wax;

( 17 )

yet the Jimple ideas thus united in the fame fub-
]e£t, are as perfectly diftincJ as thofe that come in
by different fenfes.

Thefc ftmple idea are fuggefted no other way
than from the two ways above-mentioned, viz.
fenfation and reflexion.

The mind being once ftored with the Jimple
ideas, has the power to repeat, compare, and unite
them to an infinite variety : and fo can make at
pleafure new complex ideas. But the moft enlarged
under/landing cannot frame one nev/fimple idea ;
nor by any force deftroy them that are there.

CHAP. III.

Of Ideas of one Senfe.

IDeas with reference to the different ways where-
in they approach the mind, are of four forts.
Firft, There are fome which come into our minds
by one fenfe only.

Secondly, There are others convey'd into the
mind by more fenfes than one.

Thirdly, Others that are had from reflexion only.
Fourthly, There are fome fuggefted to the mind
by all the ways ol~ fenfation and reflexion.

Firft, Some enter into the mind only by one
fenfe peculiarly adapted to receive them. Thus
cc lours, founds, fmells, &c. come in only by the
G

( i« )

eyes, ears, and nofe. And if thcfe organs are any
of them fo diforder'd as not to perform their functi-
ons, they have no poltern to be admitted by ; no
other way to bring themfelves in view, and be
perceiv'd by the undcrftanding. It will be necd-
lefs to enumerate all the particular fimpleideas be-
longing to ezchfenfe; nor indeed is it poffible;
there being a great many more than we have names
for.

CHAP. IV.
Of Solidity.

I Shall here mention one which we receive by
our touch, becaufe it is one of the chief ingre-
dients in many of our complex ideas; and that is
the idea of folidity : it arifes from the refiftance,
one body makes to the entrance of another body
into the place it poflefles, till it has left it. There
is no idea which we more conftantly receive from
fenfatmn than this. In whatever polture we are,
we feel fomewhat that fupports us, and hinders us
from finkingdownwards : and the bodies we daily
handle, make us perceive, that while they remain
between them, they do by an unfurmountable
force hinder the approach of the parts ofour hands
that prefs them. This idea is commonly called
impenetrability. I conceive folidity is more proper

( 19 )

to cxprefs it, becaufe this carries fomething more
otpofitive in it than impenetrability, which is nega-
tive, and is perhaps more a confequence of folidity,
than folidity it felf. This feems to be the moll
effential property of body, and that whereby we
conceive it tofillfpace : The idea of which is, that
where we imagine any fpace taken up by a folid
fobftance, we conceive it fo to poflefs it, that it
excludes all other folid fubflances. This refi-
nance is fo great, that no force can furmount it.
all the bodies in the world prefling a drop of -water
on all fides, will never be able to overcome the
refiftance it makes to their approaching one ano-
ther, till it be removed out of their way.

The idea of folidity is diftinguifned from that of
pure /pace, in as much as this latter is neither ca-
pable of refiftance, nor motion : 'tis diftinguifhed
from hardnefs, in as much as hardnefs is a firm co-
haefion of the folid parts of matter making up maf-
fesof a fenfible bulk, fo that the whole doth not
cafily change its figure. Indeed, bard and foft, as
commonly apprehended by us, are but relative
to the conftitutions of our bodies : that being cal-
led hard which will put us to pain fooner than
change its figure, by the preffure of any part of
our bodies; and that/oft, which changes the fi-
tuation of its parts upon an eafie and unpainful
touch.

This difficulty of changing fituation amongil
C:

( 20 )

the parts gives no more foliJity to the hardelt body,
than to the fbfteit ; nor is an adamant one jot
more folid than water : he that fliall fill a yield-
ing foft body well with air or water, will quickly
find its refinance. By this we may diUinguifh the
idea of the extenfion of body, from the idea of the
extenfion oi fpace : that of body, is the cohaefion
or continuity of folid, feparable, and movable
parts ; that cf/pace, the continuity of unfolid, in-
feparable, and immovable parts. Upon the foli-
dity of bodies depends their mutual impulfe, refi-
ftance, and protrufion. Of pure /pace and folidity
there arefeveral (among which I confefs my felf
one) who perfwade themfelves they have clear
and diftincl ideas : and that they can think on
/pace without any thing in it that refills, or is pro-
truded by body, as well as on fomething that fills
/pace, that can be protruded by the impulfe of o-
ther bodies, or refill their motion ; the idea of the
diftance between the oppofite parts of a concave
furface, being equally clear without, as with the
idea of any folid parts between. Ifanyoneask
what this folidity is, I fend him to his fenfes to in-
form him : let him put a flint or foot-ball between
his hands, and then endeavour to join them, and
he will know.

i 21 )

CHAP V.

Cffimplc Ideas of divers Sen/is.

SOme ideas we get into the mind by more than
onefenfe, zsjpace, extenfion, figure, reft and
motion. Thefe are perceivable by the eyes and
touch.

CHAP. VI.

Offimple Ideas of Reflection.

SOme are had from reflection, only : fuch are
the ideas we have of the Operations of our
minds : of which the two principal are perception
or thinking ; and volition or willing. The powers
of producing thefe operations are call'd faculties,
which are the under/landing and will, the feveral
modes of thinking, &c. belong to this head.

CHAP. VII.

Of fimple Ideas ofSenfation and Reflection,

THere are fome fimple ideas convey'd into
the mind by all the ways of fenfation and
reflection-, fuch are pleafure, pain, power, exiftence,

( " )

unity, fuccefion. Pleafure or delight, pain or un-
eafincfs accompany almoft every impreffion on our
fenles, and every action or thought of the mind.
"By pleafure or pain we mean whatever delights or
molefts us, whether it arifes from the thoughts of
our minds; or any thing operating on our bodies.
Satisfaction, delight, pleafure, happinefs and unea-
finefs, trouble, torment, mifery, &c. are but dif-
ferent degrees, the one of pleafure, the other of
pain.

The author of our beings having given us a
power over feveral parts of our bodies to move or
keep them at reft as we think fit > and alfo by
their motion to move our felves and other conti-
guous bodies; having alfo given a power to our
minds in feveral inftances, to chufc amongft its i-
deas which it will think on: to excite us to thefe
adlions of thinking and motion he has join'd to fe-
veral thoughts and fenfations a perception of de-
light : without this we mould have no reafon to
prefer one thought or a&ion to another, motion to
reft. In which ftate, man however furnifh'd with
the faculties of underftanding and will, would be a
very idle unaclive creature, and pafs his time only
in a lazy lethargick dream.

Pain has the fame efficacy to fet us on work
that pleafure has; fincewe are as ready to avoid
that, as to purfue this. This is worth our confi-
deration, that pain is often produced by the fame oh-

i n )

jells and ideas thai produce pleafure in us. This
their near conjunction gives us new occafion of ad-
miring the wifdom and goodnefs of our Maker,
who defigning the prefervation of our being, has
annexed pain to the application of many things
to our bodies, to warn us of the harm they will do
us, and as advices to withdraw us from them.
But he not defigning our prefervation barely, but
the prefervation ofevery part and organ in its per-
fection, hath in many cafes annex'd pain to thofe
very ideas which delight us. Thus beat that is
very agreeable to us in one degree, by a little
greater increafe of it, proves no ordinary torment :
which is wifely order'd by nature, that when any
object does by the vehemence of its operation di£
order the infixuments of fenfation, whofe ftruclures
cannot but be very delicate, we might by the pair,
be warn'd to withdraw before the organ be quite
put out of order. That this is the end of pain,
appears from this confideration ; that tho' great
light is infufFerable to the eyes ; yet the higheft
degree of darknefs does not at all difeafe them : be-
caufe that caules no diforderly motion in that cu-
rious organ the eye. But excefs of cold as well as
heat pains us -, becaufe it is equally defhutflive
to the temper which is neceflary to the preferva.-
tion of life.

Another reafon why God hath annex'd feveral
carets of pleafure and pain to all ths things that

C 24 )

environ and affect us, and blended them together
in all things that our thoughts and fcnfcs have to
do with, is, that we finding imperfection and dif-
fatisfaction.and want of compleat happinefs in all
the enjoyments of the creatures, might be led to
feek it in the enjoyment of him with whom is ful-
nefs of joy, and at whoje right hand are plecfuresfor
evermore. Tho' what is here faid concerning
fleafure and fain may not perhaps make thofe iJeas
clearer to us, than our own experience does, yet it
may ferve to give us due fentiments of the wifaom
and goodnefs of 'the fover eign difpofer of all things,
which is not unfuitable to the main end of thefe
enquiries: the knowledge and veneration of him
being the chief end of all our thoughts, and the
proper bufinefs of all understandings.

Exijlence and unity are two other ideas fuggeft-
ed by every object without, and every idea with-
in : when ideas are in our minds, we confider them
as being actually there, as well as we confider
things to be actually without us ; which is, that
they exifl, or have exiftence : and whatever we
confider as one thing, whether a real being or idea,
fuggefts the idea of unity.

Power is another idea deriv'd from thefe four-
ces : for finding in our ielves that we can think,
and move fevertl parts of our bodies at pleafure ;
andobferving the effecls that natural bodies pro-

< 35 )

duce in one another : by both thefe ways we get
the idea of power.

Succejfton is another idea fugpefted by our fcnies,
and by reflection on what pailes in our minds. For
if we look into our felves, we fliall find our ideas
always whilft we are awake, or have any thought,
pairing in train, one going and another coming
without intermillion.

CHAP. VIII.

Some farther confederations concerning fimple Ideas.

WHatfoever is able by affecting our fenfes,
to caufeany perception in the mind, doth
thereby produce in the undemanding a fimple idea ;
which whatfoever be the caufc of it, islook'd up-
on as a real pofitive idea in the underffanding.
Thus t'.ie ideas of heat and cold, light and darknefs,
motion and reft, &c. are equally pofitive in the
mind, tho' fome of their caufes may be meer pri-
vations. An enquiry into their caufes concerns
not the ideas as in the undemanding ; but the na-
ture of the tilings exilting without us. Thus a
fainter has diitinct ideas of white and black, as
well as the philofopber, who tells us what kind of
particles, and how rang'd in the furface, occalion'd
thofe colours.
That i privative caufe may produce a foj .
D

( =tf )

idea, appears from fiiadows; which (tho' nothing
but the abfincu of light) are difcernible; andcaufe
clear and pofitive ideas. The natural reafon of
which may be this, viz. that fince fcnlation is pro-
due'd only by different degrees and modes of moti-
on in our animal fpiriti-, varioufly agitated by ex-
ternal objects ; the abatement of any former mo-
tion mud as nccefTarily produce a new fenfation as
the incrcafe and variation of it; and thereby in-
troduce a new idea. We have indeed fome nega-
tive names which (land not directly for pofitive i-
deas, but for their abfencc ; fuch as iufipid, filence,
which denote pofitive ideas, viz. tajle and found,
with a fignification of their abfence.

It will be ufeful to diftinguiln ideas as they are
perception! in our minds, from what they are in the
bodies that caufe fuch perceptions in us: for wc
are not to think the former exact images and refem-
blancesof fomething inherent in the fubject, moll:
of thofe ol~ fenfation being in the mind, no more the
likenefs of fomething cxifting without us, than
the names that Hand for them are the likenefs of
our ideas, which yet upon hearing, they are apt to
excite in us.

Whatfoever the mind perceives- in itsfelfot is the
immediate objtct of perception, thought or under-
Handing, that I call an idea : and the power to
produce any idea in our mind, I call the qualityof
thefubjecl wherein that power is : thssa/ww ball

( 27 )

having the power to produce in us the ideas of
white, cold, and round, thofe friers as they are in
the fnow-ba!l, I call qualities ; and as they are
fnfations or perceptions in our underftandings I
call them ideas : which ideas if I fpeak otfomc-
times, as in the things themfelves, I would be un-
derftood to mean thofc qualities in the objects which
produce them in us. Thefe qualities are of two
forts, firlt, original or primary, fuch are folidity,
ex ten/ion, motion or reft, number and figure. Thefe
are infeparable from body, and fuch as it conftant-
ly keeps in all its changes and alterations : thus
take a grain of wheat, divide it into two parts, each
part has f(\\\ folidity, extenfion, figure, mobility : di-
vide it again, and it ftill retains the fame quali-
ties, and will do ftill, tho' you divide it on till the
parts become infenfible.

Secondly, Secondary qualities, fuch as colours,
fmells, tajles, founds, Sec. winch, whatever reality
we by miftake may attribute to them, are in truth
nothing in the objects themfelves, but powers to
produce various fenfations in us ; and depend on
the qualities before-mentioned.

The ideas of primary qualities of bodies are rc-
femblances of them : and their patterns really ex-
ift ;n bodies themfelves : but the ideas produced
in us by fecondary qualities, have no refemblance
of them at all : and what is Jweet, blue or -warm in
the idea, is but the certain bulk, figure, and motj-
D 2

on of the infenflble parts in the bodies thcmfelves,
which we call fo.

Thus we fee that fire at one diftance produces
in us the fenfation of warmth, which at a nearer
approach caufes the fenfation of pain. Now what
rcafon have we to fay that the idea of warmth is
actually in the fire, but that of pain not in the fire,
which the fame fire produces in us the fame way i
the bulk, number, figure and motion of the parts
of fire, are really in it, whether we perceive them
or no; and therefore may be call'd <eal qualities,
becaufe they really eltlft in that body. But light
and heat are no more really in it, than ficknefs or
pain: takeaway the fenfation of them; let not
the eyes fee light or colours, nor the ear hear
founds ; let the palate not tafte, or the nofc frr.elJ,
and all colours, tafles, odours and founds, as they are
fuch particular ideas vanifh and ccafe, and are
redue'd to their caufes (that is) bulk, motion, fi-
gure, &c. of parts.

Thsfcfecondary qualities are of two forts, firfl
immediately perceivable, which by immediately o-
peruting on our bodies, produce feveral different
ideas in us. Secondly, mediately perceivable, which
by operating on other bodies, change their prima-
ry qualities, fo as to render them capable of pro-
ducing ideas in us different from what they did be-
fore. Thefe lafl: are powers in bodies which proceed
from the particular conltitution of thofe primary

C 29 3

and original qualities, to make fuch a change in
the bulk, figure, texture, Bcc. of another body, as to
make it operate on our fenfes different from what
it did before; as in fire to make lead fluid : thefe
twolaft beingnothing but powers relating to other
bodies, and refulting from the different modifica-
tions of the original qualities are yet othcrwife
thought of; the former being elteemed real qua-
lities ; but the latter barely powers : the reafon of
this miftake feems to be this ; that our ideas of fen-
fible qualities containing nothing in them of bulk,
figure, <bc we cannot think them the effect of thofe
primary qualities which appear not to our fenfes
to operate in their productions, and with which
they have not any apparent congruity, or concei-
vable connexion : nor can reafon lhew how bodies
by their bulk, figure, &c. fhould produce in the
mind the ideas o{ warm, yellow, &c. but in theo-
ther cafe, when bodies operate upon one another,
we plainly fee that the quality produced hath com-
monly no refemblance with any thing in the thing
producing it, and therefore we look upon it as the
effect of power: but our fenfes not being able to
difcover any unlikenefs between the idea produ-
ced in us, and the quality of the object producing
it, we imagine that our ideas are refemblances of
fome thing in the objects, and not the effects of cer-
tain powers plac'd in the modification of the pri-

( 3° )
mary qualities, with which primary qualities the
ideas produced in us have no rcfemblance.

This little excurfion into natural philofophy
was neceflary in ourprefent enquiry to diftinguilh.
the primary and real qualities of bodies which are
always in them, from ihofe fecondary and imputed
qualities, which are but the powers of leveral com-
binations of thofe primary ones , when they operate
without being distinctly difcerned ; whereby we
learn to know what ideas are, and what are not
refemblances of fomething really exiftingin the bo-
dies we denominate from them.

G H A P. IX.

Of Perception.

PErception is the firft idea we receive from re-
flection : it is by fome called thinking in ge-
neral : tho' thinking in the propriety of the Englijh
tongue, figniries that fort of operation of the mind
about its iJeas, wherein the mind is active ; where
it confiders any thing with fome degree of voluntary
attention : for in bare perception the mind is for t! .e
mod part only pa five \ and what it perceives it can-
not avoid perceiving. What this is, we cannot o-
thetwife know, than by reflecting on what paflcsin
our minds when we fee, feel, hear, &c.

Impreflions made on the outward parts if they

( 3i )

are not taken notice of within, caufe no per '-
ceptioH : as we fee in thofe whole minds are in-
tently bufied in the contemplation of certain ob-
jects. A fufficientimpulfe there may be upon the
organs of lenfation : but if it reach not the obfer-
vation of the mind, there follows no perception ;
fo that where-ever there is lenfe or perception,
there fome idea is actually produced and prefent in
the undcrltanding.

We may obferve that the ideas we receive from
fenfation, are often in grown people alter'd by the
judgment without our taking notice of it. Thus a
globe of any uniform colour ( as of gold or jet) be-
ing fet before our eyes, the idea thereby imprinted
is of a flat circle varioufly fhadowed. But being ac-
cuftomed to perceive what kind of appearances
convex bodies are wont to make in us ; the judg-
ment alters the appearances into their caufes ; and
from that variety of fhadow or colour, frames to it-
feif the perception of a convex figure of one uni-
form colour. This in many cafes by a fettl'd habit
is pcrform'd fo readily, that we take that for the per-
ception of our fenfation, which is but an idea form'd
by the judgment : lb that one ferves only to ex-
cite the other, and is fcarce taken notice of itfelf.
Asa man who reads or hears with attention, takes
little notice of the characters or founds, but of the
ideas that arc excited in him by thtm.Thus habits

C 32 )

come at Jaft to produce actions in us, which often
efcape our obfervation.

The faculty of perception feems to be that which
puts the diftinction between the animal kingdom
and the inferior parts of nature: fince vegetables
many of them have fomc degrees of motion, and
upon the different application of other bodies to
them, do very brilkly alter their figures and moti-
ons, and thence have obtain'd the name oifenjl-
the plants : which yet is, I fuppofe, but bare me-
cbanifm, and no other ways produced, than the
fhortning of a rope by the affufion of water. But
perception, I believe, is in fome degree in all forts
of animals : tho' I think we may from the make
ofysxOyjler or Cockle, reafonably conclude that it
has not Co many nor fo quick fenfes as a man, or
feveral other animals.

Perception is alfo the firfl ftep and degree to-
wards knowledge, and the inlet of all the materials
of it : fo that the fewer fenfes any man has, and
the duller the imprefhons that are made by them
are, the more remote he is from that knowledge
which is to be found in other men.

C 33 )

CHAP. X.

Of Retention.

THE next faculty of the mind whereby it
makes a farther progrefs towards knowledge,
I call Retention : which is the keeping of thofe ide*
as it has receiv'd : which is dene two ways.

Fir/l, By keeping the idea which is brought in-
to the mind for fome time actually in view, whic!*
is called Contemplation.

Secondly, By reviving thofe ideas in our minds
which have difappear'd, and have been as it were,
laid out of fight : and this is memory, which is as
it were the ftore-houfe of our ideas ; for the nar-
row mind of man not being capable of having ma-
ny ideas under view at once, it was neceffary to
have a repofitory to lay up thofe ideas which at a-
notlier time it may have ufe of. But our ideas be-
ing nothing but actual perceptions in the minct
which ceale to be any thing, when there is no per-
ception of them, this laying up of our ideas in the
repofitory of the memory fignifies no more but this,
that the mind has a power in many cafes to revive
perceptions it has once had, with this additional
perception annex'd to them, that it has had them
before. And it is by the affiftance of this faculty,
that we are {Hid to have all thofe ideas in our under-
E

( 34 )
{landings, which we can bring in fight, and make
the objects of our thoughts, without the help of
thofc fcnfiblc qualities which firlt imprinted them
there.

Attention and repetition help much to the fixing
ideas in our memories : but thofe which make the
decpeft and molt laltingimpreflions are thofe which
are accompanied with pleafure or pain. Ideas but
once taken in and never again repeated are foon
Jolt ; as thofe of colours in fuch as loft their fight
when very young.

The memory in fome men is tenacious, even to
a miracle : but yet there fcems to be a conftant
decay of all our ideas, even of thofe which are
{truck deepeft; and in minds the molt retentive:
fo that if they be not fometimes renewed, the
print wears out, and at laft there remains nothing
to be feen. Thofe ideas that are often refrefh'd by
a frequent return of the objects or actions that pro-
duce them, fix themfelves belt in the memory,
and remain longcft there : fuch arc the original
qualities of bodies, viz. Solidity, Extenfion, Figure,
Motion, <bc. and thofe that almo/l conflantly affetl
us, as heat and cold : and thofe that are the affec-
tions of all kinds of beings, as Exiftence, Duration,
Number : thefe and the like are feldom quite loft
while the mind retains any ideas at all.

In memory the mind is oftentimes more than
barely pajfive; for it often fets itfelfon work to

( 35 )
fearch fome hidden ideas ; fometimes they flart of
their own accord : and fometimes turbulent and
tempeftuous paffions tumbJe them out of their cells.

The defects of die memory are two.

Fir/}, that it lofes the idea quite, and fo far it
produces perfect ignorance.

Secondly, That it moves flowly, and retrieves
not the ideas laid up in (lore quick enough to ferve
the mind upon occafions. This, if it be to a great
degree, is ftupidity. In the having ideas ready at
hand on all occafions, confifts what we call Inven-
tion, Fancy, and quicknefs of parts.

This faculty other animals feem to have to a
great degree, as well as Man, as appears by birds
learning of tunes, and their endeavour to hit the
notes right. For it feems impoflible that they
mould endeavour to conform their voices ( as 'tis
plain they do) to notes, whereof they have no /'-
deas.

CHAP. XI.

Of Difcerning, and other operations cf the mind.

ANother faculty of the mind is, that of difcern-
ing betiveenits ideas : on this depends the c-
vidence, and certainty of feveral even general pro.
pofitions, which pafs for innate truths : whereas
indeed they depend on this clear difcerning facul-
E 2

( >« )
ty of the mind, whereby it perceives two ideas to
be the fame or different. In being able nicely to
diftinguifh one thing from another, where there is
the lead difference, confifls in a great meafurc
that exaclnefs of judgment and clearnefs ofrea/on,
which is to beobferv'd in one man above another;
which is quite oppofite to wit, which confifts mod
in the aflTemblage of ideas, and putting thofc toge-
ther with quicknefs and variety, which have the
Jeaft refemblancc, to form agreeable vifions : where-
as judgment feparates carefully thofc ideas, where-
in can be found the leait difference to prevent er-
ror and deluflon.

To the well diftinguifhing our ideas, it chiefly
contributes that they be clear and determinate ;
and when they are fo, it will not breed any confu-
flon or miftake about them, tho' thefenfes fhould
convey them from the fame object differently on
different occafions.

The comparing at our ideas one with another in
refpeel of Extent, Degree, Time, Place, or any o-
ther circumftanccs, is another operation of the
mind about its ideas, which is the ground of Rela-
tions. Brutes feem not to have this faculty in any
great degree. They have probably feveral ideas
diftincl enough; but cannot compare them far-
ther than fome fenfible circumftances annex'd to
the objecls themfelvcs. The power of comparing
general ideas, which we may obferve in men, wc

( 37 )

may probably conjecture Beajls have not at all.

Csmpofitton is another operation of the mind,
whereby it combines feveral of its fimple ideas in-
to complex ones : under which operation we may
reckon that of Enlarging, wherein we put feveral
ideas together of the fame kind, as feveral unites
to make a dozen. In this alfo I fuppofe brutes come
far fhort of Man, for tho' they take in and retain
together feveral combinations of fimple ideas, as
poffibly a dog does the Jhape, fmell and voice of his
Mailer; yetthefe are rather fo many dirtinc"!: marks,
whereby he knows him than one complex idea
made out of thofe feveral fimple ones.

Abflrattion is another operation of the mind,
whereby the mind forms general ideas from fuch
as it recciv'd from particular objects, which it does
by conlidering them as they are in the mind fuch
appearances, feparatc from the circumllances of re-
al exiflence, as Time, Place, &c. Thefe become
general reprefentatives of all of the fame kind, and
their names applicable to whatever exilts conform-
able to fuch abflracl: ideas. Thus the colour which
I receive from Chalk, Snow and Milk, is made a re-
prefentative of all of that kind ; and has a name
given it (Whiteneji) which fignifies the fame qua-
lity, wherever to be found orimagin'd. And thus
Univerfals, both ideas and terms, are made.

This puts the great difference between Man and
Brutes : they feem to rcafbn about particular ob-

( 38 )
je&s, and ideas,b\it there appear nofootfteps of Ab-
ftrafticn in them, or of making general ideas.

CHAP. XII.

Of Complex Ideas.

IN the reception of fimple ideas the mind is only
pafive, having no power to frame any one to
its feif, nor have any idea which does not wholly
conGft of them. But about thefe fimple ideas it
exerts feveral afts of its own, whereby out of them
as the materials and foundations of the reft, the o-
ther are fram'd : the acts of the mind, wherein it
exerts its power over its fimple ideas, are chiefly
thefe three: firft, it combines feveral fimple ideas
into one compound one, and thus all complex ideas
are made. Secondly, it brings two ideas whether
fimple or complex together, and fets them by one
another, fo as to take a view of them at once with-
out uniting them into one; by which way it gets
all its ideas of relations. Thirdly, it fcparates
them from all other ideas that accompany them
in their real exiftence. And thus all its general i-
deas are made. I mall here begin with the firft of
thefe, and come to the other two in their due pla-
ces, hs fimple ideas areobferv'd to exift in feveral
combinations united together, fo the mind may con-
fider them as united, not only as they are really
united in external objects, but as it felf has join'd

( 39 )
them. Ideas thus made up of fevcral ones put to-
gether, I call complex, as Man, Army, Beauty, Gra-
titude, &c. By this faculty of repeating and joyn-
ing together its ideas, the mind has great power in
varying and multiplying the objects olits thoughts.
But it is ftill confin'd to thofe fimple ideas which
it receivM from the two fources oifenfation and re-
fieftion. It can have no other ideas of fenfible qua-
lities, than what come from without by the fenfes,
nor any other ideas of the operations of a thinking
fubftance, than what it finds in its felf : but ha-
ving once got thefe fimple ideas, it can by its own
power put them together and make new complex
ones, which it never receiv'd fo united.

Complex ideas however compounded, and de-
compounded, tho' their number be infinite, and
their variety cndlefs, may all be redue'd under
thefe three heads, firll Modes, fecondly Subftancest
thirdly Relations.

Modes, 1 call fuch complex ideas which contain
not the fuppofition of fubfifting by themfelves,
but are confider'd as dependences on, and affections
of fubftances, as Triangle, Gratitude, Murder, &c.
Thefe modes are of two forts, firft Simple, which
are combinations cf the fame fimple idea, as a Do-
zen, Score, &c. which are but the ideas of fo ma-
ny dittincl unites put together. Secondly, Mix'd,
which are compounded of Gmple ideas of fevers-
kinds, as Beauty, which con fifts in a certain com-

( 40 )
pofition of colour and figure, csufing delight
in the beholder. Theft, which is the concealed
change of the pofTcffion of any thing without the
confent of the proprietor. Thefe vifibly contain a
combination of "ideas, of fcvcral kinds.

Secondly, Subftances, the ideas of fubftances are
only fuch combinations of fimple ideas as are ta-
ken to rcprefent diftinct particular tilings fubfift-
ing by themfblves •, in which the confufed idea of*
fubfiance is always the chief. Thus a combination
of the ideas of a certain figure, with the powers of
Motion, Thought, and Reafoning joyn'd to fub-
fiance, make the ordinary idea of Man.

Thefe again are either of Jingle fubftances, a?
Man, Stone; or of ' collective, or feveral put toge-
ther, as Army, Heap: Ideas of feveral fubftances
thus put together, are as much each of them one
fingle idea, as that of a Man, or an Unite.

Thirdly, Relations which confilt in the confi.de-
ration and comparing one idea with another. Of
thefe feveral kinds we fhall treat in their order.

CHAP. XIII.

Of Simple Modes, and fir ft of the Simple Modes of
Space.

c

Oncerning Simple Modes we may obferve that
the modifications of any Simple Idea, are as

( 4i )

perfectly different and diftinct ideas in the mind,
as thofe of the greateff. dilhnce or contrariety ;
thus Two is as diltincl from Three, as Bluenefs from
Heat. Under this head I fhall firft conlider the
modes of Space.

Space is a fimple idea which we get both by our
figlu and touch. When we confider it barely in
length between two bodies, 'tis called DiJJar.ce;
when in length, breadth and thicknefs it may be
called Capacity. When conlider'd between the ex-
tremities of matter, which fills the capacity of
fpace with fomething folid, tangible and move-
able, it is called Extenfion ; and thus Extenfion will
be an Idea belonging to body : but Space may be
conceiv'd without it.

Each different dijlance is a different modificati-
on of fpace ; and each idea of any different fpace
is a Simple Mode of this idea. Such arc an Inch,
Foot, Yard, &c. which are the ideas of certain ftated
lengths which men fettle in their minds for the
ufe, and by thecuftomof meafuring. When thefe
ideas are made familiar to mens thoughts, they
can in their minds repeat them as often as they
will, without joyning to them the idea of body,
a- J frame to thcmfclves the ideas of Feet, Yards,
or Fathoms beyond the utmoff. bounds of all bo-
dies, and by adding thefe ltill one to another, en-
large their idea of fpace as much as they pleafe.
From tills power of repeating any idea ofDiftance,
F

( 4= )
without being ever able to come to an end, wo
come by the idea of immenfity.

Another modification of Space is taken from the
Relation of the parts of the termination of Exten-
fion or circumfcrib'd fpace amongft themfclves :
and this is what wc call Figure. This the Touch
difcovers in fenfible bodies, whole extremities come
within our reach : and the Eye takes both from
boJics and colours, whole boundaries are within its
view j where obferving how the extremities termi-
nate cither in ftraight lines, which meet at difcer-
nible angles ; or in crooked lines, wherein no an-
gles can be perceiv'd ; by confidering thefe as they
relate to one another in all parts of the extremities
of any body or fpace, it has that idea we call Fi-
gure: which affords to the mind infinite variety.

Another Mode belonging to this head, is that of
Place. Our idea of Place is nothing but the relative
pofition of any thing with reference to its diftance
from fome fix'd and certain points. Whence we
fay, that a thing has or has not changed Place,
when its diftance cither is or is not altered with
refpcdl: tothofe bodies with which we have occa-
iion to compare it. That this is fo, we may eafily
gather from hence; that we can have no idea of the
place of the Univer/e, tho' we can of all its parts.
To fay that the \vorld hjomewhere, means no more,
than that it does exift. The word Place is fometimes

( 43 )

taken to figivfie that Space which any body takes
up; and fo the Univerfe may be conceived in a Place.

CHAP. XIV.

Of Duration and its Simple Modes.

TH E RE is another fort ofDiJlance, the idea
of which we get from the fleeting, and per-
petually perifliing parts of fucceflion, which wc call
Duration. The Simple Modes of it are any diffe-
rent lengths of it, whereof we have diftincl ideas,
as Hours, Days, Years, &c. Time and Eternity.

The idea of Succejfion is got by reflecting on that
train of ideas which confhntly follow oneanot!:er
in our minds as long as we are awake. The dis-
tance between any parts of this Succefion is what
v.e call Duration: and the continuation of the
exigence of our fdves, or any thing elfecommen/u-
rate to the fucceflion of any ideas in our minds, is
what we call our own Duration, or that of another
thing co-exifting with our thinking. That this is
fo, appears from hence, that wc have no percep-
tion of fuccefllon or duration, when that fuccefllon
of our ideas ccafes, as in Sleep : the moment that
we deep, and awake, how diltant foever, feems to
be joyn'd and connected. And pofliblyit would be
fo to a waking man, could he fix upon one idea
F 2

( 44 )

•without variation, and the fucceffion of others. And
that they whole thoughts arc very intent
upon one thing, let flip out of their account a good
part of tint Duration, ami think that time fhortcr
than it is. But if a man during his fleep dream,
and variety of idea s make themfclvcs perceptible
in his mind, one after another he hath then, du-
ring fuch dreaming, a fenfe of duration and of the
length of it.

A man having once got this idea of duration,
can apply it to things which exifl: while lie does
not think i and thus we meafure the time of our
fleep, as well as that wherein we are awake.

Thofe who think we get the idea of fucceffion
from our obfervation of Motion, by ourfenfes, will
be of our opinion, when they confidcr that Motion
produces in the mind an idea of Succcflion, no o-
therwaysthan as it produces thereacontinu'd train
of diftinguifhable ideas. A man that looks upon a
body really moving perceives no motion, unlcfs
that motion produces aconftant train offucceffive
ideas. But wherever a man is, tho' all things be at
reft about him, if he thinks, he will be conjeicus of
Succeffon without perceiving any motion. Hence
motions very flow are not perceived by us; be-
eaufcthe change of diftance is fo flow, that it cau-
fes no new ideas in u?, but after a long interval.
The fame happens iri things that move vcryfwift,
which not arledling the fenfe with feyeral diftin,-

( 45 )

guifhable diftances of their motion, caufe not any
train of ideas in our minds, and confequently are
not perceived. Thus any thing that moves round
in a circle in lefs time than our ideas are wont to
fuccecd one another in our minds, is not pcrceiv'd
to move, but feems to be a perfect intire circle of
that matter which is in motion. Such a part of du-
ration as takes up the time of only one idea in our
minds, wherein wc perceive no fucceilion, we call
an Infiant.

Duration, as mark'd by certain periods and mea-
fures, is what we moft properly call Time : which
we meafurc by the diurnal and annual Revolutions
of the Sun, as being conftant, regular, and univer-
fally obfervable by all mankind, and fuppofed e-
qual to one another.

It is not neceflary that time mould be mea/ured
by motion: any conftant periodical appearance in
feemingly equidiftant fpaces, may as well diftin-
guifh the intervals of Time as what we make ufe
of. For fuppofing the Sun to be lighted, and then
extinguifhed every clay : and that in the fpaceof
an annual revolution, it mould fenfibly encreafe in
brightnefs, and fo decreafc again ; fuch a regular
appearance would ferve to mtafure out the diftan-
ces of Duration, to all that could obferve it, as well
without, as with motion. The freezing of water,
the blowing of a plant returning at equidiftant pe-
riods in all the parts of the earth would ferve for

C 4<* )

the fame purpofe. In effect, we find that a people
of America counted their years by the coming and
going away of Birds at certain feafons.

The mind having once got fuch a meafure of
Time, as the annual revolution of the Sun, can ea-
fily apply it to Duration wherein that meafure it
felf did not exift : and the idea of Duration equal
to an Annual Revolution of the Sun, is as eafily ap-
plicable in our thoughts to Duration where no Sun,
nor motion was, as the idea of a Foot or Yard to
diftances beyond the confines of the world.

By the fame means, and from the fame original
that we come to have the idea of Time, we have
alfo that idea which we call Eternity: For having
got the ideas of certain lengths of Duration, we can
in our thoughts add them to one another as oft as
we pleafe, without ever coming to an end.

And thus it is plain, that from the two foun-
tains of all knowledge before-mentioned, viz. Sen-
fation and Refletlion, we get the ideas of Duration,
and the feveral meafures of it. For,

\Jl. By obferving what paffes in our minds, how
our ideas there in train conitantly, fome vanifh, and
others begin to appear, we come by the idea of Suc-
cejfion.

idly. By obferving a difiance in the parts of this
Succeflion we get the idea of Duration.

ydly. By obferving certain appearances at regu-
lar and feemingly equidiibnt periods, we get the

( 47 )
Ideas of certain lengths or meafurcs of Duration,
as Minutes, Hours, Days, &c.

^thly. By being able to repeat thofe meafures of
Time, as often as we will, we can come to imagine
Duration, where nothing does really endure orexijl ;
Thus we imagine tomorrow, next year, or leven
years hence.

Sthly. By being able to repeat any fuch idea of a-
ny length of time, as of a Minute, Year, &c. as of-
ten as we will, and add them one to another with-
out ever coming to an end, we come by the idea of
Eternity.

6thly. By confidering any part of infinite Du-
ration, as fet out by periodical meafures, we come
by the idea of what we call Time in general.

CHAP. XV.

Of Duration and Expanfwn confidered together.

TIME is to Duration as Place is to Space or
Expanfion. They are fo much of thofe bound-
lefs oceans of Eternity and Immenfity as is fet out
and diltinguifhed from the reft: and fo are made
ufe of to denote the pofition of finite real beings in
refpect one to another, in thofe infinite oceans of
Duration and Space. Each of thefe have a twofold
acceptation.
Firft, Time in general is taken for ib much of

( 48 )
infinite Duration as is coexiltcnt with theUnivcrfe,
and meafurcd out by the motions of its great bo-
dies. Thus it is ufeJ in the phrafes before all time,
•when time Jh all be no more.

Place is like wife taken for that portion of infi-
nite fpace poirelTe J by the material world, tho' this
might be more properly called Extenfion. Within
thefe two are confined the particular Time or Du-
ration, Extenfion or place of all corporeal beings.

Secondly, Time is fometimes applied to parts
of that infinite Duration that were not really mca-
furM out by real Exiftence, but fuch as we upon
occafion do fuppofc equal to certain lengths of
mealur'd Time, as in the Julian Period, which
makes an excurfion of feven hundred lixty four
years beyond the Creation. Thus we may fpeak
of Place or Diftance in the great Inane, wherein I
can conceive a fpace equal to, or capable of recei-
ving a body of any afiigned dimenfions.

CHAP. XVI.

Of Numbers.

TH E complex ideas of 'Number are form'd by
adding feveral Unites together. The Simple
Modes of it are each feveral combinations, as, Two,
Three, &c. Thefe arc of all others molt diftinct,
the near ell being as clearly different from each o-

( 49 )

ther as the moft remote : Two being as diftincl:
from One, as two hundred. But it is hard to form
diftincft ideas of every the leaft excefs in Extenfi-
on. Hence demonltrations in numbers are more
general in their ufe, and more determinate in their
application than thofeof Extcnfion.

Simple Modes of Numbers, being in our minds
but fo many combinations of Unites which have
no variety, but more or lefs : Names for each dip-
tine! combination, feem more necefTary than in a-
ny other fbrt of ideas. For without a name or mark,
to diftinguim that precife collection, it will hardly
be kept from being a heap of confufion. Hence
fome Americans have no diitindt idea of any num-
ber beyond twenty : {o that when they are dif>
courfed with of greater numbers, they fhew the
hairs of their head. So that to reckon right two
things are required.

Fir ft, That the mind diftinguifh carefully two
ideas which are different one from another, only by
the addition or fubftraction of one Unite.

Secondly, that it retain in memory the names or
marks of the feveral combinations from a Unite to
that number; and that in exact order, as they fol-
low one another. In either of which if it fails, the
whole bufinefs of Numbring will be difturbed ; and
there will remain only the confufed idea of Multi-
tude : but the ideas neceffary to diftinct Numera.
tion will not be attained to.
G

C jo )

CHAP. XVII.

Of Infinity.

THE idea fignified by the name Infinity, it
belt examin'd, by confidering to what Infi-
nity is by the Mind attributed, and then how it
frames it. Finite and Infinite then are Jook'd upon
as the modes of Quantity, and attributed primari-
ly to things that have parts, and are capable of in-
creafe or diminution, by the Addition or Subfirac-
tion of any the leaft part. Such are the ideas of
Space, Duration, and Number.

When we apply this idea to the Supreme Being,
we do it primarily in refpect of his Duration and U-
biquity ; more figuratively when to his IVifdom,
Power, Goodnefs, and other attributes which are pro-
perly inexhauflible and incomprehenfible : for when
■we call them Infinite, we have no other idea of
this Infinity, but what carries with it fome reflec-
tion on the Number, or the Extent of the atts or
objects of God's Power and Wifdom, which can ne-
ver be fuppofed fo great or fo many, that thefe
attributes will not always furmount and exceed,
tho' we multiply them in our thoughts, with the
Infinity ofend/e/s Number. I do not pretend to fay,
how thefe attributes are in Cod, who is infinitely be-
yond the reach of our narrow capacities : but this

C S\ )

is our way of conceiving them, and thefe our ideas
of their Infinity.

• The next tiling to be confidercd, is horo ive come
by the idea of Infinity. Every one that has any
idea of any ftated lengths of Space, as a Foot, Yard,
&c. finds that he can repeat that idea, and join it
to another, to a Third, and fo on without ever com-
ing to an end of his Additions: from this power
of enlarging his idea of Space, he takes the idea of
Infinite Space or lmmenfity. By the fame power of
repeating the idea of any length of Duration we
have in our minds, with all the endlefs addition of
Number, we come by the idea of Eternity.

If our idea of Infinity be got by repeating with-
out end our own ideas; why do we not attribute
it to other ideas, as well as thofe of Space and Du-
ration ; fince they may be as eafily and as often re-
peated in our minds as the other : yet no body e-
ver thinks of infinite Sweetnefs or JVhiteneJs, tho'
he can repeat the idea of Sweet or White as fre-
quently as thofe of Yard or Day. I an/wer, that
thofe ideas that have parts, and are capable of in-
creafe, by the addition of any parts, afford us by
their repetition an idea of Infinity ; becaufc with
the endlefs repetition there is continued an enlarge-
ment, of which there is no end : but it is not fo in
other ideas: for if to the perfecftcft idea I have of
White, I add another of equal whitenefs; it enlar-
ges not my idea at all. Thofe ideas that confifl not
G 2

C 52 )

of part?, cannot he augmented to what proportion
men pleafe, or be (ketch \i beyond what they have
recciv'd by their fenfes, but Space, Duration, and
Number being capable of increafe by repetition,
leave in the mind an idea of an entilefs room for
more; and fo thofe ideas alone lead the mind to-
wards the thought of Infinity.

We are carefully to diitinguifh between the idea
of the Infinity of Space, and the idea of a Space In-
finite. The firft is nothing but a fuppofed endlels
progrclTion of the mind over any repeated idea of
Space. But to have actually in the mind the idea
of a Space Infinite, is to fuppofe the mind already
paffed over all thofe repeated ideas of Space, which
an endlefs repetition can never totally reprefent to
it ; which carries in it a plain contradiction.

This will be plainer, if wc confidcr Infinity in
Numbers. The Infinity of numbers, to the end
of whofe addition every one perceives there is no
approach, eafily appears to any one that rcflecTs on
it: but how clear foever this idea of the Infinity
of Number be, there is nothing yet more evident,
than the abfurdity of the aftual idea of Infinite
Number.

( 0 )

CHAP. XVIII.
Of other Simple Modes.

TH E mind has feveral diftinft ideas of Slid-
ing, Rowling, Walking, Creeping, &c. which
are all but the different modifications of motion.
Swift and Slow are two different ideas of Motion,
the meafures whereof are made out of the difhn-
ces of Time and Space put together.

The like variety we have in Sounds : every ar-
ticulate word is a iifferent modification of found:
as are alfo notes of different length put together,
which make that complex idea call'd Tune.

The modes of Colours might be alfo very vari-
ous : fbme of which we take notice of, as the diffe-
rent degrees, or as they are term'd fhades of the
fame colour. But fince we feldom make afTembla-
ges of Colours, without taking in Figure alfo, as
in Painting, &c. Thofe which are taken notice of
do molt commonly belong to mix'd modes, as
Beauty, Rainbow, &c.

All compounded Tajles and Smells are alfo modes
made up of the fimple ideas of thofe fenfes: but
they being fuch as generally we have no names
for, cannot be fet down in writing, but muft be
left to the thoughts and experience of the reader.

C 54 )

CHAP. XIX.

Of the Modes of Thinking.

WHEN the mind turns its view inwards
upon its felf, Thinking is the firft idea that
occurs : wherein it obferves a great variety of mo-
difications ; and thereof frames to its felfdiftinct
ideas. Thus the perception annex'd to any impref-
fion on the body made by an external object, is
call'd Senfation. When an idea recurs without the
prefence of the object, it is call'd Remembrance.
When fought after by the mind, and brought again
in view, it is Recolleclion. When held there long
under attentive confideration, it is Contemplation.
When ideas float in the mind without regard or
reflection, 'tis call'd in French Rejvery, our lan-
guage has fcarce a name for it. When the ideas are
taken notice of, and as it were regiftred in the me-
mory, it is Attention. When the mind fixes its view
on any one idea, and confiders it on all (Ides, it is
Intention and Study. Sleep without dreaming is reft
from all thefe. And Dreaming is the perception of
ideas in the mind, not fuggefted by any external
objects, or known occafions ; nor under any choice
or conduct of the Understanding. Of thefe various
modes of Thinking, the mind forms as dirtinct i-
deas, as it does of White and Red, a Square or t
Circle.

< fS )

CHAP. XX.

Of the Modes ofPleafure and Pain.

PLeafure and Pain are fimple ideas which we
receive both from Senfation and Reflection.
There are thoughts of the Mind, as well as fenfa*
tions, accompany'd with Pleafure or Pain. Their
caufes are term'd Good or Evil. For things are e-
fteem'd Good or Evil only in reference to Pleafure
or Pain. That we call Good which is apt to caule
or increafe Pleafure, or diminifh Pain in us : to pro-
cure or preferve the pofTeffion of any Good, or ab«
fence of any Evil : and on the contrary, that we
call Evil, which is apt to produce or increafe any
Pain, or diminifh any Pleafure in us; or e\Ce to
procure us any Evil, or deprive us of any Good :
by Pleafure and Pain I would be underftood to
mean of Body or Mind, as they are commonly di«
ftinguifh'd ; tho' in truth they are only different
conltitutions of the mind, fometimes occafion'd by
diforder in the body, fometimes by thoughts of the
mind. Pleafure and Pain, and their caufes Good
and Evil, are the hinges upon which our paffions
turn : by reflecting on the various modifications
or tempers of mind, and the internal fenfations
which Pleafure and Pain, Good and Evil produce
in us, we may thence form to ourfelves the ideas

of our Paflions. Thus by reflecting upon the thought
we have of the delight, which any thing is apt to
produce in us, we have an idea we call Love : and
on the contrary, the thought of the pain, which
any thing prefent or abfent produces in us, is what
we call Hatred. Defire is that uneafinefs which a
man finds in himfelf upon the abfence of any thing,
the prefent enjoyment of which carries the idea of
Delight with it. Joy is a Delight of the mind arif-
ing from the prefent or afTur'd approaching pofTef-
fion of a Good. Sorrow is an uneafinefsof the mind,
upon the thought of a Good loft, or the fenfe of a
prefer,: Evil. Hopeh a Pleafure in the mind u-
pon the thought of a probable future enjoyment of
a thing which is apt to delight. Fear is an uneafmefs
of the mind upon the thought of a future Evil
likely to befal us. Anger is adifcompofure of mind
upon the receipt of injury, with a prefent purpofe
of Revenge. Defpair is the thought of the unat-
tainablenefs of any Good. Envy is an uncalinefs of
mind, caufed by the confederation of a Good we
dtfire, obtained by one we think fhould not have
had it before us.

It is to be confidered that in reference to the Paf-
fions, the reivoval or lefTening of a Pain, is confi-
der'd, and operates as a Pleafure ; and the lofsor di-
minifliingof a Pleafure, as a Pain. And farther, that
the Paflions in moft perfons operate on the body, and
caufe various changes in it : but thefe being not al-

C 57 )
ways fenfible, do not make a necefTary part of the
idea of each Paflion. Befides thefe modes of Plea-
fure and Pain which refult from the various confi-
derations of Good and Evil, there are many others,
I might have inftanccd in, as the Pain of Hunger
and Tbirfl, and the Pleafure of Eating and Drink-
ing; and of Mufick, Sec. but I rather chofe to in-
ftance in the Paflions, as being of much more con-
cernment to us.

CHAP. XXI.

Of Power.

rT"' H E mind being every day informed by the
fenfes, of the alteration of thofe fimple ideas
it obferves in things without : reflecting alfo on
what paffes within itfelf, and obferving a conftant
change of its ideas, fometimes by the impreffions
of outward objects upon the fenfes ; and fometimes
by the determination of its own choice : and con-
cluding from what it has fo conftantly obferv'd to
have been, that the like changes will for the fu-
ture be made in the fame things, by the fame a-
gents, and by the like ways, confiders in one thing,
the poffibility of having any of its fimple ideas
chang'd ; and in another, the poffibility of mak-
ing that change, and fo comes by that idea which
we call Power. Thus we fay Fire has a Power to
H

( *8 )

melt Gold, and make it fluid ; andCoA/has a Power
to be melted.

Power thus confiderM, is twofold, viz. as able
to make, or able to receive any change : the one
may be call'd Afiive, the other Pajfwe Power. Of
Paffive Poivsr all fenfible things abundantly fur-
niftl us with ideas, whofe fenfible qualities and
beings we find to be in a continual flux, and there-
fore with rcafon we look on them as liable (till to
the fume change. Nor have we of Active Power
fewer inftances : fincc whatever change is obferv-
ed, the mind mult collect a power fomewhere able
to make that change. But yet if we will confider it
attentively, bodies by our fenfes do not afford us
fo clear and diftinct an idea of Aclive Power, as we
have from reflection on the operations of our minds.
For all power relating to Action, and there being
but two fort3 of Aclhn, viz. Thinking and Mo>
tion, let us confider whence we have the cleareft i-
deas ofthe powers which produce thefe actions.

Of Thinking, Body affords us no idea at all : it
is only from Reflection that we have that ; neither
have we from Body any idea of the beginning of
Motion. A Body at reft affords us no idea of any
Aftive Power to move ; and when it is fet in Mo-
tion itfeJf, that Motion is rather a Paffion than an
Action in it. The idea of the beginning of Mo-
tion we have only by reflection on what paflcs in
our felvcs; where we find by experience that bare-

( 59 )

ly by willing it, we can move the parts of our bo-
dies which were before at reft.

We find in our felves a Power to begin or for-
bear, continue or end fcveral actions of our minds,
and motions of our bodies, barely by a thought or
preference of the mind. This power which the
mind has thus to order the confidcration of any
idea, or the forbearing to consider it ; or to prefer
the Motion of any part of the Body to its Reft,
imd vice verfa in any particular inftance, is that
we call the Will. The actual exercife of that
■power, is that which we call Volition at Willing :

The forbearance or performance of that Action,
confequent to fuch order or command of the mind,
is called Voluntary : and whatfoever Action is per-
formed without fuch a thought of the mind, is cal-
led Involuntary*

The Power of Perception is that we call t'he Un-
derftandivg. Perception, which we make the Act
of the Underftanding, is of three forts. Firji, The
Perception of ideas in our minds. Secondly, The
Perception of the Signification of Signs. Thirdly,
The Perception of the Agreement or Difagree-
rnent of any diftinct ideas. Thcfe powers of the
mind, viz. of perceiving and preferring are ufuafly
called by another name; and the ordinary way of
fpeaking is that the Underftanding and Will are
t\:o faculties of the mind. A word proper enough,
;f *t be ufed fo as not to breed any confufion ia
H 2

( to )
mens thoughts, by being fuppofed, (as I fufpeot
it has been) to ftand for fome real Beings in the
Soul th.it performs thofe aftions of Understanding
and Volition.

From the confideration of the Extent of the
power of the mind, over the actions of the man,
which every one finds in himfclf, arife the ideas of
Liberty and Necejjity • fo far as a man has a power
to think or not to think ; to move or not to move
according to the preference or direction of his own
mind, fo far is a mm free. Where-ever any per-
formance or forbearance are not equally in a man's
power ; where-ever doing or not doing will not
equally follow upon the preference of his mind,
th*e he is not free, tho' perhaps the action may
be voluntary. So that the idea of Liberty is the idea
of a power in any agent, to do or forbear any
action according to the determination or thought
of the mind, whereby either of them is preferred
to the other; where either of them is not in the
power of the agent to be produe'd by him, accord-
ing to his volition, there he is not at liberty : that
agent is under Necejfity. So that Liberty cannot
be where there is no Thought, no Volition, no Will ;
but there may be Thought, there may be Will,
there may be Volition where there is no Liberty.
Thus a Tennis-ball, whether in motion by the flroke
of a racket, or lying (till at reft, is not by any one
taken to be a fice Agent ; becaufe we conceive not'

( 61 )

a Tennis-ball to think, and confequently not to have
any Volition or Preference of Motion to Reft, or
vice verfa. So a man finking hrmfelf or his friend
by aconvulfive motion of his arm, which it is not
in his power by Volition or the direction of his
mind, to flop or forbear; no body thinks he has
in this Liberty, every one pities him as acting by
NeceJJity and Conftraint. Again, fuppofe a man
be carried whilfl fait afleep into a room where is a
perfon he longs to fee, and be there lock'd faft in
beyond his power to get out; he awakes, and is
glad to fee himfelf in fo defirable company, which
he flays willingly in ; that is, prefers his ftaying to
going away. Is not this flay voluntary? I think
no body will doubt it, and yet being lock'd faft
in, he is not at liberty to flay, lie has not free-
dom to be gone. So that Liberty is not an idea
belonging to Volition or Preferring ; but to the
perfon having the power of doing or forbearing to
do, according as the mind fhall chufe or direct.

As it is in the motions of the body, fo it is in
the thoughts of our minds : where any one is fuch
that we have power to take it up, or lay it by ac-
cording to the Preference of the mind, there we are
at liberty. A waking man is not at liberty to think
or not to think, no more than he is at liberty
whether his body fhall touch any other or no :
but whether he will remove his contemplation
from one idea to another, is many times in his

( 62 )

choice. And then he is in refpect of his ideas,
as much at liberty as he is in refpect of bodies he
rcfts on. He can at pleafure remove himfelf from
one to another : but yet fomc ideas to the mind,
like fome motions to the body are fuch, as in cer-
tain circumftances it cannot avoid nor obtain their
abfence by the utmoft effort it can ufe. Thus a man
on the rack is not at liberty to lay by the idea of
Pain, and entertain other contemplations.

Where-ever Thought is wholly wanting, or the
power to act or forbear, according to the direction
of Thought, there Neccflky takes place. This in
an agent capable of Volition, when the beginning
or continuation of any action is contrary to the
preference of his mind, iscall'd Compulfion ; when
the hindring or flopping any action is contrary to
his Volition, it is called Rejlraint. Agents that
have no Thought, no Volition at all, are in e-
very thing neceffary agents.

And thus I have in a fhort draught given a
view of our original ideas, from whence all the
reft are deriv'd, and of which they are made up.
And which may be all redue'd to thefe few pri-
mary and original ones, viz. Extenfion, Solidity, and
Mobility which by our fenfes we receive from bo-
dy : Thinking and the power of moving, which by
reflection we receive from our minds. Exi/lence,
Duration, Number, which belong both to the one
and to the other. By thefe I imagine might be

( <*3 )

explain'd the nature of Colours, Sounds, Taflet,
Smells, and all other ideas we have •, if we had but
faculties acute enough to perceive the feveral mo-
dify'd extenfions and motions of thefe minute bo-
dies which produce thofe feveral fenfations in us.

CHAP. XXII.

Of Mixed Modes.

Mixed Modes are combinations of fimple ideas
of different kinds, (whereby they are di-
flinguifh'd from fimple modes, which confift only
of fimple ideas of the fame kind, put together by
the mind) as Virtue, Vice, a Lie, &c. The mind be-
ing once fumifh'd with fimple ideas, can put them
together in feveral compofitions, without examin-
ing whether they exift fo together in nature. And
hence I think it is, that thefe ideas are called Ac-
tions, as if they had their original and conftant exi-
gence more in the thoughts of men than in the
reality of things : and to form fuch ideas it fuffi-
ced that the mind put the parts of them together,
and that they were confident in the underftanding,
without confidering whether they had any real be-
ing. There are three ways whereby we get thefe
complex ideas of mixed Modes.

Firjf, By experience and obfervation of thing?

( *4 )

themfelves : thus by feeing two men wrcftlc, we
get the idea of wreftling.

Secondly, By invention or voluntary putting to-
gether of feveral fnnple ideas in our own minds;
fo he that firfl invented Printing, had an idea of
it firfl in his min~, before it ever cxifted.

Thirdly, By explaining the names of aclions we
never faw, or notions we cannot fee; and by enu-
merating all thofc ideas which go to the making
them up. Thus the mixed Mode which the word
Lie ftands for, is made up of thefe fimplc ideas :
Firft, Articulate founds. Secondly, Certain ideas in
the mind of the fpeaker. Thirdly, Thofe words., the
ftgns of thefe ideas. Fourthly, Thofe figns put toge-
ther by Affirmation or Negation, otherwife than
the ideas they ftand for, are in the mind of the
fpeaker. Since languages are made, complex ideas
are ufually got by the explication of thofe terms
that ftand for them : for fince they confift of Am-
ple ideas combined, they may by words ftanding
for thofe fimple ideas be reprefented to the mind
of one who underftands thofc words, though that
combination of fimple ideat was never offer'd to
his mind by the real exiltence of things.

Mixed Modes have their unity from an act of the
mind, combining thofe feveral fimple ideas to-
gether, and confidering them as one complex one :
The mark of this union is one name given to that
combination. Men fcldom reckon any number

( ^ )
of ideas to make one complex one : but fuch col-
lections as there be names for. Thus the kit
an old man, is as fit to be united into one complex i-
dea, as that of a father : yet there being no name
for it, it is not taken for a particular complex /'-
dea; nor a dilrinct fpecics ofaclion, from that of
killing any other man.

Thofe collaftions of ideas have names generally
flmx'd, which are offrequent ufe in converfatio:-. :
in which cafes men endeavour to communicate
thoughts to one another with all pofTible dif-
patch. Thofe cti.crs which they have ieldom oc-
cafion to mention, they tie not together, nor give
them names.

Tftis gives the reafon, why there arc words in

every language, which cannot be rendred by any

one (ingle word of another. For the fafhions and

cultoms of one nation, make feveral combinations

of ideas familiar in one, which another had never

any occafion to make. Such were, 'Oroa.Kivu.oz

among the Greeks, Profcriptio among the Romans.

This alfo occafions the conjlant change of langua*

ges; becaufe the change of cullom and opinions,

brings with it new combinations of ideas, which,

to avoid long defcriptions, have new names an-

nex'd to them, and fo they become new /pedes of

i modes.

Of all our fimple ideas, thofe that have had moft

made out of them, are Thinking, and

I

( 66 )

Motion ; (which comprehend in them all Action)
snd Power, from whence thefe actions arc conceiv'd
to flow. For actions being the great bufinefs of
mankind, it is no wonder if the feveral modes of
Thinking and Motion fhould be taken notice of,
the ideas of them obferv'd and laid up in memory,
and have names affign'd them. For without fuch
complex ideas with names to them, men cou'd not
eafily hold any communication about them. Of
this kinJ, are the modes of actions diftinguifh'd by
their Caufes, Means, Objects, Ends, lnflruments,
Time, Place, and other circumftances ; as alfo of
the powers fitted for thofc actions : thus Boldnefs
is the power to do or fpeak what we intend with-
out fear or diforder : which power of doing any
thing, when it has been acquir'd by the frequent
doing the fame thing, is that idea we call Habit :
when forward and ready upon every occafion to
break into action, we call it Difpofition. Thus Te-
Jlinefs, is a difpofition or aptnefs to be angry.

Power being the fource of all action, the fubflances
wherein thefe powers are, when they exert thi3
power, are call'd Caufes : and the fubflances there-
upon produe'd, or the fimple ideas introdue'd into
any fubjedt, effects. The efficacy whereby the new
fubftance or idea is produe'd, is call'd in the fub-
ject exerting that power, Action ; in the fubject
wherein any fimple idea is chang'd, or produe'd,
PaJJion : which efficacy in intellettual agents, w«

( <*7 )

can, I think, conceive to be nothing elfe but modes
of T hinking and Willing : in corporeal agents, no-
thing elfe but modifications of motion. What-
ever fort of action, befides thefe produces any ef-
fect ; I confefs my felf to have no notion, or idea
of. And therefore many words which fecm to ex-
prefs fome action, fignifie nothing of the action,
but barely the effect, with fome circumltances of
the fubjedt wrought on, or caufe operating. Thus
Creation, Annihilation, contain in them no idea of
the action or manner, whereby they areprodue'd,
but barely of the caufe, and the thing done. And
when a country- man fays the cold freezes water,
tho' the word Freezing, fcem to import fome acti-
on, yet it truly fignifies nothing but the effect, viz.
That water that was before fluid, is become hard,
and confident, without containing any idea of the
action whereby it is done.

CHAP. XXIII.

Of our Complex Ideas of Subjlances.

THE mind obferving feveral fimple ideas to
go conltantly together, which being pre-
fum'd to belong to one thing, are calPd fo united
in one fubject by one name, which we are apt af-
terward to talk of and confider as one fimple idea,
jvhich indeed is a complication of many idecs to-
I 2

C 68 )
gethci. Wc imagine not theb&mple idea to fub-
fift by thcmfclvcs, but fuppofc fume Subjlratum,
wherein they fubfift, which wc call Subflance. The
idea of pure lubftancc is nothing but the fup-
pos'd, but unknown fupport of thofe qualities,
which arc capable of producing limple ideas in us.

The ideas of particular Subflance s are compos'd
out of this obfeure and general idea of Subitancc,
together with fuch combinations of fimpJe ideas,
as are obferv'd to cxift together, and fuppos'd to
flow from the internal conftitution, and unknown
eflence of that fubltance. Thus we come by the
ideas ot Man, HorJe,Gold, Sic. Thus the fenfible
qualities of Iron, or a Diamond make the complex
ideas of thofe fubftances, which a Smith or a Jewel-
ler commonly knows better than a philofophcr.

The fame happens concerning the operations
of the mind, viz. Thinking, Reajbning, S:c. which
we concluding not to fubfifl: by thcmfclvcs, nor
apprehending how they can belong to body, or be
produe'd by it •, we think them the actions of fomc
other fubftancc, which we call Spirit : of whole
fubltance or nature we have as clear a notion as
of that of body; the one being but the fuppos'd
Subjlratum oi the limple ideas we. have from with-
out ; as the other of thofe operations which we ex-
periment in our fclvcs within : fo that the idea of
corporeal Sub/lance in matter, is as remote from our
conceptions as that of/piriiual Subftance.

( 6p )

Hence we may conclude that he has the perfect-
eft idea of any particular fubftance, who has col-
lected molt of thofe fimple ideas which doexift in
it : among which we are to reckon its acTwe pow-
ers, and pajjive capacities, tho' not Llri&ly fimple /-
deas.

Secondary qualities for the molt part ferve to di-
ftinguifh fubltances. For our fenfes fail us in the
difcovery of the Bulk, Figure, Texture, Sec. of the
minute parts of bodies on which their real confti-
tutions and differences depend: and fecondary
qualities are nothing but powers with relation to
our fenfes. The ideas that make our complex ones
of corporeal fubltances, are of three forts. Fir ;/?,The
ideas of primary qualities of things, which are difco-
vcr'd by our fenfes : fuch are Bulk, Figure, Motion,
<kc. 6VoW/y,The fenfible fecondary qualities, which
arc nothing but powers to produce feveral ideas in
us by our fenfes. Thirdly, The aptnefs we confi-
der in any fubftance to caufe, or receive fuch al-
terations of primary qualities, as that the fubftance
fo alter'd, fliould produce in us different ideas,
from what it did before : and they are call'd Ac-
tive and Paffive Pcwers. All which, as far as we
have any notice, or notion of them, terminate in
fimple ideas.

Had we fenfes acute enough to difcern the mi-
nute particles of bodies, it is not to be doubted,
but they would produce quite different ideas in us j

C 70 )

as we find in viewing things with micro/copes.
Such bodies as to our naked eyes are colour'd and
opaque, will through micro/copes appear pellucid.
Blood to the naked eye appears all red ; but by a
good micro/cope we fee only fbme red globules
fwimming in a tranfparent liquor.
The infinite -wife Author of our beings has fitted
our organs, and faculties to the conveniences of life
and the bufinefs we have to do here : we may by
our fenfes know and diftinguifh things fo far as to
accommodate them to the exigencies of this life.
We have alfoinGght enough into their admirable
contrivances, and wonderful effects to admire, and
magnifie the wifdom, power and goodnefs of their
Author. Such a knowledge as this which is fuited
to our prefent condition, we want not faculties to
attain ; and we are fitted well enough with abili-
ties to provide for the conveniences of living.

Befides the complex ideas we have of material
Subftances ; by the fimple ideas taken from the o-
perations of our own minds, which we experiment
in ourfelves, as Thinking, Under/landing, Willingy
Knowing, &c. co-exifting in the fame fubftance, we
are able to frame the complex idea of a Spirit. And
this idea of an immaterial fubflance, is as clear as
that we have of a material. By joining thefe with
Subftance, of which we have no diftinct idea, we
have the idea of a Spirit : and by putting toge-
ther the ideas of coherent, folid parts, and power

( 7i )

of being mov'd, join'd with Subftance, of which
likewife we have no pofitive idea, we have the l-
dea of Matter. The one is as clear and diftinft as
the other. The fubftance of Spirit is unknown to
us -, and fo is the fubftance of Body equally un-
known to us : two primary qualities or properties
of Body, viz. Solid coherent parts, and impul/e, we
have diftincl: clear ideas of: fo likewife have we,
of two primary qualities or properties of Spirit,
Thinking and a. power of Aclion. We have alfo clear
and diftincl ideas of feveral qualities inherent in
bodies, which are but the various modifications of
the extenfion of cohering folid parts, and their mo-
tion. We have likewife the ideas of the feveral
modes of Thinking, viz. Believing, Doubting, Ho-
ping, Fearing, 6"c. as alfo of Willing and Moving
the Body confequent to it.

If this notion of Spirit may have fome difficulties
in it, not eafie to be explain'd, we have no more
reafon to deny or doubt of the exigence of Spirits,
than we have, to deny or doubt of the exiftence of
Body: becaufe the notion of Body is cumbred
with fbme difficulties very hard, and perhaps im-
poftible to be explain'd. The divifibility in infini-
tum, forinftance, of any finite extenfion involves
us whether we grant or deny it in confequences im-

polTiblc to be explicated, or made confiftent. We
have therefore as much reafon to be fatisfied with
our notion of Spirit, as with our notion of £;.'■ •.

( 72 )

and the exiftcnce of the one, as well as the other.
"\Vc have no other idea of the Supream Being,
but a complex one of Exigence, Power, Knowledge,
Duration, Pleafure, HappineJ's, and of feveral o-
ther qualities, and powers which it is better to
have than be without, with the addition of infinite
to each of theft; .

In which complex idea we may obferve that
there is no fimple one, bating Infinity, which is
not alfo a part of our complex idea of other fpi-
rits ; becaufe in our ideas, as well of lpirits as o-
ther things, we are reftrain'd to thole we receive
from Senfaticn and RtjieSlion.

CHAP. XXIV.

Of Colle Stive Ideas ofSubfiances.

THere are other ideas of Subftances which may-
be call'd ColleSihe, which arc made up of
many particular fubftances confiJer'd as united
into one idea, as a Troop, Army, Sec. which the
mind makes by its power of compofition. Thefc
eolleStive ideas are but the artificial draughts of the
mind bringing things remote, and independent
into one view, the better to contemplate and dif-
courfe of them united into one conception, and
fignify'd by one name. For there are no things fo

( 73 )

remote, which t!:e mind cannot by this art of com-
pofition, bring into one idea, as is viiible in that
fignified by the name Univerfe.

CHAP. XXV.

Of Relation.

THere is another fet of ideas which the mind
gets from the comparing of one thing with
another* "When the mind fo considers one thing,
that it does as it were bring it to, and fet it by ano-
ther, and carry its view from one to the other,
this is Relation or Refpecl : and the denominati-
ons given to things intimating that Refpecl, are
what we call Relatives, and the things fo brought
together Related. Thus when I call Cajus, Husband,
or Whiter, I intimate fome other perfon, or thing
in both cafes, with which I compare him. Any of
our ideas may be the foundation of Relation.

Where languages have fail'd to givecor-relative
names, there the Relation is not fo eafiJy taken no-
tice of: as in Concubine, whicli is a Relative name,
as well as Wife.

The ideas of Relation may be the fame,
in thofe men who have far different ideas of the
things that are Related. Thus thofe who have dif-
ferent ideas, of Man, may agree in that of Father.
K

( 74 )

There is no idea of any kind, which is not cap-
able of an almoft infinite number of confiderati-
ons, in reference to other things : and therefore
this makes no fmall part of mens words and
thoughts. Thus one fingle man may at once fuf-
tain the Relations of Father, Brother, Son, Huf
band, Friend, SubjecJ, General, European, Englijh-
man, //lander, Mafter, Servant, Bigger, Lefs, Sec.
to an almoft infinite number ; he being capable of
as many Relations as there can be occafions of com-
paring him to other tilings in any manner of a-
greement, difagreement, or refpect whatfoever.

The ideas of Relations are much clearer and
more di/lincl than of the things related; becaufe
the knowledge of one limple idea is oftentimes fuf-
ficient to give me the notion of a Relation : but
to the knowing of any fubftantial being, an accu-
rate collection of fundry ideas is neceflary.

CHAP. XXVI.

O/Caufe and Effeii, and other Relations.

TH E ideas of Caufe and Effeft, we get from
our obfervation of the vicijfitude of things*
while we perceive fome qualities or fubftances be-
gin to exift, and that they receive their esiftence
from the due application and operation of other
beings : that which produces, is the Caufe ; that

( is )

which is produced the Effctl. Thus Fluidity in
was is the effect of a certain degree of heat, which
we obferve to be conftantly produced by the appli-
cation of fuch heat.

We diftinguilh the originals of things into two
forts.

Fir/l, When the thing is wholly made new, fo
that no part thereof did ever exift before, as when
a new particle of matter doth begin to exift, which
had before no being ; 'tis called Creation.

Secondly, When a thing is made up of particles
which did all of them before cxift, but the thing b
conftituted of pre-exifting particles, which altoge-
ther make up fuch a collection of iimplc ideas ; had
not any exiftence before, as this Man, this Egg,
this Rofe, &c. This, when referr'd to a fubftance,
produced in the ordinary courfe of nature, by an
internal principle, but fet on work by fome exter-
nal agent, and working by infcnfible ways which
we perceive not, is called Generation.

When the Caufe is extrinfical, and the Effect
produced by a fenfible Separation or Ju.xta poiition
of difcernible parts, we call it Making; and fuch
are all artificial things. When any fimple idea is
produced, which was not in that fubjeel before, we
call it Alteration.

The denominations of things taken from 77 me,
are for the moft part only Relations. Thus when
it is faid that queen Elifabetb lived fixty-nine, and
K 2

( 76 )
reigned forty-five years, no more is meant, than that
the duration of her exigence was equal to fixty-
ninc, and of her government to forty-five annual
revolutions of the fun : and fo are all words an-
fwering, Htm long.

Young and Old, and other words of Time, that
are thought to ftand for pcfitive ideas, are indeed
Relative j and intimate a Relation to a certain
length of Duration, whereof we have the idea in
our minds. Thus we call a Man Young or Old,
that has lived littleor much of that time that men
ufually attain to. This is evident from our applica-
tion ofthefe names to other things; for a Man is
called Young at Twenty, but a Horfe Old, <bc.
The Sun and Stars we call not Old at all, Ixcaufe
we know not what period God ha$ let to that fort
of Beings.

There are other ideas, that are truly Relative,
which we fignifie by names, that are thought Po-
fitive and Abfohte ; fuch as Great and Little, Strong
and IVeak. The things thus denominated are re-
ferred to fume (tandards with which we compare
them. Thus we call an Apple Great, that is bigger
than the ordinary fort of thofe we have been ufed
to. And a Man Weak, that has not (b much ftrength
or power to move as men ufually have, or thofe
of his own lizc.

( 77 )

CHAP. XXVII.

Of Identity and Diver Jit}'.

Another occafion the mind takes of compar-
ing, is the very Being of Things : when
confidering a thing as exifting at any certain time,
or place, and comparing it with it felf as exifting at
any other time, <bc. it forms the ideas of Identity
and Diverfity. When we fee any thing in any cer-
tain time and place, we are fure, it is that very
thing ; and can be no other, how like foever it
may be in all other refpecls.

We conceiving it impofhble, that two things of
the fame kind fhould exift together in the fame
place, we conclude that whatever exifts any where
at the fame time, excludes all ofthe fame kind, and
is there it felf alone. When therefore we demand
whether any thing be the fame, or no, it refers al-
ways to fomething that exifted fuch a time, in fuch
a place, which it was certain at that inftant was
the fame with it felf, and no other.

We have ideas of three forts of fubftances, Fir/I,
Of God, Secondly, Finite Intelligences, Thirdly,
Bodies.

Firji, God being Eternal, Unalterable, and every

( 78 )

where concerning his Identity, there can be no
doubt.

Secondly, Finite Spirits having had their determi-
nate time and place of beginning to exift, the Re-
lation to that time and place will always determine
to each its Identity, as long as it exifts.

Thirdly, The lame will hold of every particle of
matter to which no addition or fubftra&ion is made.
Thefe three exclude not one another out of the
lame place, yet each exclude thofe of the fame
kind, out of the fame place.

The Identity and Dlvetftty of Modes ani Relati-
ons are determined after the fame manner thatSub-
ihnces are : only the Actions of Finite Beings, as
Motion and Thought, confifting inSucccffion, they
cannot exift in different times and places as perma-
nent Beings : for no motion or thought confider-
ed as at different times can be the fame, each part
thereof having a different beginning of cxiftence.

From whence it is plain, that Exiftence it felf
is the Principium Individualionis, which determines
a Being to a particular time and place, incommu-
nicable to two Beings of the fame kind. Thus, fup-
pofe an Atom exifting in a deterrnin'd time, and
place; it is evident that confidered in any inftanr,
it is the fame with it felf, and will be fo, as long as
its exiftence continues. The fame may be faid of
two, or more, or any number of particles, whilft
they continue together. The Mafs will be the fame

( 79 )

however jumbled : but if one atom be taken away,
it is not the fame mafs.

In Vegetables, the identity depends not on the
fame mafs, and is not applyed to the fame thing.
The reafon of this is the difference between an a-
nimate body, and mafs of matter ; This being only
the cohefion of particles any how united; The o-
ther, fuch a difpofition and organization of parts,
as is fit to receive and diftribute nourifhment, fo
as to continue and frame the wood, bark, leaves,
<bc. (of an Oak, for inRance) in which confifls the
vegetable life. That therefore which has fuch an
organization of parts partaking of one common life,
continues to be the fame Plant, tbo' that life be
communicated to new particles of matter vitally
united to the living plant. The cafe is not fo much
different in Brutes, but that any one may hence
fee what makes an Animal, and continues it the
fame.

The identity of the fame Man likewife confifts
in a participation of the fame continued life, in fuc-
ceeding particles of matter vitally united to the
fame organized body.

To underftand Identity aright, we muftconfider
what Idea the word it is applied to Hands for. It
being one thing to be the fame Subftance, another
the fame Man, and a third the fame Per/on.

An Animal, is a living organized body : and the
fame animal, is the fame continued life communi-

( eo )

catcd to different particles of matter, as they hap-
pen fucceffively to be united to that body, and nur
notion of Man, is but of a particular fort of Ani-
mal.

Per/on (lands for an intelligent being, that rea-
fonsand reflects, and can confidcr it felf the fame
thing in different times and places ; which it doth
by that Confcioufnefs that is infeparablc from think-
ing. By this every one is to himfelf what he calls
Self, without confulering whether thvxSelfbe. con-
tinual in the fame, or divers fubftances. In this
confifts Vcr final Identity, or the fimencfs of a ra-
tional being: and fo far as this confcioufnefs ex-
tends backward to any paft action, or thought, (b
far reaches the identity of that perfon. It is the
fame Self now, it was then : and it is by the fame
Self, with this prefent one, that now reflects on it,
that that action was done.

Self is that confeious thinking thing, whatever
fubftanee it matters not, which is confeious of
pleafure or pain, capable of happinefs or mifery ;
and fo is concerned for it felf, as far as that confci-
oufnefs extends. That with which the confciouf-
nefs of this prefent thinking thing, can join it fclf,
makes the fame perfon, and is one felf with it ; and
fo attributes to it klf, and owns all the actions of
that thing, as its own, as far as that confcioufnefs
reaches.

This Perfonal Identity is the object of reward

( 8i )

and punifhment, being that by which every one is
concerned for himfelf. If the Confcioufnefs went a-
lqng with the little finger, when that was cut off, it
would be the fame felf that was juft before concern-
ed for the whole body.

If the fame Socrates, waking and fleeping, did
not partake of the fame confcioufnefs, they would
not be the fame Perfon. Socrates waking, could
not be in juflice accountable for what Socrates fleep-
ing did, no more than one Twin, for what his bro-
ther Twin did, becaufc their outfides were fo like,
that they couid not be diftinguiflied.

But fuppofe I wholly lofe the memory of fome
parts of my life, beyond a poflibiiity of retrieving
them, fo that I fhall never be confeious of them a-
gain ; am I not the fame Per/on that did thofe acti-
ons, tho' I have now forgot them ? I anfwer, that
we muff, here take notice what the word lis appli-
ed to, which in this cafe is the man only: and the
fame man being prefumed to be the fame perfon,
lis eafily here fuppos'd to ftand alfo for the fame
perfon. But if it be pcffible for the fame man, to
have diftinct incommunicable confeioufnefs at dif-
ferent times, it is paft doubt the fame man would,
at different times, make different perfons. Which
we fee is the fenfe of mankind in the folemneft de-
claration of their opinions, human laws not punilh-
ing the madman for the fober man's actions, nor
the fober man for what the madman did ; thereby
L

( 82 )

making them two perfons. Thus we fay in Englip}t
fuch a one is not himfelf or is befides himfelf in
which phrafcs it is infinuated, that Selfh changed,
and the Self fame Perfon is no longer in that man.

But is not a man drunk, or fober the fame Per-
fon ? why elfc is lie punifhed for the fame fact he
commits when drunk, tho' he be never afterward:
confeious of it ? juft as much the fame perfon, as »
man that walks, and does other things in his fleep,
is the fan:c perfon, and is as anfwerable for any
mifchicfhcfhalldo in it. Human laws punifh both
with a jullice fuitable to their way of knowledge :
becaufe in thefc cafes they cannot diflinguifh cer-
tainly what is real, and what is counterfeit; and
fo the ignorance in drunkennefs or deep is not ad-
mitted as a plea. For tho' punifhment be annexed
to perfonality, and pcrfonality to conferoufnefs ;
and the drunkard perhaps is not confeious of what
he did; yet human judicatures juftly punifh him,
becaufe the fact is proved againft him ; but want of
confeioufnefs cannot be proved for him. But in the
great day wherein the Secrets of all Hearts fiall be
Lid open, it may be reafonableto think no one fhall
be made to anfwer for what he knows nothing of,
but (hall receive his doom, his own Conference accuf-
i>ig, orelfe excufing him.

To conclude, whatever fubllance begins to exifr,
i: muft during its exigence be the fame : whatever
compofitions of fubltances begin to cxift, during

( 83 )
the union of thofe fubftances, the concrete muft bz
the fame. Whatfoever mode begins to exift, during
its exiftence it is the fame : and fo if the compofi-
tion be of diftincl: fubftances, and different mode-,
the fame rule holds. Whence it appears that the
difficulty or obfeurity that has been about this mat-
ter, rather arifes from names ill us'd, than from any
objeurih in the things themfelves. For whatever
makes the fpecifkk Idea, to which the name is ap-
plied, ifthatZ/wbe fteadilykeptto, thediftincUon
of any thing into the fame, and divers, will eafily
be conceived, and there can arife no doubt concern-
ing it.

C H A P. XXVIII.

Of other Relations.

ALL fimple Ideas, wherein are parts or degrees,
afford an occafion of comparing the fubjccte
wherein they are to one another in refpecl of thofe
fimple Ideas. As Whiter, Sweeter, More, Left, &c.
thele depending on the equality and excefs of the
fame fimple Idea, in fevcral fubjecTs may be called,
Proportional Relations.

Another occafion of comparing tilings is taken
from the circumffances of their origine, as Fat her,
Son, Brother, &c. thefe may be called Natural Re
la t ions.

h 2

( 34 )

Sometimes the foundation of confidering things,
is fomc act whereby any one comes by a moral right,
power, or obligation to do fomcthing : fuel) are Ge~
tieral, Captain, Burgher ; thefe arc Injlituted, and
Voluntary Relations, and may be diflinguifhed from
the Natural, in that they arc alterable and feparable
from the pei fons to whom they fomctimes belong-
ed, tho' neither of the fubftances fo related be def-
troyed. But natural relations are not alterable, but
are as lading as their fubjects.

Another relation is the conformity or difagree-
ment of mens voluntary actions to a rule to which
they are referred, and by which they are judged of:
thefe may be called Moral Relations. It is this con-
formity or difagreement of our actions to fome law
(whereby good or evil is drawn on us from the will
and power of the law-maker, and is what we call
Reward or punijhmenf) that renders our actions mo-
rally good, or evil.

Of thefe moral Rules or Laws there fecm to be
three forts with their different enforcements. Firfl,
the Divine Law. Secondly, Chi/ Law. Th\rd\y,Tl?e
Law of Opinion or Reputation. By their relation to
the fufr, our actions are either Sins or Duties: to
the fecond, Criminal or Innocent : to the third Vir-
tues or Vices.

i/l. By the Divine Law, I mean that law which
God has fet to the actions of men, whether promul*

( 8; )

gate d to them by the light of nature, or the voice
of Revelation.

That God has given a Jaw to mankind, feems
undeniable, fince he has, Fir ft, A right to doit, we
are his creatures. Secondly, Goodnefs and wifdom
to direct our actions to what is belt. Thirdly, Power
to enforce it by reward, and punifhment of infinite
weight, and duration. This is the only true touch-
fione of moral rectitude, and by which men judge
of the molt confiderable moral good or evil of their
actions : that is, whether as duties or fins they arc
like to procure them happinefs or mifery from
the hands of the Almighty.

idly. The Civil Law, is the rule fet by the Com-
mon-wealth, to the actions of thofe that belong to
it. This law no body over-looks ; the rewards and
punirtiments being ready at hand to enforce it, ex-
tending to the protecting or taking away of life, li-
berty, and eltatc of thole who obferve or difobey it.

%dly. The law of Opinion or Reputation. Vir-
tue and Vice arc names fuppofed every where, to
ftand for actions in their own nature, Right and
Wrong. As far as they are really fo applied, they
fo far are co-incident with the divine law. But it is
vifible that thefe names in the particular inftances
of their application, through the feveral nations
and focietiesof men, areconltantly attributed on-
ly to fuch actions as in each country and fociety,
are in reputation or difcrcdit. So that the meafuje

( 86 )
of what is every where called and efteemcd Virtue
and Vice, is the approbation or diflike, praife or
blame, which by a tacit confent eftabJiflies it felf
in the focieties and tribes of men in the world:
whereby feveral actions come to find cre.lit ordif-
grace amonglt them, according to the judgment,
maxims, or fafhions of the place.

That this isfo, appears hence : that tho' thatpaf-
fes for Virtue in one place, which is elfewhere ac-
counted Vice; yet every Virtue and Praife, Vice
and Blame go together ; Virtue is every where
that which is thought piaife-worthy : and nothing
elfe but that which has the allowance of public!:
efteem, is called Virtue. Thcfc have fo clofe an
alliance, that they are often called by the fame
name.

'Tis true, Virtue and Vice do in a great meafure
every where correfpond with the unchangeable rule
of Right and Wrong, which the laws of God have
elbblilhed ; becaufe the obfervation of thefe laws
viflbly fecures and advances the general good cf
mankind, and the neglect of them breeds mifchief
and confufion : and therefore men without renoun»
cing all fenfe and reafbn, and their own intereft,
could not generally miftake in placing their com-
mendation and blame on that fide that deferved it
not.

They who think not commendation and difT
grace fufficient motives to engage men toaccom-

( *7 )

modate themfelves to the opinions and rules of
thofe with whom they converfe, feem little Ucill'd
in the hiftory of mankind. The greatelf. part
whereof govern themfelves chiefly by this lavi of
Fajbion.

■The penalties that attend the breach of God's
laws arc fcldom ferioully reflected on, and thofe
that do reflect on them, entertain thoughts of fu-
ture reconciliation. And for the punifhment due
from the laws of the common-wealth, men flatter
themfelves with the hopes of impunity : but no
man efcapes cenfure and difiike who offends againfl:
fafhion ; nor is there one of ten thoufand fliffand
infenfiblc enough, to bear up under the conftar.?
dillikc and condemnation of his own club.

Morality then is nothing but a relation to thefe
laws or rules ; and thefe rules being nothing but
a collection of leveral fimple ideas ; the confor-
mity thereto is but fo ordering the action, that the
fimple ideas belonging to it, may correfpond to
thofe which the law requires. By which we fee
how moral beings, and notions are founded on, and
terminated in the fimple ideas of fenfation and re-
flection. For example, let us corrfider the complex
idea fignified by the word Murder. Firft from re-
flection, we have the ideas of Willing, Confidering,
Purposing, Malice, Szc. Alio of Life, Perception,
and Self-Motion. Secondly from fenfation, we
have the ideas of man, and of fome action where-

C 23 >

by we put an end to that perception and motion
in the man, all which fimplc ideas, are compre-
hended in the word Murder.

This collection of fimple ideas being found to
agree or difagree with the elteem of the country I
have been bred in, and to be held worthy of pralfe
or blame, I call the action Virtuous, ox Vicious. If
I have the will of a Supreme Invifiblc Law-maker
for my rule, then, as I fuppofe the action com-
manded or forbidden by God, I call it Good or Evil,
Sin or Duty: if I compare it with the Civil-Law
of my Country, I call it Lawful or Unlawful, a
Crime or no Crime.

Moral actions may be confidered two ways*

Fir/}, as they are in themfclves a collection of
fimple ideas, in which fenle they are pofitive abfo-
lute ideas.

Secondly, As Good or Bad, or Indifferent : in this
refpect they arc Relative, it being their conformi-
ty or difagreement with fome rule that makes them
be fo. We ought carefully to diftinguifh between
the pofitive idea of the action, and the reference
it has to a rule : both which are commonly com-
prehended under one name, which often occallons
confuiion, and mifleads the judgment.

Thus the taking from another what is his, with-
out his confent, is properly called Stealing : but
that name being commonly undei flood to fignific
alfo the moral pravity of the action, men are apt to

( 89 )
condemn whatever they hear called Stealing as
an ill action, difagrceing with the rule of Right.
And yet the private taking away his fword from a
madman to prevent his doing mifchief, tho' it be
properly denominated Stealing, as the name of
fuch a mixed Mode, yet when compared to the Jaw
of God, it is no fin or tranfgreffion, tho' the name
Stealing ordinarily carries fuch an intimation
with it.

It would be infinite to go over all forts of Re-
lations-, I have here mentioned fome of the molt
confidcrablc, and fuch as may ferve to let us fee
from whence we get our ideas of Relations, and
in they are founded.

C H A P. XXIX.
Of clear, oh/cure, dijlincl and confufed ideas.

HAving (hewn the original of our ideas, and
taken a view of their feveral forts ; I (hall
olfer fome few other confiderations concerning
them. The firfl: is, that fome are clear, others ob-
fcure : fome dijlincl:, and others confufed.

Our fimple ideas are clear, when they are fuch
as the objects thcmfelves from whence they were
taken, did in a well-ordered fenfation or percep-
tion prefent them. Whilft the memory retains
M

( 90 )

them thus, and can produce them fo to the mind
when it has occafion to confider them, they are
clear ideas.

Our complex ideas are clear when the ideas that
go to their compofition are clear : and the number
and order of thofe fimple ideas, that are their in-
gredients, is determinate and certain.

The caufe of Obfcurity in fimple ideas feems to
be either dull organs, or flight impreflions made by
the objects, or a weaknefs in the memory, not able
to retain them as recciv'd.

A diftinft idea is that wherein the mind per-
ceives a difference from all other : and a confufed,
is fuch an one as is not fuffkiently diftinguifhable
from another from which it ought to be different.
Obfcurity is oppofed toclearnefs, confufion to di-
ftinctnefs.

This confufion incident to ideas, is only in refe-
rence to their names . For every idea a man has being
vifibly what it is, and diftinct from all other ideas
but it felf, that which makes it confused is, when
it is fuch that it may as well be called by another
name as that which it is expreffed by, the differ-
ence which keeps the things diftincl, and makes
fome of them to belong rather to the one, and
fome of them to the other of thofe names being
left out; and fothe diftinftion which was intend-
ed to be kept up by thefe different names is quite
loft.

( 91 )

Confufion is occafioned'chiefly by the following
defaults.

Firfl, When any complex idea (for it is complex
ideas that are mod liable to confufion) is made up
of too fmall a number of fimple ideas, and fuch as
are common to other things: whereby the differ'
ences that make it deferve a different name, are
left out. Thus an idea of a Leopard being conceiv-
ed only as a fpotted heft, is confufed ; it not being
thereby fufficiently diftinguifhed from a Panther,
and other forts of bealts that are fpotted. Where
the ideas for which we ufe different terms, have
not a difference anfwcrable to their diftin<5t names,
and fo cannot be diftinguifhed by them, there it is
that they are truly confus'd.

Secondly, When the ideas are fo jumbled toge-
ther in the complex one, that it is not eafily dif-
ccrnible, whether it more belongs to the name gi-
ven it, than to any other. We may conceive this
confufion by a fort of pictures ufually (hewn,
wherein the colours mark out very odd and unu-
fual figures, and have no difcernible order in their
pofition. This, when faid to be the picture of a
Man or Caefar, we reckon confufed, becaufe it is
not difcernible in that ftate, to belong more to the
name Man or Caefar, than to the name Baboon or
Pompey. But when a cylindrical mirrour rightly
placed, hath reduced thofe irregular lines on the
tabic, into their due order and proportion, then
M 2

( 9* )
the eye prefently lees thut it is a Man or Caefar ;
that is, that it belongs to thofc names, and is fuffi-
cicntly diftinguifhable from a Baboon or Pompey ;
that is, from the ideas Ggnified by thofe names.

Thirdly, When any one of our ideas fignified
by a name is uncertain and undetermined. Thus
he that puts in, or leaves out an idea out of his com-
plex one of Church or Idolatry, every time that he
thinks of either, and holds not fteady to any one prc-
cife combination of ideas, that makes it up, is faid
to have a confus'u idea of Church or Idolatry. Con-
fufion always concerns two ideas, and thofe moft,
which moft approach one ar.other. To avoid con-
fufion therefore we ought to examine what other
it is in danger to be confounded with, or which it
cannot eafily be feparated from ; and that will be
found an idea belonging to another name, and fo.
fhould be a different thing, from which yet it is
not furlkiently diftincl, and fo keeps not that dif-
ference from that other idea which the different
name import;.

It is to be obferved that our complex ideas mr.y
be very clear and diftinft in one part, and very ob-
fcure and confufed in another. Thus in Gbilide-
drum, or Body of a Thou/and Sides, the idea of the
figure may be confufed, tho' that of the number
be very diftincT:: we can difcourfe and demon-
lli ate concerning that part of this complex idea
which depends on the number Thoufand ; tho' it

( 93 )

is plain we have no piecifc idea of its figure, fb as to
diftinguilh it by that from one that has but Nine
,vd Ninety-nine fides. The not obferving
this, cnufes no fmall error in mens thoughts, and
confufion in their difcourfes.

CHAP. XXX.

Of Real and Fantaftical Ideas.

OUR ideas in reference to things from whence
they are taken, or which they may be fup-
pofed to reprefent, come under a Threefold di-
ftinction, and are, Firft, either Real or Fantaflical.
Secondly, Adequate or Inadequate. Thirdly, True
or Falfe.

By real ideas I mean fuch as have a foundation
in nature, fuch as have a conformity with the real
being and exiftence of things, or with their Arche-
types.

Fantaflical are fuch as have no foundation in
nature, nor any conformity with that reality of
being, to which they are referred as to their Arche-
types. By examining the fcveral forts of ideas we
fhall find, that, Firft, our fimple ideas arc all real;
not that they are images or representations of
what does exiit, but as they are the certain effects
of powers in things without us, ordained by our
Maker, to produce in us fuch fenfations : they

C 94 )

are real ideas in us, whereby we diftinguifh the qua-
lities that are really in things themfelves.

Their reality lies in the fteady correfpondence
they have with the dtftinft conltitutions of real
beings. But whether they anfwer to thofe confti-
tutions as to Caufes or Patterns it matters not ; it
fuflices that they areconftantly prodnced by them.
Complex ideat being arbitrary combinations of
fimple ideas put together, and united under one ge-
neral name, in forming of which the mind ufes
its liberty ; we mult enquire which of thefe are
real, and which imaginary combinations, and to
this I fay, that,

Fir/}, Mixed modes and relations having no o-
ther reality than what they have in the minds of
men : nothing elfe is required to make them real,
but a pofTibility of exifting conformable to them.
Thefe ideas being themfelves Archetypes, cannot
differ from their Archetypes, and fo cannot be chi-
merical ; unlefs any one will jumble together in
them inconfiftent ideas. Thofe indeed that have
names affigned them in any language, mufl have
a conformity to the ordinary bonification of the
name that is given them, that they may not be
thought fantaftical.

Secondly, Our complex ideas of Subflances being
made, in reference to things exiiting without us,
whofe reprefentations they are thought, are no far-
ther real, than as they are fuch combinations of

< 9J 5

fimple ideas, as are really united, and co-exift in
things witkout us. Thofe are fantaftical which are
made up of feveral ideas, that never were found
united, as Centaur, Sec.

CHAP. XXXI.

Of Ideas Adequate or Inadequate.

REAL ideas are either Adequate or Inadequate,
Firft, Adequate, which perfectly reprefent
thofe Archetypes which the mind fuppofes them
taken from, and which it makes them to ftand for.
Secondly, Inadequate,wh\ch are fuch as do but par-
tially or incompleatly reprefent thofe Archetypes
to which they are referred : whence it appears.

Firft, That all our fimple ideas are Adequate -, for
they being but the effects of certain powers in
things fitted and ordained by God, to produce fuch
fenfations in us, they cannot but be correfpond-
ent and adequate to fuch powers, and we are fure
they agree to the reality of things.

Secondly, Our complex ideas of modes being vo-
luntary collections of fimple ideas, which the mind
puts together without reference to any real Arche-
types, cannot but be Adequate ideas. They are
referred to no other pattern, nor made by any ori-
ginal, but the good-liking and will of him that
makes the combination. If indeed one would con-
firm his ideas, to thofe which arc formed by another

C 9* )
per foil, ilicy may be wrong or Inadequate, bceaufe
they agree not to that which the mind defigns to
be their archetype and pattern. In which refpect
only, any ideas of modes can be wrong, imperfect,
or inadequate.

Thirdly, Our ideas of Subftances, have in the
mind a double reference: Firfi, They are fome-
times referred to a fuppofed real eflence, of each
fpecics of things. Secondly, They are defigncd for
rcprcfentations in the mind of things that do exift,
by ideas difcoverable in them : in both which rc-
Ipects they arc Inadequate.

Firfi, If the names of Su'oftances ftand f >x things,
as fuppofed to have certain real eflences, whereby
they are of this or that fpecies, (of which real cf-
fences men are wholly ignorant and know nothing)
it plainly follows that the ideas they have in their
minds, being referred to real eflences, as Arche-
types which are unknown, they muft be fo far from
being Adequate, that they cannot be fuppofed to
be any reprefentation of them at all. Our com-
plex ideas of Subftances are, as have been
fhewn, nothing but certain collections of Ample
ideas that have been obferved, or fuppofed con-
stantly to exift together. But fuch a complex ;*-
dea cannot be the real eflence of any Sub-
Itance: for then the properties we difcover in it
would be deducible from it, and their neceflary
connexion with it be known, as all the properties

( 91 )

of a Triangle depend on, and are deducible from
the complex idea oiThree Lines including a Space :
but it is certain that in our complex ideas of Sub-
fiances, are not contained fuch ideas on which all
the other qualities that are to be found in them
depend.

Secondly, Thofe that take their ideas of Subftan-
ces from their fenfible qualities, cannot form A-
dequate ideas of them : becaufe their qualities and
powers are fo various, that no man's complex idea
can contain them all. Mod of our fimple ideas,
whereof our complex ones of Subftances do con-
filt, are powers which being relations to other Sub-
fiances ; we cannot be fure we know all the
powers, till we have tryed what changes they are
fitted to give and receive from other Subfhnces, in
their feveral ways of application : which being not
pofTible to be tryed upon one body, much lefs u-
pon all, it is impoflible we fhould have Adequate
ideas of any Subftance, made of a collection of all
its properties.

CHAP. XXXII.

Of True and Falfe Ideas.

TR U TH and Faljbood in propriety of fpeeeh
belong only to propofitions ; and when /-
deas are termed True or Fal/e, there is fome fecret
o '.acit propofition, which is the foundation of that
N

( 98 )

denomination. Our ideas being nothing but ap-
pearances or Perceptions in the mind, can in (tricl-
nefs of fpeech no more be faid to be true or falfe,
than iingle names of things can be faid to be true or
falfe. The idea of Centaur has no more falffiood in it,
when it appears in our minds, than the name Cen-
taur when it is pronounced or writ on paper. For
truth or falffiood lying always in fome affirmation
or negation, out ideas are not capable any of them,
of being falfe, tili the mind paffes fome judgment
on them ; that is, affirms or denies fomething of
them. In a metaphyfical fenfe they may be faid to
be true, that is, to be really fuch as they exift ;
tho' in things called true, even in that fenfe, there
is perhaps a fecret reference to our ideas, look'd u-
ponas the ftandards of that truth; which amounts
to a mental propofition.

When the mind refers any of its ideas to any
thing extraneous to it, they are then capable of be-
ing true or falfe : becaule in fuch a reference the
mind makes a tacit fuppofition of their conformity
to that thing; which fuppofition, as it is true or
falfe, lb the ideas thcmfelves come to be denomi-
nated. This happens in thefe cafes :

Firft, When the mind fuppofes its idea, con-
formable to that in other mens minds; called by
the fame name, fuch as that of Juflice, Virtue, &c.

Secondly, When the mind fuppofes any idea
conformable to fome real exiltence. Thus that of

( 99 )

Man is true, that of Centaur falfe, the one having
a conformity to what has really exilted ; the other
not.

Thirdly, When the minJ refers any of its ideas
to that real conftitution, and efTence of any thing
whereon all its properties depend : and thus the
greateft part, if not all our ideas of Subjlances, are
falfe.

As to the Fir/}, When we judge of our ideas by
their conformity to thofe of other men, they may
be any of them falfe. But ample ideas arc leaft
liable to be fo miftaken ; we feldom miftake Green
for Blue, or Bitter for Sweet ; much Jefs do we
confound the names belonging to different fenfes,
and call a Colour by the name of a Tajle. Complex
ideas are much more liable to fallhood in this par-
ticular : and thofe of Mixed Modes more than
Subftances. Becaufe in Subftances their fenfible
qualities fervefor the molt part to diftinguifti them
clearly : but in Mixed Modes we are more uncer-
tain, and we may call that Juflice, which ought to
be called by anodier name. The rcafon of this is,
that the abitrac"!: ideas of Mixed Modes, being mens
voluntary combinations of fuch a precife collection
of fimple ideas, we have nothing elfe to refer our
ideas of Mixed Modes as ftandards to ; but the /dw
of thofe who are thought to ufe names in their pro-
per fignifications : and fo as our ideas conform or
differ from them, they pafs for true or falfe.
3S 2

( ico )

As to the Second, When we refer our ideas to the
real exiftence of things, none can be termed falfe,
but our complex ideas of Subftances. For our
limple ideas being nothing but perceptions in us
anfwerable to certain powers in external objects,
their truth confifts in nothing but fucli appearan-
ces, as are produced in us fuitable to thofe powers l
neither do they become liable to the imputation of
falfliood, whether we judge thefc ideas to be in
the things themfelves, or no. For God having fet
them as marks of diltinguifhing things, that we
may be able to difcern one thing from another ;
and thereby chufe them as we have occafion : it
alters not the nature of our fimplc ideaf, whether we
think the idea of Blue (for inftance) to be in the
Violet it (elf, or in the mind only : and it is equal-
ly from that appearance to be denominated Blue,
whether it be that real colour, or only a peculiar
texture in it, that caufes in us that idea : fince the
name Blue notes properly nothing but that mark
of diftinclion, that is in a Violet, difcernible only
by our eyes, whatever it confifts in.

Neither would our fimple ideas be fa/Je, if by
the different ftructure of our organs it were So or-
dered, that the fame object fhould produce in feve-
ral mens minds different ideas. For this could ne-
ver be known, fince objects would operate con-
ftantly after the fame manner. It is moft probable
neverthelefs, that the ideas produced by the fame

( idi )

cbjccls in different mens minds, arc very near and
undifcernibly like. Names of fimple ideas may ba
mif-applied, as a man ignorant in the Engliflj tongue
may call Purple, Scarlet : but this makes no fa}£
hood in the ideas.

Complex ideas of modes cannot be falfe in re-
ference to the efTence of any thing really exifting ;
becaufe they have no reference to any pattern ex-
ifting, or made by nature.

Our complex ideas of Subftances, being all re-
fcrr'd to patterns in things themfelves, may be falfe.
They are fo, Firjl, When look'd upon as repre-
sentations of the unknown elfences of tilings, ^i?-
tondly, When they put together fimple ideas which
in the real exiftence of things, have no union : as
jn Centaur. Tbirdly,When from any collection of
fimple ideas, that do always exift together, there
is feparated by a direel negation any one fimple i-
iea, which is conftantly joined with them. Thus,
if from extenfion, folidity, fixednefs, malleablenefs,
fufibility, isc. we remove the colour obferved in
Gold.

If this idea be only left out of the complex one
otGold, it is to be looked on as an inadequate and
imperfect, rather than a falfe one : fince, tho' it
contains not all the fimple ideas, that are united
in nature : yet it puts none together, but what do
really cxilt together.

Upon the whole, I think that our ideas as they

( 102 )

are conftdered by the mind, either in reference to
the proper fignification of their names, or in re-
ference to the reality of things, may more proper-
ly be called Right or Wrong ideas, according as
they agree or difagree to thofe patterns to which
they are referred. The ideas that are in mens
minds fimply confidered, cannot be wrong, unlefs
complex ideas, wherein inconfiftent parts are jumbled
together. "All other ideas are in themfelves right,
and the knowledge about them right.and true know-
ledge. But when we come to refer them to any pat-
terns, or archetypes, then they are capable of be-
ing wrong, as far as they difagree with fuch arche-
types.

CHAP. XXXIII.
Of the JJfociation of ideas.

TH E R E is fcarce any one that does not ob-
ferve fomething that feems odd to him,
and is in it fdf really extravagant in the opinions,
reafonings, and actions of other men. The lealt
flaw of this kind, if at all different from his own,
every one is quick -fighted enough to efpy, and for-
ward to condemn in another, tho' he be guilty of
much greater unreafonablenefs in his own tenets
and conduct, which he never perceives, and will
very hardly be convine'd of.

( i°3 }

This fort of unreafonablenefs is ufually imput-
ed to Education and Prejudice, and for the mod
part truly enough ; tho' that reaches not the bot-
tom of the difeafe, nor Ihews diftinclly enough
whence it rifes, or wherein it lies. Education is
often rightly affigned for the caufe ; and preju-
dice is a good general name for the tiling it
felf; but yet 1 think he ought to look a little far-
ther who would trace it to the root it fprings from,
and fo explain it, as to Ihew whence this flaw has
its original in very fobcr and rational minds, and
wherein it confifts. For this being a weaknefs to
which all men are liable, and a taint which uni-
verfally infects mankind, the greater care mould
be taken to lay it open.

Some of our ideas have a natural correfpond-
ence and connexion one with another : it is the
office and excellency ofourreafon to trace thefe,
and hold them together in that union and corre-
fponuence which is founded in their peculiar beings.
Belides this, there is another connexion of ideas
wholly owing to chance or cultom : ideas that ia
themfelvcs are not at all of kin, come to be fo u-
nited in fome mens minds, that 'tis very hard to
feparate them ; they always keep company, and
the one no fooner comes into the underftanding,
but its aiTociate appears with it; and if they are
more than two, the whole gang always infcparable
mew themfelves together. This ftrong combina-

( 104 )
tion of Ideas not ally'd by nature, the mind makes
in it felf either voluntarily, or by chance : and
hence it comes in different men to be very diffe-
rent, according to their different Inclinations, Edw
cations, Interefls, &c. Cuftom fettles habits of
Thinking in the Undemanding as well as of Deter-
mining in the Will, and of motions in the Body;
all which feem to be but trains of motion in the
Animal Spirits, which once fet a going, continue
on in the fame fteps they have been us'd to ; which
by often treading are worn into a fmooth path,
and the motion in it becomes cafie, and, as it
were, natural. As far as we can comprehend
Thinking, thus ideas feem to be produced in our
minds ; or if they are not, this may ferve to ex-
plain their following one another in an habitual
train, when once they are put into that track, as
well as it does to explain fuch motions of the
Body.

This connexion in our minds of ideas in them-
felves loofe and independent one of another, is of
fb great force to fet us awry in our actions, as well
moral as natural, paffions, reafonings, and notions
themfelves, that perhaps there is not anyone thing
that deferves more to be look'd after. Thus the
ideas of Goblins and Sprights have really no more
to do with Darknefs than Light; yet let but a
foolifh Maid inculcate thefe often on the mind of
a Child, and raife them there together, poffibly he

( IC5- )
fhall never be able to feparate ihem again fo long
as he lives ; but Darkncis (hall ever afterwards
bring with it thofe frightful ideas. A man has fuf-
fer'd pain or ficknefs in any place; he faw his
friend die in f'uch a room ; tho' thefe have in na-
ture nothing to do one with another, yet when the
idea of the place occurs to his minJ, it brings that
of the Pain and Dilpleafure with it, he confounds
them in Ms mind, and can as little bear the one as
the other.

Intellectual Habits and Defects this way con-
traded are not lei's frequent and poweiful, tho'
lefs obferved. Let the ideas of Being and Matter
be ftrongly joined either by Education or much
Thought, whillt thefe are it ill combined in the
mind, what notions, what reafonings will there
be about feparate Spirits \ Let Cultom from the
very Childhood have joined Figure and Shape to
the idea of God, and what abfurdities will that
mind be liable to about the Deity \ Let the idea
of Infallibility be joined to any perfon, and thele
two conltantly together poiTefs the mind, and then
one Body in two places at once, fhall be fwallow-
cd for a certain truth, whenever that imagined In-
fallible Perfon dictates and demands affent with-
out inquiry.

Some fuch wrong combinations of ideas will be
found to eftablifh the irreconcilable oppolition be-
tween different feds of philofophy and religion :
O

C 106 )

for we cannot imagine every one of their follower*
to impofe wilfully on himfelf, and knowingly rc-
fufc truth offer'd by plain Reafon. Intereft, tho'
it does a great deal in the cafe, yet cannot be
thought to work whole focieties of men to fo uni-
verfal a pervcrfenefs, as that every one of them
fhould knowingly maintain falfhood : fome at lead
muft be allowed to do what all pretend to •, i. e. to
purfue truth fincercly. That therefore which cap-
tivates their reafons, and leads men of fincerity
blindfold from common fenfe, will, when examin-
ed, be found to be, what we are fpeaking of: fome
independent ideas, arc by education, cuftom, and
the conftant din of their party fo coupled in their
minds, that they always appear there together, and
they can no more feparate them in their thoughts,
than if they were but one idea •, and they operate
as if they werefo. This gives fenfe to jargon, de-
monftration to abfurdities, and confiftency to non-
fenfe, and is the foundation of the greateit, I had
almoil faid, of all the errors in the world : or if it
docs not reach fo far, it is at lead the mod danger-
ous one, fince fo far as it obtains it hinders men
fiom feeing and examining. The confufion of two
different ideas which a cuftomary connexion of
them in their minds hath to them in effeel made but
one, cannot but fill mens heads with falfe views,
and their reaibnings with falfe confequences.
Having thus given an account of the Original

( io7 )

Sorts and Extent of our ideas, which are the in-
ftruments or materials of our knowledge, I ihould

i immediately proceed to fhew, what ufe theunder-
ftanding makes of them, and what knowledge we
have by them. But upon a nearer approach I find
that there is fo clofc a connexion between ideas and

! words ; and our abftracl: ideas and general words
have ib conftant a relation one to another, that it
is impofiible to fpeak clearly and diftinclly of our
knowledge, which all confifts in propofitions,

I without confidcring firft, the Nature, Ufe, and Sig-
nification of Language, which therefore mud be
the bufinefs of the next Book.

ni j

( io8 )

BOOK III.

CHAP. I.

Of Words or Language in General.

GOD having defign'd man for a fociable crea-
ture, made him not only with an inclina- J
tion, and under a neccffity to have fcllowfhip with
thofe of his own kind, but furnilhed hini alfo with
Language, which was to be the great instrument
and common tye of focicty. Man therefore had
by nature his organs fo fafhioned, as to be fit to
frame articulate founds, which we call Words.

But bcfides articulate fi\ 'Js (which birds may
be taught to imitate) it was further necefTary that
he fliould be able to ufe thefe founds as figns of In-
ternal Conceptions, and make them (land as marks
of the ideas in his mind, whereby they might be
made known toothers.

But neither is it enough for the perfection of
Janguagc, that founds can be made figns ofideas,
unlefs thefe can be made ufe of, fo as to compre-
hend feveral particular things; for the multipli-
cation of words would have perplexed their ufe,
had every particular thing need of a dill incl name
to be fignified by. To remedy this inconvenience,

( iop )

Language bad yet a farther improvement in th«
ufe of General Terms, whereby one word was made
to mark a multitude of particular exiftences,
which advantageous ufe of founds was obtained
only by the difference of the ideas they were made
figns of. Thofe names becoming general, which
are made to ftand for general ideas ; and thofe re-
maining particular, where the ideas they are ufed
for are particular. There are other words which
fignifie the want or abfence of ideas, as Ignorance,
Barrenne/i,8cc. which relate to pofitive ideas, and
fignifie their abfence.

It is obfervable that the words which frand for
Actions and Notions, quite removed from fenfe,
are borrowed from fenfible ideas, v. g. to Ima-
gine, Apprehend, Comprehend, Underihnd, Ad-
here, Conceive, Inftill, Difguit, Difturbance,
Tranquility, 6r. which are all taken from the
Operations of Things Senfible, and applied to
modes of Thinking. Spirit in its primary fignifi-
cation is no more than breath ; Angel a meffen-
ger. By which wc may guefs what kind of no-
tions they were, and whence derived; which filled
the minds of the firffc beginners of languages, and
how nature, even in thenaming of things unawares,
fuggefted to men the originals of all their know-
ledge : whilft to give names that might make
known to others any operations they felt in them-
felves, or any other ideas, that came not under

( I io )

their fenfes, they were fain to borrow words from
the ordinary and known ideas of Senfation.

The better to underftand tbe Ufe and Force of
Language, as fubfervient to Knowledge, it will be
convenient to confider,

Firfl, To what it is that Names in the ufe of Lan-
guage are immediately applied.

Secondly, Since all (except proper names) are<7<?-
neral, and fo (land not for this or that fingle thing,
but for Sorts and Ranks : it will be neceflary to con-
fider what thofe forts and kinds of things are;
wherein they confifr, and how they come to be
made. This (hall be confidered in the following
chapters.

CHAP. II.

Of the Signification of Words.

MA N, tho' he have great variety of thoughts,
yet are they all within his own bread;, in-
vifible and hidden from others, nor C3n of them-
felves be made to appear. It was neceflary there-
fore, for the comfort and advantage of Society, that
man mould find out fame External Signs, where-
by thofe invifible ideas might be made known to o-
thers. For which purpofe nothing was fo fit, either
for plenty or quicknefs, as thofe Articulate Sounds
he found himfelf able to make. Hence "words came

C in )

to be made ufe of by men, as figns of their ideas :
not upon the account of any natural connexion be-
tween articulate founds, and certain ideas ; for
then there would be but one Language amongfl:
all men ; but by a voluntary impofition, whereby
fuch a word is made arbitrarily the mark of fuch an
idea. The ufe then of words, is to be fenfible marks
of our ideas; and the ideas they Hand for, are
their proper and immediate Signification : in which
they (land for nothing more but the ideas in the
mind of him that ufes them. For when a man
fpeaks to another, it is that he may be underftood ;
that is, that his founds may make known his ideas
to the hearer.

Words being voluntary Signs cannot be impof-
ed on things we know not : this would be to make
them figns of nothing, founds without fignificati-
ons. A man cannot make his words the figns ei-
ther of Qualities in things, or of Conceptions in the
mind of another, whereof he has no ideas in his
own.

Words in all mens mouths (that fpeak with
any meaning) ftand for the ideas which thofe that
ufe them have, and which they would exprefs by
them. Thus a Child that takes notice of nothing
more in the metal he hears called Gold, than the
Yellow Colour, calls the fame colour in a Peacock's
tail Coll. Another, that hath better obferved, adds
to fhining Yellow, great Weight ; and then the

( H2 )

found Gold flands, when he uf-s it, for a complex
idea of a mining Yellow, an J very weighty Sub-
fiance.

Tho' wor's fignifie properly nothing but the /-
deas in mens minds, yet they arc in their thoughts
fecretly referred to two other things.

Firft, They fuppof. their words to be marks of
ideas, in the minds of other men with whom they
communicate ; elfe they could not difcourfe intel-
ligibly with one another : in this cafe men Hand
not to examine whether their ideas and thofeof o-
ther men be the fame ; they think it enough that
they ufe the word in the common acceptation of
that Language.

Secondly, They fuppofe their words to (land alfo
for the reality of things.

Words then being immediately the figns of mens
ideas, whereby they exprefs their thoughts and i-
maginations toothers, there ariles by confhmt ufe
fuch a connexion between certain founds and the
ideas they (land for ; that the names heard almoft
as readily excite certain ideas, as if the objects
themfelves were prefent to the fenfes.
• And becaufe we examine not precisely the fg-
nification of words, we often in attentive confide-
ration let our thoughts more on words than tilings :
nay, fome (becaufe we often learn words before
we know the ideas they (land for) fpeak feveral
words no otherwife than Parrots do, without any

[ t*| )

meaning at all. But fo iar as words are of life and
finnification, fo far there is a conftant connexion be-
tween the found and idea; and a defignation that
the one ftand for the other ; without which appli-
cation of them, they are nothing but infignihcant
noife.

Since then words fignifie only mens peculiar /-
deas, and that by an arbitrary impofition, it follows
that every man has an inviolable liberty to make
words ftand for what ideas he pleafes. It is true,
common ufe by a tacit confent appropriates cer-
tain founds to certain ideas in all Languages; which
fo far limits the fignification of each found, that
unlefs a man applies it to the fame ideas, he can-
not [peak properly: and unlefs a man's words ex-
cite the fame ideas in the hearer, which he makes
them Hand for in fpeaking, he cannot /peak intel-
ligibly. But whatever be the confcqucnce of any
man's ufe of words, different either from their
publick ufe, or that of the perfons to whom he
addreffes them, this is certain, their fignirication
in his ufe of them is limited to his ideas, and
they can be figns of nothing elfe.

( H4 J

CHAP. III.
Of General Terms.

ALL things that exift being Particulars, it
might be expected that words mould be fo
too in their fignification : but we find it quite con-
trary; for moft of the words that make ah Lan-
guages are General Terms. This is the effect of
Reafon and Ncceffity, for,

Firjl, It is impoffibic that every particular tiling
fiioulJ have a diifinct peculiar name, becaufe it is
impoflible to have diflinct ideas of every particular
thing; to retain its name, with its peculiar appro-
priation to that idea.

Secondly, It would be ufelefs, unlefs all could be
fuppokd to have thefe fame ideas in their minds.
For names applied to particular things, whereof I
alone have the ideas in my mind, could not be fig-
nificant or intelligible to another, who is not ac-
quainted with all thofe particular things which had
fallen under my notice.

Thirdly, It would be of no great ufe for the Im-
provement of Knowledge : which, tho' founded in
particular things, enlarges it felf by general views ;
to which things reduced into forts under general
names, are properly fubfervient. In things where
we have occafion to confider and difcourfe odndi-

( "5 )

vidiials, and particulars, we ufe proper names : as
in Perjons, Countries, Cities, Rivers, Maintains, Sec.
Thus we fee that Jockeys have particular names
for their horfes, becaufe they often have occafion
to mention this or that particular horfe when he is
out of light.

The next thing to beconfiJered, is how General
Words come to be made. Words become general
by being made figns of General ideas: ideas be
come general by feparating from them, the cir-
cumftances of Time, Place, or any other ideas that
may determine them to this or that particular
exiftence. By this way of Abjlrattion> they be-
come capable of reprefenting more Individuals,
than one : each of which having a conformity to
that abftracl idea, is of that fort.

But it may not be amifs to trace our notions
and names, from their beginning ; and obferve by
what degrees we proceed and enlarge our ideas,
from our firft infancy. It is evident that the firft
ideas Children get, are only particular, as of the
Nurfe or Mother, and the names they give them
are confined to theft: Individuals. Afterwards ob-
ferving that there are a great many other things
in the world, that refemble them in fliape, and other
qualities, they frame an idea which they find thofe
many particulars do partake in ; to that they give
with others the name Man for example ; in this
they make nothing new, but only leave out of the

P 2

( "« )

complex idea they had of Peter, Jama, Mary, Zee.
that which is peculiar to each, and retain only
what is common to all. And thus they come to
have a general name, and a general idea.

By the fame method they advance to more ge-
neral names and notions. For obfervir.g Gevetari
things that differ from their idea of Man, and can-
not therefore be comprehended under that name,
to agree with Man in fome certain qualities, by
retaining only thofe qualities, and uniting them
into one idea, they have another more general i-
dea, to which giving a name they make a term of
a more com prehenfive exten lion. Thus by leav-
ing out the fhape, and fome other properties figni-
fied by the name Man, and retaining only a body
■with life, fenfe, and fpontaneous motion ; we form
the idea, Signified by the name Animal. By the
fame way the mind proceeds to Body, Sub/lance,
and at Iaft to Being, Thing, and fuch univerfal
Terms which ftand for any ideas whatfoever.
Hence we fee that the whole myitery of Genus
and Species, is nothing elfe but abjiraft ideas more
or lefs Comprehensive, with names annexed to
them.

This (hews us the reafon why in defining words,
v.'e make ufe of the Genus : namely to fave the la-
bour of enumerating the feveral fimple ideas,
which the next general term foods for. From
what has been faki it is plain that General and U-

\

( H7 )

vherfal belong not to the real exigence of things ;
but are inventions of the Underftancing ma'.c by
it for its own ufe, and concern only figns, either
words or ideas.

It muft be conGdered in the next place, what
kind of Bonification it is that general words have.
It is evident that they do not barely fignify one
particular thing : for then they would not be ge-
neral terms, but proper names : neither do they (ig-
nifie a Plurality: for then Man and Men would
iignifie the fame th ng; but that which they fig-
nifie, is 2. fort of things, and this they do, by being
made a lign of an ab(lrac~l idea in the mind, to
which idea, as thims exifting are found to agree,
fo they come to be ranked under that name, or to
be of that fort. The E fences then of the forts or
fpecies of things, arc nothing but thefe ab/lracl i-
deas.

It is not denyed here that Nature makes things
alike, and fo lays the foundation of this lorting
and claffing : but the forts or /pedes themfelvcs
are the workmanfhip of Human Understanding :
fo that every diitinct abjlratt idea, is a distinct Ef~
fence, and the names that itand for fuch diftincl: i-
deas, are the names of things efll'ntially different.
Tims Oval, Circle, Rain and Snow are effentially
different. To make this clearer, it may not be a-
mifs to conGder the fcveral fignifications of the
word E fer.ee.

C "8 )

Firft, It may be taken for the very being of any
thing ivhereby it is, what it is ; thus the real inter-
nal, (but unknown) conftitution in Subjlances,
may be called their Effence. This is the proper Sig-
nification of the word.

Secondly, In the Schools the word EfTence has
been almoft wholly applyed to the artificial consti-
tution of Genus and Species ; it is true, there is or-
dinarily fuppofed a real conftitution of the forts of
things: and it is part doubt there muft be fome
real conftitution, on which any collection of fimple
ideas, co-exifting, muft depend. But it being evi-
dent, thatthings are ranked into forts, under names
only as they agree to certain abftracl ideas, to
which we have annexed thofe names, the effence
of each Genus or Species, is nothing but the abflratt
idea, which the name ftands for ; this the word EJ^
fence imports in its molt familiar ufe.

Thefe two forts of Effence may not unfitly be
termed the one Real, the other Nominal. Between
the nominal EfTence and the name, there is fo near
a connexion, that the name of any fort of things,
cannot be attributed to any particular being, but
what has the EfTence whereby it anfwers that ab-
firat~l idea, whereof that name is the fign.

Concerning the real EfTences of corporeal Sub-
fiances, there are two opinions.

Firjl, Some ufing the word Effence for they know
not what, fuppofe a certain number of thofe Ef-

( H9 )

fences, according to which, all natural things arc
made, and of which they equally partake, and do
become of this or of that Species.

Secondly, Others look on all natural things to
have a real, but unknown conftitution of their
infenfible parts, from whence flow their fcnfible
qualities, which ferve us to diftinguifli them one
from another ; and according to which we rank
them into forts, under common denominations.
The former fuppofition fcems irreconcilable with
the frequent production of monftcrs, in all the fpe-
cies of Animals: flnce it is impoffible that two
things partaking of the fame real EJJence, mould
have different Properties. But were there no other
reafon againft it; yet the fuppofition of EfTenccs
which cannot be known, and yet the making them
to be that which diflinguifheth the fpecies of things,
is fo wholly ufelefs and unferviceable to any part of
Knowledge, that that alone were fufficient to make
us lay it by.

We may further obferve that the nominal, and
real EfTences oijimple ideas and modes, are always
the fame : but in Subjiances always quite diffe-
rent. Thus a figure including a fpace between three
lines, is the real as well as nominal EfTence of a
triangle ; it being that foundation from which
all its. properties flow, and to which they are infe-
parably annexed; but it is far otherwife in Cold
or any other fort oiSubOance ; it is the real confti-

( 12* )

turion of its infenfiUe parts, on which depend all
thofe Properties that are to be found in it ; which
conftitution iince we know nor, nor have any par^
licular idea of, we can have no name that is the
11 gn of it. But yet it is its Colour, Weight, FufibU't-
ty, and Fixednefs, &c. which makes it to be Gold,
or gives ii a right to that name; which is there-
fore its nominal EjJ'ence, fince nothing can be cailed
Gold but what has a conformity to that abftracl
complex idea, to which that name is annexed.

That Efllnces are but attract ideas, may far-
ther appear by their being held ingenerable and
incorruptible. This cannot be true of the real
conftitution of tilings. All things in Nature (fave
the Author of it) are liable to change : their real
Ejjences and Conltitutions are deftroyed and pe-
rifh : but as they are ideas cftablifhcd in the mind,
they remain immutable. For whatever becomes
of Alexander or Bucephalus, the ideas of man and
horfe remain the fame. By thefe means the Ef-
fence of a Species refts fafe and entire, without the
exiftencc of one Individual of that kind.

It is evident t' en that this docVine of the im-
mutability of ElTenccs proves them to be only ab-
ftradt ideas, and is founded on the relation efta-
blifhed between them and certain founds, as figns
of them, and will always be true, as long as the
fame name can have the fame fignification.

( 1*1 )

CHAP. IV.

Of the Names of Simple Ideas.

WORDS tho' they fignifie nothing imme-
diately, but the ideas in the mind of the
Speaker ; yet we (hall find that the names of fimple
Ideas, mixed Modes, and natural Subfiances have
each of them fomething peculiar. And,

Firjl, The names of fimple Ideas and fid '[lances,
with the abltradt Ideas in the Mind, intimate Ibme
real Exiflence, from which was derived their ori-
ginal pattern: but the names of mixed Modes ter-
minate in the idea that is in the Mind.

Secondly, The names of fimple Ideas and Modes
fignifie the real as well as nominal Offences of their
fpecies : the names of fid fiances fignifie rarely, if
ever any thing, but barely the nominal ' E fences of
thofe fpecies.

Thirdly, The names of fimple Ideas are not cap-
able of Definitions ; thofe of complex Ideas are :
the reafon of which I mall fliew from the nature
of our ideas, and the fignification of words.

It is agreed that a Definition is nothing elfe but
the (hewing the meaning of one word, by feverai
other, not Jynonymous Terms. The meaning of
tt-ords being only the ideas they are made to Hand

a

( 122 )
for ; the meaning of any term is then fhewed, of
the word defined, when by other words the idea it
is made the fign of, is as it were, reprefented or fet
before the view of another, and thus its fignifica-
tion alcertained. The names then of fimple ideas
are incapable of being defined, becauie the feve-
ral terms of a Definition fignifying feveral ideas,
they can altogether by no means reprefent an ;"-
dea which has no compofition at all, and therefore
a Definition, which is but the (hewing of the mean-
ing of one word, by feveral others not fignifying
each the fame thing, can in the names of fimple
ideas have no place.

The not oblerving this difference in our ideas,
has occafioned thofe trifling Definitions winch are
given ns of fome fimple ideas ; fuch'as is that of
motion, viz. The Aft of a Being in Power, as far
forth as in Power.

The Atomifts who define Motion to be a Paf
fage frome one place to another, what do they
more than put one fynonymous word for another \
For what is Paffagc other than a Motion? Nor
will the fuccefiive application of the parts of the
fuperficies of one body to thofe of another, which
the Carte fans give us, prove a much better defi-
nition of Motion when well examined.

The Aft of Perfpictious, as far forth as perfpial-
r.us, is another Pcripatetick definition of a fimple /'-
ita, which it is certain can never make the mean-

( 123 )

ing of the word Light, winch it pretends to define,
underftood by a blind man. And when the Carte-
fians tell us, that Light is a great number of little
globules finking brifkiy on the bottom of the eye ;
thefe words would never make the idea the word
Light (lands for, known to a man that had it not
before.

Simple ideas then can only be got by the im-
preffions objects make on our minds, by the pro-
per ln-letts appointed to each fort. If they are not
received this way, all the words in the world will
never be able to produce in us the ideas they
Hand for. Words being founds, can produce in us
no other fimple ideas than of thofe very founds,
nor excite any in us, but by that voluntary con-
nexion which they have with fome ideas which
common ufe has made them figns of: and there-
fore he that has not before received into his mind
by the proper In-lett the fimple idea, which any
word ftands for, can never come to know the fig-
nification of that word, by any ether words cr
founds whatfoever.

But in complex ideas which confilt of (everal
fimple ones, the cafe is quite otherwife ; for words
(landing for thofe feveral ideas that make up the
compofition, may imprint complex ideas in the
mind, that never were there before, and lb make
their names be underftood. In them definitions
take place. Thus the word Rainbow, to one who

. <i2

( 124 )

knew all thofe colours, but yet had never feen that
P ' hoenomenon, might, by enumerating the Figure,
hargenefs, Pofition, and Order of the Colours, be.
fo well defined, that it might be perfectly under-
stood.

The names of fimple Ideas, Subjlances, and
mixed Modes have alfo this difference, that thofe
of mixed Modes (land for ideas perfectly arbitrary:
Thofe of Subjlances are not perfectly fo, but re-
fer to a pattern, tho' with fome latitude; and
thofe of fimple ideas are perfectly taken from the
exiftence of things, and are not arbitrary at all.

The names of fimple modes differ little from
thofe of fimple ideas.

CHAP. V.

Of the Names of Mixed Mode» and Relations.

TH E names of mixed Modes being general,
(land for abftracl ideas in the mind, as o-
ther general names do; but they have fomethirig
peculiar which may defeive our attention.

And Firfl, the ideas they Hand for, or if you
pleafe the eflences of the feveral fpecies of mixed
Modes, are made by the understanding ; wherein
they differ from thofe of fimple ideas.

Secondly, They are made arbitrarily, without
patterns, or reference to any real exiftence, where-

( "S )

in they differ from thofe of Subjlanees. The mind
unites and retains certain collections, as fo many
djflinct fpecifick ideas, whilit other combinations
that as often in nature occur, and are as plainly
fuggefted by outward things, pafs neglected with-
out particular names, or fpecifications.

The mind in forming thofe complex /Vm, makes
no new idea, but only puts together thofe which it
had before, wherein it does three things. Firft, It
chufes a certain number. Secondly, It gives them
connexion, and combines them into one idea.
Thirdly, It ties them together by a name ; all this
may be done before any one individual of that fpe-
cies of Modes ever exifted : as the ideas of Sacri-
lege or Adultery might be framed, before either of
them was committed; and we cannot doubt but
law-makers have often made laws about fpecies of
Aclions, which were only the creatures of their
own underftanding.

But tho' mixed Modes depend on the mind, and
are made arbitrarily ; yet they are not made at
random, and jumbled together without any reafon
at all, but are always made for the convenience of
communication, which is the chief end of language,
and therefore fuch combinations are only made, as
men have frequent occafion to mention. Thus men
having joined to the idea of killing the idea of
Father and Mother, and fo made a diftincl fpe-
pes from the killing a man's Son or Neighbour,

( I*<5 )

bccaufe of the different heinoufnefs of the crime,
and the diftinel puni/hment due to it, found it
neceffary to mention it by a diftinct name, which
is the end of making that diftinct combination.

In mixed Modes it is the name that feems to
preferve their ElTences, and to give them their
Jafting duration. The collection of ideas is made
by the mind, but the name is as it were the Knot
which ties them faft together : hence we feL'om
take any other for diftinct fpecie6 of mixed Modes,
but fuch as are fet out by names. We muft ob-
ferve that the names of mixed Modes always fig-
riifie the real EfTences of their fpecies, which being
nothing but the abftracl: complex ideas, and not re-
ferred to the real existence of things ; there is no
fuppofition of any thingmore fignified by any name
of a mixed Mode, but barely that complex idea the
mind it felf has formed : which when the mind
has formed, is all it would exprefs by it, and is
that on which all the properties oi the fpecies de-
pend, and from which alone they flow ; and fo in
thefe the real and nominal Efjence is the fame.

This alfo fhews the reafon why the names of
mixed Modes are commonly got, before the ideas
they fland for are perfectly known : becaufe there
being no fpecies of thefe ordinarily taken notice of",
but fuch as have names, and thofe fpecies being
complex ideat made arbitrarily by the mind, it is
convenient, if not necelTary, to know the names,

( i«7 )

before we learn the complex ideas % unlefs a man
will fill his head with a company of abftracl com-
flex ideas, which others having no names for, he
has nothing to do with, but to lay by, and forget a-
gain. In the beginning of languages it was necef-
lary to have the idea before one gave it the name ;
and fo it is (till, where a new complex idea is to be
made, and a name given it. Infimple ideas and fub-
fiances I grant it is otherwife ; which being fuch i-
deas as have real exiltence and union in nature, the
ideas or names are got, one before the other, as it
happens.

What has been faid here of mixed Moats, is
with very little difference applicable to Relations
aifo ; which fince every man himfelf may obferve,
I may fpare my felf the pains to enlarge on.

CHAP. VI.

Of the Names ofSubftances.

THE common names of Subftances ftand for
forts as well as other general teims ; that is,
for fuch complex ideas, wherein feveral particular
Subftances do, or might agree, by virtue of which
they are capable to be comprehended in one com-
mon conception, and be fignified by one name ;
I fay, do or might agree, for tlio' there be but one

( »8 )

Sun exifting, yet the idea of it being abftracted, ia
as much a fort, as if there were as many funs as
there are (tars.

The meafure and boundary of each fort where-
by it is conftituted that particular fort, and diftin*
guifhed from others, is what we call its Ejfsnce ;
which is nothing but that abitract idea to which
that name is annexed, fo that every thing con-
tained in that idea, is eiTential to that fort. This
I call Nominal EJfence, to diflinguilh it from that
real constitution of fubftav.ces, on which this iVo-
tn'inal EJfence, and all the properties of that fort
depend, and may be called its real EJfence : thus
the nominal EJ/ence of Gold is that complex idea the
word Gold Hands for, let it be for inftance a Body,
Yellow, Weighty, Malleable, Fufible, and Fixed :
but its real EJfence is the conltitution of its infen-
fible parts, on which thofc qualities, and all its ci-
ther properties depend ; which is wholly unknown
to us.

That EJfence in the ordinary ufe of the word re-
lates to Sorts, appears from hence, that if you
take away the abitract ideas by which we fort In-
dividuals, and rank them under common names,
then the thought of any thing eiTential to any of
them inftantly vanifhes : we have no notion of the
one without the other, which plainly (hews their
Relation. No property is thought eiTential to
any Individual whatfoever, till the mind re-

( 129 )

fers it to fome fort or fpecies of Things, and then
prefently, according to the abllracl idea of that
fort, fomething is found eflential ; fo that cf-
fcntial or not clfential, relates only to our abfhacT:
ideas, and the names annexed to them, which a-
mounts to no more but this, that whatever parti-
cular thing has not in it thofe qualities contained
in the abflracl idea which any general term Hands
for, cannot be ranked under that fpecies, nor be cal-
Jed by that name ; fince that abflracl idea is the
very Elfence of that fpecies. Thus if the idea of
Body with fome people be bareExtenfion, or Space,
then Solidity is not eflential to Body : if others
make the idea, to which they give the nameZ?^
to be Solidity and Extenfion •, then Solidity is ei«
fential alfo to Body. That alone therefore iscon-
fidered as efTential, which makes a part of the
complex idea the name of a Sort ftands for, without
which no particular thing can be reckoned of that
fort, nor be entituled to that name.

Subjlances are diftinguiflied into Sorts and Spe-
cies by their nominal Effence ; for it is that alone,
that the name which is the mark of the Sort figni-
fies : and the fpecies of Things to us are nothing
but the ranking them under diltincT: names, ac-
cording to the complex ideas in Us, and not ac-
cording to precife, diftindl, real Effences in Them.
We cannot rank and fort Things by their real
Effences, becaufe we know them not: our facul-
R

C *3° )
ties carry us no farther in the Rnowledge of Sab-
llances, than a collection of thofe fenfible ideas we
obfcrve in them. But the internal Conflitution
whereon their properties depend, is utterly un-
known to us. This is evident when wc come to
examine but the ftones we tread on, or the iron we
daily handle : we foon find that we know not their
make, and can give no reafon of the different qua-
Jities we find in them ; and yet how infinitely thefe
come ihort of the fine contrivances and unconceiv-
able real EiTences of Plants and Animals, every
one knows. The workmanfhip of the All-wife and
Powerful God in the great fabrick of theUniverfe,
and every part thereof farther exceeds thecompre-
henfion of the molt inquifitive and intelligent
man, than the bed contrivance of the moll inge-
nious man, doth the conceptions of the moll ig-
norant of rational creatures. In vain therefore do
we pretend to range things intoy3r/.r, and difpofe
them into certain ClaJJes, under names by their
real EJfences, that are fo far from our difcovery or
comprchenfion.

But tho' the nominal EJfences of Subftances are
made by the mind, they are not yet made fo ar-
bitrarily as thofe of mixed Modes. To the mak-
ing of any nominal EJ/ence, it is necelfary,

Firfl, That the ideas whereof it confilts, have
fuch an union as to make but one idea, how com-
pounded foever.

( 13* )

Secondly, That the particular ideas fo united be
exactly the fame, neither more or lefs: for if
two abftract complex ideas differ cither in number
or forts of their component parts, they make two
different, and not one and the fame Effence.

In the Firft of thefe, the mind in making ks
complex ideas of Subffances, only follows Nature,
and puts none together which are not fuppofed to
have an union in nature. For men obferving cer-
tain qualities always joined and exiffing together
therein copy nature, and of ideas fo united, make
their complex ones of Subffances.

Secondly, Tho' the mind in making its complex
ideas of Subffances, never puts any together that
do not really, or are not fuppofed to co-exift : yet
the number it combines depends upon the various
care, induftry or fancy of him that makes it. Men
generally content themfeives with fome few obvi-
ous qualities, and often leave out others as mate-
rial and as firmly united as thofe that they take in.

In Bodies organized and propagated by Seeds,
as Vegetables and Animals, the fbape is that which
to us is the leading quality, and mod charairerif-
tical part that determines xhefpecies : in moff o-
ther bodies not propagated by feed, it is the colour
we chiefly fix on, and are moff led by. Thus where
we find the colour of Gold, we are apt to imagine
all the other qualities comprehended in our ccm
plex idea of Cold, to be there alio.

R2

( III )

Tho' the nominal Effences of Subftances are all
fuppoied to be copied from Nature, yet they are
all, or moft of them, very imperfect : and fince the
composition of thofe complex ideas is in feveral
men very different, we may Conclude that thefc
boundaries of fpecics are as Men, and not as Na-
ture makes them; if at leaft there are in Nature
any fuch prefixed bounds.

It is true, that many particular Subftances are
fo made by Nature, that they have an agreement
and likenefs one with another, and fo afford a
foundation of being ranked into Sorts : but the
fitting of things by us, being in order to naming
and comprehending them under general terms, I
cannot fee how it can be properly faid, that Na-
ture fcts the boundaries of ths fpecies of things.
But if it be fo, our boundaries of fpecies, are not
exactly conformable to Nature.

If the firll forting of Individuals depends on the
mind of man, varioufly collecting the fimple /V<r J/,
that make the nominal Effence of the loweft fpe-
cies ; it is much more evident, that the more com-
prehenfive Gaffes, called Genera, do fo. In forming
more general ideas that may comprehend different
forts, the mind leaves out thofe qualities that di-
ftinguilh them, and puts into its new collection on-
ly fuch ideas as are common to feveral forts. Thus
by leaving out thofe qualities which are peculiar
to Gold, Silver, <£>c. and retaining a complex idta%

C *33 >

made up of thofe that are common to each fpe-
cies, there is a new Genus conftituted, to which the
name Metal is annexed.

So that in this whole bufinefs of Genera and
Species, the Genus or more comprehenfive, is but
a partial conception of what is in the Species, and
the /pedes but a partial idea of what is to be found
in each Individual. In all which there is no new
thing made, but only more or lefs coroprehenfive
figns, whereby we may be enabled to exprefs in a.
few fyllables great numbers of particular things,
as they agree in more or lefs general conceptions,
which we have framed to that purpofe. If thefe
abflratl general ideas be thought to be complear,
it can only be in refpect of a certain eltablilhed re-
lation between them, and certain names, which are
made ufe of to fignirle them, and not in refpecl of
any tiling exiiting as made by Nature.

This is adjufted to the true end of Speech, which
is to be the eafieft and fhorteft way of communi-
cating our notions. This is the proper bufinefs of
Genus and Species : and this men do without any
confideration of real ellences.and fubftantial forms,
which come not within the reach of our know-
ledge, when we think of thofe things; nor within
the fignificacion of our words when we difcourfe
with others.

c m )

CHAP. VII.
Of Particles.

BEfides words which are the names of ideas in
the mind, there are others made ufe of to fig-
nifie the Connexion that the mind gives to ideas or
propofitionsone with another, and to intimate fome
particular Aclion of its own at that time relating
to thofe ideas. This it does feveral ways; as »/, is
Not, are marks of the mind affirming or denying :
befides which, the mind does in declaring its fcnti-
ments to others connecl not only the parts of pro-
politions, but whole fentences one to another with
their feveral relations, and dependencies to make a
coherent difcourfe.

The words llgnifying that connexion the mind
gives to feveral affirmations and negations, that it
unites in one continued Reafoning or Narration,
are called Particles. And it is in the right ufe of
thefe, that more particularly confifts the clearnefs
and beauty of a Good Stile. To exprefs the de-
pendence of his Thoughts and Reafonings one u-
pon another, a man muft have words to fliew what
connexion, reftriclion, diflinclion, oppofition, em-
phafis, <bc. he gives to each refpeclive part of his
difcourfe.

Thefe cannot be underftood rightly, without a
clear view of the poftures, Hands, turns, limitatir

( W )

on?, exceptions, and feveral other thoughts of the
mind : of thefe there are a great variety, much ex-
ceeding the number of Particles that mod langua-
ges have to exprefs them by; for which reafon it
happens, that mod of thefe Particles have divers,
and fometimesalmoftoppofite fignifications. Thus
the particle But in Englijh, hasfevera! very different
fignifications ; as, But to fay no more : here it inti-
mates a ftop of the mind in the courfe it was go-
ing, before it came to the end of it. I fail) but two
Planets : here it (hews that the mind limits the
fenfe to what is exprefled with a Negation of all
other : Toil pray, but it is not that God "would bring
you to the true Religion, but that he would confirm
you in your own. The former of thefe intimates a
fuppofition in the mind of fomething otherwife
than it fhould be : the latter /hews, that the mind
makes a direct oppofition between that and what
goes before. All Animals have fenfe, but a Dog is
an Animal. Here it fignifics the connexion of the
latter propofition with the former. To thefe, di-
vers other fignifications of this Particle might be
added, if it were my bufinefs to examine it in its
full latitude.

I intend not here a fall explication of this fort
of Signs, the inftances I have given in this one,
may give occafion to reflect on their ufe and force
in language, and lead us into the contemplation
of feveral actions of our minds in difcouifmg,

( 13* )

which it has found a way to intimate toothers by
thefe Particles, fome whereof conftantly, and o-
thers in certain conftrudtions, have the fenfe of a
whole fentence contained in them.

CHAP. VIII.

Of abftrafl and concrete Terms.

THE Mind, as has been fhewn, has a power
to abftracl its idea, whereby the Sorts of
Things are diftinguifhed : now each abflrail idea
being diftincl, fo that the one can never be the o-
ther, the mind will, by its intuitive knowledge
perceive their difference ; and therefore in propo-
rtions, no two whole ideas can ever be affirmed
one of another : nor does the common ufe of lan-
guage permit that any two abftracl words or names
of abflratl ideas, mould be affirmed one of another.
All our affirmations are only in Concrete, which is
the affirming one abjlraft idea to be joined to ano-
ther : which abftracl ideas in Sub/lances, may be of
any fort, tho' the moft of them are of Powers : in
all the reft thefe are little elfe but Relations.

All our fimple ideas have abjlracl as well as
Concrete names, as Whitenefs White, S-weetnefs
Sweet, Sec. The like alfo holds in our ideas of
Modes and Relations, as Jttfliee Jttff, Equality E-
qual, Sec. But as to our ideas of Subftances, we have
very few abftracl names at all. Thofe few that the

( 137 )

fchools have forged, as Animalitas, Humcmtas, &c.
hold no proportion with the infinite number of
frames of fubitances, and could never get admit-
tance into common ufc, or obtain the licence of
publick approbation j which feems to intimate the
confeffion of all mankind, that they have no ideas
of the real Eifences of Subftances, fince they have
not names for fuch ideas. It was only the doctrine
off ubftantial Forms, and the confidence of miftaken
Pretenders to a Knowledge they had not, which
firlt coin'd, and then introduced Animalitas, Hu-
manitas, and the like : which yet went very little
farther than their own fchools, and could never get
to be current amonglt undcrftanding men.

CHAP. IX.

Of the Imperfeclion of Words.

TO examine the PcrfeClion or ImperfeClion of
Words, it is neceflary to confider their ufe
and end, which is twofold, Firfl, to record our
own thoughts : Secondly, to communicate our
thoughts to others : the Firfl is for the help of our
own memories, whereby we do as it were talk to
our felves : for this purpofe any Words may ferve
the turn : words being arbitrary flgns, we may ufe
which we pleafe for this purpofe ; and there will
be no Imperfection in them, if we conftantly ufe
the fytt&Jjgn for the fame idea.
S

( '38 )

Secondly, As to Communication by Words; that
too has a double ufe : Fir/}, Their Civil Ufe,
which is fuch a Communication of thoughts and
ideas by Words, as may fcrve in common Con-
vcrfation and Commerce, about the ordinary Af-
fairs and Conveniencies of civil Life. Secondly,
The philofophical ufe of Words, by which I mean
fucli an ufe of them, as may fcrve to convey the
precife notions of things, and to exprefs certain
Truths in general Propofftions, thefc two ufes are
very diftindr, and a great deal lefs exadtnefs will
ferve in the one, than in the other.

The end of Language in Communication is to
be underload; that is, to excite by founds in the
hearer, the fame idea which they (land for in the
mind of the Jpeaker. The doubtfulnefs and uncer-
tainty of their fignifkation, which is the imperfec-
tion we are here fpeaking of, has its caufe more in
the ideas themftlves than in any incapacity in the
founds to iignifie them ; for in that regard they are
all equally perfect. That then which makes the
difference, is the difference of ideas they ftand for,
which mull be learned and retained by thofe, who
would difcourfe together intelligibly. Now this is
difficult in thefe cafes,

Fir/I, Where the ideas they {tand for are very
complex. Hence the names of mixed Modes arc
liable to great uncertainty and obfeurity in their
fignification. For here the idea being made up of

< »39 )

mmy parts, it is not eafy to form and retain it ex-
actly ; of this fort chiefly are moral Words, which
have fclJom in two different men, the fame pre-
cife lignification.

Secondly, Where the ideas they fiand for, have
no certain connexion in nature, and therefore no
fettled flandard to reclifie and adjufl them by. This
again is the cafe of the names of mixed Modes,
which are alfemblages of ideas put together at plea-
fure. Common ufe indeed regulates the meaning
of Words pretty well for common Conversion :
but it is not fufheient to adjuft them to phiiofo-
phical difcourfes, there being fcarce a name of any
very complex idea, which in common ufe has not a
great latitude ; and is not made the fign of far dif-
ferent ideas.

The way of learning thefe names does not a lit-
tle contribute to the doubtfulnefs of their fignirica-
tion. For we may obferve that children are taught
the names of dmple ideas, and fubftances, by hav-
ing the things fhewn them ; and then they repeat
the name that ftands for it; asIVhit-e, Siveet, Milk,
Sugar, &c. But in mixed Modes the founds are
learned firlt, and men are to learn afterwards their
Cgnilication, by their own obfervation and indu-
ftry, or the explication of others : which is the
reafon that thefe words are little more than bare
founds in the minds of molt, becaufe few are at the
pains to fettle their ideas and notions precifely ;

S 2

( i4o )
and thofe which arc, make them thefigns of i dear,
different from whit others undcrftand by them,
which is the occalion of molt disputes.

Thirdly, Where the fignilication of a word is re-
ferred to a ftandard which is not eafily known :
this is the cafe of the names of fubflances, which
being fuppofed to ftand for their realEJJences, muft
needs be of uncertain application, becaufe thefe
Elfenccs are utterly unknown ; and it will be im-
poflible to know what is, or is not Antimony, v.g.
when that wor ! is to ftand for the real Effence oi
it ; whereof we have no idea at all.

Or fuppofe thefe names only ftand for fimple *'-
deas, found to co-exift in fubflances, yet thus they
will be liable to great uncertainty too : becaufe
thefe fimple ideas being very numerous, men frame
different idejs of the fame fubjeefs, by putting dif-
ferent ideas into their complex one, of fuch fub-
ftances feveral men obferve feveral properties in
the fame fubftance, and none of them all ; who
having but imperfeel defcriptions of things, can
have but uncertain figniikations of words.

Fourthly, Where the fignih'cation of the word,
and the real Effence of the thing, are not the fame,
which is ftill the cafe of fuhftanccs, from hence we
may obferve,

Firji, That the names of fimple ideas are leafl
liable to miftakes : Firfl, Becaufe the ideas they
Hand for, being each but one fingle perception, arc

( 141 )

eafier got, and more clearly retained, than the more
complex ones of Subftances and mixed Modes,
Secondly, Becaufe they are not referred to any o-
ther Eirence, but barely that perception they im-
mediately fignify.

Secondly, Names of fimfle Modes are next to
fimple ideas lead liable to doubt or uncertainty, e-
fpecially tbofe of Figure and Number, of which
men have fo clear and diftinct ideas.

Thirdly, In mixed Modes, when they are com-
pofed of a few and obvious ideas, their names are
clear and diftinct enough ; otherwife doubtful and
uncertain.

Fourthly, The names effubftances being annex-
ed to ideas, that are neither the real EfTences, nor
exact Reprefentations of things, are liable yet to
greater Imperfection, when we come to a philofo»
phicalufeof them.

CHAP. X.

Of the Abufe of Words.

B Elide the natural and unavoidable Imperfec-
tions of Languages, there are wilful Faults
and Neglects, which men are often guilty of in
their ufe of words. For,

Firfl, They ufe words without clear anddijiinii

Ideas, or, which is worfe, Cgns without any thing

.J ; fuch are for the moft part introduced by

C 142 )

feels of Philofopliy and Religion, either out of an
affectation oH fmgularity, or to fupport fome ftrange
Opinion; or to cover the weaknefs of thegr Hypi-
thefis. Thefe are commonly fuch as had no deter-
minate collection of ideas annexed to them, when
they were firft invented ; or at leaft fuch, as if well
examined will be found inconfiftent.and therefore
may juftly be called infignificant terms : inTtances
of this kind may eafily be had from the fchool-men
and metaphyftcians. Others Jearn words which the
propriety of language has affixed to very impor-
tant ideas, and often upon occafion ufe them with-
out any diltinct meaning at all : whence their no-
tions being unftcady and confufed, their difcourfe
muftbe filled with empty unintelligible Ncife and
Jargon, efpecially in moral matters where the
words ftand for arbitrary, and numerous collecti-
ons of ideas, not regularly and permanently united
in Nature.

Secondly, Another Abufe is lnconflancy in the ufe
of Words; it is hard to find a difcourfe on any fub-
ject wherein the fame words are not ufed fome-
times for one collection of ideas, fbmetimes for
another. The wilful doing whereof can be im-
puted to nothing but great folly, or greater diflio-
nefty: and a man in his accompts with another,
may with as much fairnefs make the characters
of numbers, ftand fometimes for one, and fome-
times for another collection of Unites; as in his

( M3 )

difcourfe, or reafoning, make the fame words ftand
for different collections of fun pie ideas.

Thirdly, Another h an affetted obfeurity, either
by ufmg old words in new fignifications, or by in-
troducing new and ambiguous terms, without de-
fining them; or putting them together, fo as to
confound their ordinary meaning. Tho' the Peri-
patetick philofophy has been molt eminent in this
way, yet other feels have not been wholly clear
of it. The admir'd art of difputing hath added
much to the natural imperfection of Languages,
whilff, it has been made ufe of, and fitted to perplex
the deification of words, more than to difcover
the Knowledge and Truth of things : and he that
will look into that fort of learned writings, will
find the words there much more obfeure, uncer-
tain, and undetermined in their meaning, than
they are in ordinary Converfation.

Fourthly, Another is the taking words for things :
this, tho' it in fome degree concerns all names in
general; yet more particularly affects thofe of Sub-
fiances. Thus in the Peripatetick Philofopby, Sub-
jlantial Forms, Abhorrence of Vacuum, Sec. are ta-
ken for fomcthing real. To this Abufe thofe men
are molt fubject, who confine their thoughts to any
one Jyftem-, and give themfelves up into a firm be-
lief of the perfection of any received Hypothefis ;
whereby they come to be perfuaded, that the
terms of that feet, are fo fuited to the nature of

( »44 )
things, that they perfectly correfpond with their
real exiftence.

Fifthly, Another is the felting them in the place
cf things which they can by no means fgnify. We
may obferve that in the general names of Subltances,
whereof the nominal Eiienccs arc only known to
us, when we affirm or deny any thing about them,
we do molt commonly tacitly fuppofe or intend
they mould ftand for the real Effcnce of a certain
fort of Subltanccs. Thus when a man fays CoUl
is malleable, he would infinuate fomething more
than this, what I call Gold is malleable, (tho' tru-
ly it amounts to no more) namely, that what has
the real EiTence of Cold is malleable, that is, that
malleablenefs depends on, and is infeparable from
the real Eflence of Gold. But a man not knowing
wherein that real EfTence conlifts, the connexion
in his mind of malleablenefs, is not truly with an
Ejfenct he knows not, but with the found Gold l.c
puts for it. It is true, the names ofSubftanccs
would be much more ufeful ; and Proportions c»
preft by them much more certain, were the real
EfTences of Subftances the ideas in our minds,
which thofe words fignified. And it is for want oi
thofe real EfTences that our words convey fo little
knowledge, or certainty in our difcourfes about
them. But to fuppofe thefe names to Rand for a
thing, having the real Effence on which the pro-
perties depend, is fo far from diminishing the im-

( I4J )

perfection of our words, that by a plain abufe it
adds to it •, when we would make them ftand for
fbmething, which not being in our compkx ideas,
the name we ufe can no way be the fign of it. In
mixed Modes, any idea of the complex one being
left out, or changed, it is allowed to be another
thing, that is, to be of another /pedes, as is plain
in Chance-medley, Man-flattghter, Murder, &c. be-
caufe the complex idea fignified by that name, is
the real 3S well as nominal Eflence ; and there is
no fecret reference of that name to any other Ef-
fence, but that. But in Subftanccs it is not lb; for
tho' in that called Gold, one puts in his complex
idea, what another leaves out, and vice verfa, yet
men do not ufually think the fpecics changed, be-
caule they refer the name in their minds to a real
immutable ElTence of a thing exifting, on which
thofe properties depend : but this reference of the
name to a thing we have not the idea of, is fo far
from helping us at all, that it only ferves the more
to involve us in difficulties. This reference is
grounded on this fuppofition, namely, that the
fame precife internal conftitution goes always with
the fame fpecifick name : in which are contained
thefe two h\kfuppofitions.

Firfl, There are certain precife EJJences, accord-
ing to which, Nature makes all particular things ;
and by which they are diftinguifhed mxo/pecies.

Secondly, This tacitly infinuates as if we had r-
T

( M*. )
deas of thefe Eflences; for why do we enquire,
whether this or that thing have the real Eflence
of that fpecics man for inftancc, if we did not fup-
pofe it known, which yet is utterly falfe ; and
therefore fuch applications of names as would
make them ftand for ideas we have not, muft needs
caufe great dftbrder in difcourfe and reafoningsa-
bout them ; and be a great inconvenience in our
communication by words.

Sixthly, Another more general, tho' lefs ob-
ferved, abufe of words, is, that men having by
long and familiar ufe, annexed to them certain /'-

'ley are apt to imagine fo near and necejjary a
connexion, between the names, and the fignifications
they ufe them in, that they forwardly fuppofe one can-

i under ftand what their meaning is ; as if it
were pa(t doubt, that in the ufe of thefe common
received founds, the fpeaker and hearer had ne-
ccllarily the fame precife ideas. And {o likewife
taking the words of others, as naturally ftanding
for juft, what they themfelves have been ac-
cuftomed to apply them to, they never trouble
themfelves to explain their own, or under-
itand anothers meaning : from whence com-
monly proceeds noife, and wrangling without im-
provement or information ; whilft men take
words to be the conltant regular marks of agreed
notions, which in truth are no more but the vo-
funtajy and unfteady ligns of their own ideas-

( 147 )

Thus life, is a term, none more familiar : any one
almoft would take it for an affront, to be aiked
what he meant by it, and yet if it comes in que-
ition, whether fuch a thing has life, or not, it is
cafy to perceive, that a clear diltincl fettled idea,
does not always accompany the ufe of fo known
a word.

Seventhly, Figurative Speech is alfo an abufe of
Language : for tho' in difcourfes, where we feek
rather pleafure and delight, than information and
improvement, fuch ornaments as are borrowed
from figurative fpeeches and allufions, can fcarce
pafs for faults ; yet if we would fpeak of things as
they are, we mult allow, that all the art ofrheto-
rick, befides order and cJearnefs, all the artificial
and figurative application of words, eloquence hath
invented, are fornothing elfebut to infinuate wrong
ideas, move the paflions, and thereby miflead
the judgment, and fo indeed are perfedt cheat.
And therefore however allowable they may be
in harangues and popular addreffes ; they are
certainly in all difcourfes that pretend to inform
and initrucl, wholly to be avoided ; and where
truth and knowledge are concerned, cannot but
be thought a great fault, either of the language or
perfon that makes ufe of them.

To conclude this confideration, the ends of
language in our difcourfc with others, are chiefly
thefe three.

T 2

( MS )

Fir/}, To make our thoughts or ideas known
to another ; this we fail in : i /?, When we ufe
names without clear and diftinct ideas in our
minds, idly, When we apply received names to
ideas, to which the common ufe of that language
does not apply them, %dly, When wc apply them
unsteadily, making them ftand now for one, and
hy and by for another idea.

Secondly, To make known our thoughts with as
much taps and quicknefs as is poflible. This men
fail in when they have complex ideas, without
having distinct names for them, which may hap-
pen either through the defect of a language, which
has none, or the fault of that man who has not
yet learned them.

Thirdly, To convey the knowledge of things:
this cannot be done, but when our ideas agree to
the reality of things.

He that hath names without ideas, wants mean-
ing in his words, and fpeaks only empty founds :
he that hath complex ideas, without names for
them, wants difpatch in his expreflion. He that
ufeshis words loofely and unsteadily, will either
not be minded, or not understood. He that applies
his names to ideas, different from their common
ufe, wants propriety in his language, and fpeaks
gibberifh. And he that hath ideas of fubjlances,
difagreeing with the real existence of things, fo
far wants the materials of true knowledge in hi3

( 149 )

undemanding, and has inftead thereof, chimeras.

Language being the great conduit whereby men
convey their difcoveries, reafonings, and know-
ledge from one to another ; he that makes an ill
ufe of it, thot' he does not corrupt the fountains
of knowledge which are in things themfelves, yet
he does as much as in him lies, break or flop
the pipes whereby it is diftributed to the publick
ufe and advantage of mankind. He that ufes
words without any clear and Heady meaning,
what does he but lead himfeif and others into er-
rors .' And he that defignedly docs it, ought to
be look'd on as an enemy to truth and knowledge.

If we look into books of controverfie of any
kind, we fhall fee that the efFed of obfeure, un-
fteady and equivocal terms, is nothing but noife
and wrangling about founds, without convincing or
bettering a man's underftanding. For if the idea
be not agreed on between fpeaker and hearer, for
which the words Hand, the argument is not about
things but names.

It deferves to be confidered, and carefully exa-
mined, whether the greateltpart of the dilputes in
the world, are not merely verbal, and about the
lignification of words; and that if the terms they
are made in were defined and reduced in their fig-
nifications, to the lingle ideas they ftand for, thofe
difputes would not end of themfelves, and imme-
diately vanifh.

( »5° )

CHAP. XI.

Of the Remedies of the foregoing Imperfeflions
and Abufcs.

TO remedy the defects of fpeech above-men-
tioned, the following rules may be of ufe.

Fir/}, A man fhouid take care to ufe no word
without a fignification, no name without an idea
for which he makes it ftand. This rule will not
feem needlefs to any one, who will take the pains
to recollect how often he has met with fuch words,
as Inftintl, Sympathy, Antipathy, Sec. fo made ufe
of, as he might eafily conclude, that thofe that
ufed them had no ideas in their minds to which
they applied them.

Secondly, Thofe ideas he annexes them tofhould
be clear and diflinB, which in complex ideas is by
knowing the particular ones that make that com-
pofition; of which, if any one be again complex,
we mud know alfo the precife collection that is
united in each, and lb till we come to fimple ones.
In Subftances the ideas muft not only be diftincT:,
but alfo conformable to things as they exift.

Thirdly, He muft apply his words, as near as
may be, to fuch ideas, as common ufe has annex-
ed them to : for words, efpccially of languages al-
ready framed, are no man's private poiTefTion, but

( 1*1 )

the common meafure of commerce and •omma-
nication; and therefore it is not for any one to
change the ftamp they are current in, nor alter
the ideas they are affixed to ; or at leaft, when
there is a neceflity to do fo,he is bound to give no-
tice of it. And therefore,

Fourthly, When common ufe has left the figni-
fication of a word uncertain and loofe, or where it
is to be ufed in a peculiar fenfe; or where the
term is liable to any doubtfulnefs or miftake,
there it ought to be defined, and its fignification
afcertained.

Words Handing for Jimple ideas being not defin-
able, their fignification muft be fhewn either, F/r/7,
By a fynonymous word. Secondly, By naming a
fubject, wherein that fimple idea is to be found.
Thirdly, By prefenting to the fenfes that fubject,
which may produce it in the mind, and make
him actually have the idea that word ftands for.,
Mixed Modes may be perfectly defined, by exact-
ly enumerating thofe ideas that go to each com-
pofition. This ought more efpecially to be done
in mixed Modes belonging to Morality: fince
definition is the only way whereby the precife
meaning of moral Words can be known : and
yet a way whereby their precife meaning may be
known certainly, and without leaving any room
for any conteft about it.

For the explaining the fignification of the names

( fp )

of fubftances, both the fore-mentioned ways,o/z. of
fhewing,and defining arcrequifitc in many cafes to
be made ufc of; their names are belt defined by
their leading Qualities, which are moftly Jhape in
animals and vegetables; and colour in inanimate
bodies ; and in fome, both together- Now thefe
leading Qualities are belt made known by (hewing,
and can hardly be made known otherwifei The
fhape of a Horfe or Caflbwary will be but imperfectly
imprinted on the mind by words : the light of the
animals doth it much better. And the idea of the
particular colour of Gold is not to be got by any
defcription of it, but only by the frequent exer-
cife of the eyes about it. The like may be faid
of thofe other fimple ideas, peculiar in their kind
to any fubftance, for which precife ideas there arc
no peculiar names.

But becaufe many of the fimple ideas, which
make up our fpecifick ideas of fubftances, are
powers which lie not obvious to our ier\(e in the
things, as they ordinarily appear ; therefore in
the fignification of our names of Subftanccs, fome
part of the fignification will be better made known,
by enumerating thofe fimple ideas, than in (hew-
ing the fubftance it felf. For he that to the Tel-
low fhining colour of Cold, got by fight, (hall from
my enumerating them have the ideas of great
Duilibi/ity, Fujibility, Fixednefs, and Solubility in
Aqua Regia will have a perfecter idea of Geld,

( 153 )

than he can have by feeing a piece oiGold, and
thereby imprinting in his mind only its obvious
qualities.

It were to be wifiied that words Handing for
things, which me known and diitinguifhed by
their outward mapes, mould be exprefTed by little
draughts and prints made of them. A Vocabulary
made after this falhion, would perhaps with more
eafe, and in lefs time, teach the true fignification
of many terms, efpecially in languages of remote
countries, or ages -, and fettle truer ideas in mens
minds of fcveral things, whereof we read the names
in ancient authors, than all the large and labori-
ous comments of learned criticks. Naturali(ls that
treat of Plants and Animals, have found the benefit
of this way : and he that confults them will find
that he has a clearer idea of Apium and Ibex from
a little print of that herb or beaft, than he could
have from a long definition of the names of either
of them ; and fo no doubt he would have of Stri-
gil, and Sijlrum, if inftead of a Curry-comb or Cym-
bal, which arc the Englilh names dictionaries ren-
der them by, he could fee ftamped in the margin
fmall pictures of thefc inftruments, as they were
in ufe amongit the ancients.

Fifthly, The lafl: rule that I fhall mention is,

that in all difcourfes wherein one man pretends

to inftrucT: or convince another, he ihould ufe the

lame word conltantly in the fame fenfe •, if this

U

( |54 > m

were done (which no body can refufe, without
great difingenuity) many of the books extant
might be fpared ; many of the controverfies in
diipute, would be at an end ; fcveral of thofe great
volumes fvvollen with ambiguous words, now u-
fed in one fenfe, and by and by in another, would
fhrink into a very narrow compafs: and many of
the Philofophers (to mention no other) as well as
Poets works, might be contained in a Nutfiel.

C m )

BOOK IV.

CHAP. I.

Of Knowledge in General.

SINCE the mind in all its thoughts and rea-
fonings, has no other immediate object but
its own ideas, which alone it does or can conteni'
plate ; it is evident that our knowledge is only
converfant about them. Knowledge truen feems to
be nothing but the perception of the connexion
and agreement, or difagrcement and repugnancy
of any of our ideas : where this perception is,
there is knowledge ; and where it is not, there,
tho' we fancy, guefs, or believe, yet we always
come fhort of Knowledge. When we know that
White is not Black, what do wc but perceive that
thele two ideas do not agree ? Or that the three
angles of a Triangle, are equal to two right ones;
what do we more but perceive that equality to
two right ones, does necelTarily agree to, and is
infeparable from the three angles of a Triangle?
But to underftand a little more diftinclly, wherein
this agreement or difagreement confilts •, we may
icduce it all to thefc four forts; Firft, Identity ot
U 2

I 156 J

Diverfity; Secondly, Relation; Thirdly, Co-exift*
ence ; Fourthly, Real Exijtence.

1. Identity or Diverfity : 'tis the firft act of the
mind, to perceive its ideas; and Co far as it per
them, to know each what it is, and thereby
to perceive their difference, that i?, the one not to
be the other : by this the mind clearly perceives
e.ich ilea to agree with it fclf, and to be what it is j
and all diftinct ideas to difagree. This it does
without any pains or deduction, by its 1.
power of perception and diltindtion. This is what
men of art have reduced to thofe general rules,
viz. What is, is. And it is impofible for the fame
thing to be, and not to be. But no maxim can make
a man know it clearer, that Round is not Square,
than the bare perception of thofe two ideas, which
the mind at iirft fight perceives to difagree.

2. The next fort of agreement or difagreement the
mind perceives in any of its ideas, may be called
Relative, and is nothing but the perception of the
Relation, between any two ideas of what kind fo-
evcr : that is, their agreement or difagreement one
with another in feveral ways the mind takes of
comparing them.

3. The third fort of agreement or difagreement
to be found in our ideas, is Co-exifience, or Non-co-
exiflence in the fame fubject; and this belongs par-
ticularly toSubltances. Thus when we pronounce
concerning Gold, that it is fixed, it amounts to no

( '57 )

more but this, that fixednefs, or a power to remain
in the fire uric on. fumed, is an idea that always ac-
companies that particular fort of Tcllownefs , Weight ,
Fujibility, Sec. which make our complex idea, fig-
nified by the word Gold.

4. The fourth fort is that of actual and real Ex-
ifletice agreeing to any idea. Within thefe four
forts of agreement or difagreement, I fuppofe is
contained all the knowledge we have, or arc cap-
able of. For all that we know or can affirm con-
cerning any idea, is, that it is, or is not the fame
with fume other : as that Blew is not Yellow. That
it docs, or does not co-exiit with another in the
fame fubjccl: : as that Iron is fufceptible of Magne-
tical Imprejfions : that it has that or this Relation
to fome other ideas: as that two Triangles upon
equal bafes between two parallels are equal; or that
it has a real Exiltence without the mind : as that
God is.

There are feveral ways wherein the mind is pof-
fcfs'd of truth, each of which is called Knowledge.
Firjl, There is aCtual Knowledge, when the mind
lias a prefent view of the agreement or difagree-
ment of any of its ideas, or of the Relation they
have one with another. Secondly, A man is faid
to know any propolltion, when having once evi-
dntly perceived the agreement or difagreementof
the ideas whereof it confifts, and fo lodged it in his
memory, that whenever it comes to be reflected on

( ij8 )

again, the mind alTcnts to it without doubt or hc-
fitation, and is certain of the truth of it. And this
may be called habitual Knowledge : and thus a man
may be faiJ to know all thofe truths which arc
lodged in his memory, by a foregoing, clear, and
full perception.

Of habitual Knowledge there are two forts : the
one is of fuch truths laid up in the memory, as
whenever they occur to the mind, it actually per-
ceives the Relation that is between thofe ideas.
And this is in all thofe truths, where the ideas
themfclves, by an immediate view, difcover their
agreement or diiagreement one with another. The
other is of fuch truths, whereof the mind having
been convinced, it retains die memory of the con-
viction, without the proofs. Thus a man that re-
members certainly, that he once perceiv'd the de-
monftration, that the three angles of a Triangle
are equal to two right ones, knows it to be true,
when that demonftration is gone out of his mind,
and polTibly cannot be recollected : but he knows
it in a different way from what he did before ;
namely, not by the intervention of thofe interme-
diate ideas, whereby the agreement or difagrce-
ment of thofe in the proportion was at firft per-
ceiv'd •, but by remembring, /'. e. knowing that hw
was once certain of the truth of this propofition,
that the three angles of a Triangle are equal to
two right ones. The immutability of the fame Re-

( 159 )

lations between the fame immutable things, is
now the idea that fliews him, that if the three
angies of a Triangle were once equal to two right
ones, they will always be fo. And hence he comes
to be certain, that what was once true, is always
true ; what ideas once agreed, will always agree ;
and confequently, what he once knew to be true,
he will always know to be true, as long as he can
remember that he once knew it.

CHAP. II.
Of the Degrees of our Knowledge.

AL L our Knowledge confifting in the view
the mind has of its own ideas, which is the
utmoft light, and greatefl certainty we are cap-
able of: the different clear nefs of our Knowledge,
feems to lie in the different way of perception the
mind has of the agreement or difagreement of any
of its ideas.

When the mind perceives this agreement or dif-
agreement of two ideas immediately by themfelves,
without the intervention of any other ; we may
call it intuitive Knowledge, in which cafes the
mind perceives the truth, as the eye does light,
only by being directed towards it. Thus the mind
perceives that White is not Black, that Three are
more than Two, and equal to One and Two. This

( itfo )
furt of Knowledge is irrefdtible, and like the bright
fun-Aline, forces it fclf immediately to be perceiv-
ed as loon as ever the mind turns its view that
way. It is on this intuition, that depends all the
certainty and evidence ef our other Knowledge ;
which certainty every one finds to be fo great, that
he cannot imagine, and therefore not require a
greater.

The next degree of Knowledge is, where the
mind perceives not this agreement ordifagreement
immediately, or by the Juxta-pofition as it were of
the ideas, becaufe thofe ideas concerning whofea-
grcement or difagreemeot the enquiry is made,
cannot by the mind be fo put together, as to ihew
it. In tins cafe the mind is fain to difcover the a-
greement or difagreement which it fearches, by
the intervention of other ideas : and this is that
which we call Reafening: and thus if we would
know the agreement or difagreement in bignefs,
between the three angles of a Triangle, and two
right Angles •, we cannot by an immediate view,
and comparing them do it; becaufe the three
angles of a Triangle cannot be brought at once,
and be compared with any other one, or twoangles.
And fo of this, the mind has no immediate or i:.-
tuitivc Knowledge. But we muft find out fome o-
ther Angles, to which the three Angles of a Tri-
angle have equality, and finding thofc equ-1 to
two right ones, we come to know the equality of

( Itfl )

thefe three Angles to two right ones. Thofe in-
tervening ideas, which ferve to (hew the agreement
of any two others, are called Proofs. And where
the agreement or difagreement is by this means
plainly and clearly perceived, it is called Demon-
jlration. A quicknefs in the mind to find thole
Proofs, and to apply them right, is, I fuppofe, that
which is called Sagacity.

This Knowledge, tho' it be certain, is not fo
clear and evident as intuitive Knowledge. It re-
quires pains and attention, and fleady application
of mind, to difcover the agreement or difagree-
ment of the ideas it confiders, and there muft be
a progreffion by fteps and degrees, before the mind
can in this way arrive at certainty. Before De-
monftration there was a doubt, which in intuitive
Knowledge cannot happen to the mind, that has
its faculty of Perception left to a degree capable
of diftinft ideas, no more than it can be a doubt
to the Eye (that can diftinctiy fee White and
Black") whether this Ink and Paper be all of a Co-
lour.

Now in every {tep that Reafon makes in de-
monflrative Knowledge, there is an intuitive Know-
ledge of that agreement or difagreement it feeks
with the next intermediate idea, which it ufes as a
Proof; for if it were not fo, that yet would need a
Proof; fince without the Perception of fuch agree-
ment or difagreement, there is no Knowledge pro-
X

( i«a )
duccJ. By which it is evident, that every flep in
Reafoning, that produces Knowledge, has intuitive
:ty ; which when the mind perceives, there
is no more required but to remember it, to make
the agreement or difagreement of the ideas con-
cerning which we enquire, vifible and certain. This
intuitive Perception of the agreement or difagree-
ment of the intermediate ideas in each flep and
progreflion of the Demonftration, muft alfo be ex-
actly carried in the mind ; and a man mult be fure
that no part is left out •, which becaufe in long de-
ductions, the memory cannot eafiiy retain ; this
Knowledge becomes more imperfect than intui-
tive ; and men often embrace Falfhoods, for De-
monstrations.

It has been generally taken for granted, that Ma-
thematicks alone are capable of demonftrative Cer-
tainty. But to have fuch an agreement or difagree-
ment as may be intuitively perceived, being as I
imagine not the privilege of the ideas of Number,
Extenfion and Figure alone ; it may poffibly be
the want of due method and application in us, and
not of fufEcient evidence in things, that Demon-
ftration has been thought to have fo little to do in
other parts of Knowledge. For in whatever ideas
the mind can perceive the agreement or difagree-
ment immediately, there it is capable of intuitive
Knowledge : and where it can perceive the agree-
ment or difagreement of any two ideas, by an in-

( i*3 )

luitive Perception of the agreement or difagree-
ment they have with any intermediate ideas, there
the mind is capable of Demonstration, which is
not limited to the ideas of Figure, Number, Exten-
fion, or their Modes. The reafon why it has been
generally fuppofed to belong to them only, is bc-
caufe in comparing their Equality or Excefs, the
Modes of Numbers have every the leaft difference,
very clear and perceivable: and in Extenjhn, tho'
every the leaft Excefs is not fo perceptible, yet
the mind has found out ways to difcover the juft
Equality of two Angles, Extenfions, or Figures-,
and both, that is, Numbers and Figures, can be
(et down by vifible and lafting marks.

But in other fimple ideas, whofe Modes and
Differences are made and counted by Degrees, and
not Quantity, we have not fo nice and accurate a
diftinclion of their Differences, as to perceive or
find ways to meafure their juft Equality, or the
leaft Differences. For thofe other fimple ideas be-
ing Appearances or Senfations produced in us, by
the Size, Figure, Motion, Sic. of minute Corpufdes
fingly infenfible; their different Degrees alfo de-
pend on the variation of fome, or all of thofe cau-
fes ; which fince it cannot be obferved by us in
Particles of Matter, whereof each is too fubtile to
be perceived, it is impoflible for us to have any ex-
act meafures of the different degrees of thefe fimple
ideas. Thus, for inftance,not knowing what num.-

X 2

( i64 )

ber of Particles, nor what Motion of them is fit to
produce any precife degree of Whitenefs ; we can-
not demonltrate the certain equality of any two
degrees oi~ Whitenefs, becaufc we have no certain
ftandard to meafure them by, nor means to diftin-
guilh every the lead difference : the only help we
have being from our fenfes, which in this point
fail us.

But where the difference is (6 great as to pro-
duce in the mind ideas clearly diftinct; there i-
tieas of Colours, as we fee in different kinds, Blue
and Red (for inftance) are as capable of Demon-
ftration, as ideas of Number and Extenfion. What
is here faid of Colours, I think, holds true in all
fecondary Qualities. Thcfe two then, Intuition
and Demonftration, are the degrees of our Know
ledge : whatever comes fhort of one of thefe, is
but Faith or Opinion, not Knowledge, at leaft in all
general Truths. There is indeed another Percep-
tion of the mind employed about the particular
Exijleiice of finite Beings, without us, which going
beyond Probability, but not reaching to either of
the foregoing degrees of Certainty, pafles under the
name of Knowledge.

Nothing can be more certain, than that the i-
dea we receive from an external Object is in our
minds: this is intuitive Knowledge; but whether
we can thence certainly infer the Exiftence of any
thing without us, correfponding to that idea, is

( 1*5 )

that whereof fome men think there may be a que-
ftion made, becaufe men may have fuch an idea
in their minds, when no fuch thing exuts, no fuch
Object affects their lenfes. But 'tis evident that
We are invincibly confeious to our felveg of a dif-
ferent Perception, when we look upon the Sun in
the day, and think on it by night ; when we actu-
ally tafte Wormwood, or fmell iRo/e, or only think
on that Savour or Odour : Co that I think we may
add to the two former forts of Knowledge, this
alfo of the Exigence of particular external Ob-
jects, by that Perception and Confcioufnefs we
have, of the actual entrance of ideas from them,
and allow thefe three degrees of Knowledge, viz.
intuitive, demonjlrative, and fenfiti've .

But fince our Knowledge is founded on, and
employed about our ideas only: will it follow
thence that it mull be conformable to our ideas%
and that where our ideas are clear and diftinct,
obfeure and confufed, there our Knowledge will
be fo too \ 1 anfxer, No : for our Knowledge con-
fining in the Perception of the agreement or dip-
agreement of any two ideas; its clearnefs or ob-
fcurity conulls in the clearnefs or obfeurity of that
Perception, and not in the clearnefs or obfeurity
of the ideas themfelves. A man (for inflance) that
lias a clear idea of the angles of a Triangle, and
of Equality to two right ones, may yet have but
sn obfeure Perception of their agreement; and fo

C 166 )
have but a very obfcure Knowledge of it. But ob-
fcure and confufed ideas can never produce any
clear or diftinft Knowledge ; becaufe, as far as any
ideas are obfcure or confufed, fo far the mind can
never perceive clearly, whether they agree or dis-
agree : or, to exprefs the fame thing in a way
lefs apt to be mifunderftood : he that hath not
determin'd ideas to the words he ufes, cannot
make propofitions of them, of whofe truth he can
be certain.

C K A P. III.

Of the Extent of Human Knowledge.

FROM what has been faid concerning Know*
ledge, it follows that, Fir/}, That we can
have no Knowledge farther than we have ideas.

Secondly, That we have no Knowledge far-
ther than we can have Perception of that agree-
ment or difagreementofour ideas, either by Intui-
tion, Demonjlration, or Senfation.

Thirdly, We cannot have an intuitive Know-
ledge that (hall extend it felf to all our ideas, and
all that we would know about them ; becaufe we
cannot examine and perceive all the relations they
have one to another, by Juxta-pofition, or an im-
mediate Comparifon one with another. Thus we
cannot intuitively perceive the equality of two
Extenfions, the difference of whofe figures make*

( i<*7 )

their parts uncapabje of an exact immediate' ap-
plication.

Fourthly, Our rational Knowledge cannot reach
to the whole extent of our ideas ; becaufc between
two different ideas we would examine, we cannot
always find fuch Proofs as we can connect one to
another, with an intuitive Knowledge in all the
parts of the Deduction.

Fifthly, Sen fitiveKnowledge reaching no farther
than the Exiltence of things actually prefent to
our fenfes, is yet much narrower than either of
the former.

Sixthly, From all which it is evident, that the
extent of our Knowledge, comes not only fhort of
the reality of 'Things, but even of the extent of
our own ideas. We have the ideas of a Square, a
Circle and Equality, and yet perhaps fhall never
be able to find a Circle equal to a Square.

The Affirmations or Negations we make con-
cerning the ideas we have, being reduced to the
four forts above-mentioned, viz. Identity, Co-exift-
ence, Relation, and real Exigence ; I fhall examine
how far our Knowledge extends in each of thefe,

Fir/l, As to Identity and Diver fity, our intuitive
Knowledge is as far extended as our ideas them-
felves ; and there can be no idea in the mind,
which it does not prefently by an intuitive Know*
ledge, perceive to be what it is, and to be different
from any other.

( i«8 >

Secondly, As to the agreement or difagrcement
of our ideas in Co-exijlence .- in this our Know-
ledge is very fhort, tho' in this confifts the great-
eft and molt material part of our Knowledge, con-
cerning Subjlances : for our ideas of Subjlances, be-
ing, as I have fhewed, nothing but certain Collec-
tions of fimple ideas, co-exifling in onejubjeci, (our
idea of Flame, for inlt'ancc, is a Body hot, luminous
and moving upward.') When we would know any
thing farther concerning this or any other fort of
Subftance, what do wc but enquire what otherqua-
Jities or powers thefe Subftanceshave or have not?
which is nothing elfe but to know what other fimple
ideas do, or do not co-exifl with thofe that make
Up that complex idea. The reafon of this is, be-
caufe the fimple ideas which make up our com-
plex ideas of Subftances, have no vifible necefTary
connexion or inconfiftence with other fimple ideas,
whofe Co-cxiftence with them we would inform
our felves about. Thefe ideas being likewife for
the moft part fecondary Qualities which depend U-
pon the primary Qualities of their minute or in-
fenfible parts, or on fomething yet more remote
from our comprehenfion; it is impoffible wefhould
know which have a necefTary Union, or Inconfift-
ency one with another, fince we know not the
Root from whence they fpring, or the Size, Figure,
and Texture of Parts on which they depend, and
from which they rcfult.

( 1*9 )

Befides this, there is no difcoverable Connexion
between any fecondary Quality, and thofe primary
Qualities that it depends on. We are fo far from
knowing what Figure, Size,or Motion produces (for
inftance) a yellow Colour, ox fweet Tajle, or a /harp
Sound, that wc can by no means conceive how
any Size, Figure, or Motion cm poffibly produce
in us the idea of any Colour, Tajle, or Sound v/hzt-
foever ; and there is no conceivable Connexion
between the one and the other.

Our knowledge therefore of Co-exiftence reaches
little farther than Experience. Some few indeed
otthe primary Qualities have a necelfary Depen-
dence, and vifible Connexion one with another:
as Figure necefTarily fuppofes Extenfion, receiving
6r communicating Motion by Impulfe, fuppofes Soli-
dity. But Qualities co-exiftent in any fubjecT,
without this Dependence and Connexion, cannot
certainly be known to co-exift any farther, than
experience by our fenfes informs us. Thus, tho*
upon trial we find Gold Yellow, Weighty, Malle-
able, Fufible and Fixed, yet becaufe none of thefe
have any evident Dependence, or neceffary Con-
nexion with the other ; we cannot certainly know,
that where any four of thefe are, the fifth will be
there alfo, how highly probable foever it may be :
but the higheft degree of Probability, amounts not
to Certainty; without which there can be no true
Knowledge : for this Co-exiftence can be no fur-
Y

C 170 )

ther known, than it is percciveJ; and it cannot
be perceived, but either in particular fu! jecls, by
tiic o')!crvation of our fenfes ; or in general, by
the nccellary Connexion of the ideas themfelves.

As to Incompatibility, or Repugnancy to Co-exifl-
ence, we may know that any fubjed can have of
each fort of primary Qualities, ! ut one particular
at once. One Extenfion, one Figure ; and Co of
fcnfible ideas peculiar to each fenfe : for whatever
of each kind is prefent in any fubjeel, excludes all
other of that fort : (at initance, one fubjecl cannot
have two Swells, or two Colours at the fame time.

As to Power j of Sub/lances, which makes a great
part of our enquiries about them, and is no incon-
siderable brand) of our Knowledge : Our Know-
as to thefe reaches little farther than Expe-
rience ; becaufe they confift in a Texture and Mo-
tion of parts, which we cannot by any means come
to difcover ; and I doubt whether with thofe War
culties wc have, we fhall ever be able to carry our
general Knowledge much farther in this part. Ex-
perience is that which in this part wc mud depend
on ; and it were to be wifhed that it were more
improved : we find the advantages fome mens
generous pains, have this way brought to the
flock of natural Knowledge. And if others, efpeci-
ally the Philofophers by fire who pretend to it,
had been Co wary in their Obfervations, and
fiacere in their Reports, as thofe who call them-

( I7i )

felves Philofephers ought to have been : our ac-
quaintance with the Bodies here about us, and our
infight into their powers and operations had been
yet much greater.

As to the third fort the agreement or difagree-
merit of our ideas in any other Relation : this is the
largeit field of Knowledge, and it is hard to deter-
mine how far it may extend. This part depend-
ing on our fagacity in finding intermediate ideas,
that may (hew the Habitudes and Relations of /'-
deas-, it is an hard matter to tell when we are at
an end of fuch difcoveries. They that are igno-
rant of Algebra, cannot imagine the wonders in
this kind, are to be done by it : and what farther
improvements and helps, advantageous to other
parts of Knowledge, the fagacious mind of man
may yet find out, it is noteafy to determine. Tin's
at lead I believe that the ideas of Quantity, are not
thofe alone that arc capable of Demonstration and
Knowledge: and that other, perhaps more ufeful
parts of Contemplation, would afford us Certain-
ty, if Vices, Paflions, and domineering interelr. did
not oppofe or menace endeavours of this kind.

The idea of a fupream Being, infinite in Power,
Goodnefs, and Wifdom, whofc Workmanfhip we
arc, and on whom we depend ; and the idea of our
felves, as understanding rational Creatures, would
I fuppofe, if duly confidered, afford fuch Founda-
tions of our Duty, and Rules of Adieu, as might
Y 2

( 172 )

place Morality among the Sciences capable of De-
monftration : wherein I doubt not but from piin-
ciplcs as inconteftable as thofe of the Mathema-
ticks, by necefTary confequences, the meafure of
Right and Wrong might be made out, to any one
that will apply himfclf with the fame intiiffcrency
and attention to the one, as he does to the other
of thefe Sciences. The Relations of other Modes
may certainly be perceived as well as thofe of Num-
ber and Extenfion. Where there is no Property,
there is no Injujlice, is a Propofition as certain as
any Dcmonftration in Euclid: for the idea of Pro-
perty being a right to any thing ; and the idea of In-
juftice, being the invafion or violation of that right :
it is evident that thefe ideas being thus eftablifhed,
and thefe names annexed to them, I can is cer-
tainly know this Propofition to be true, as that a
Triangle has three Angles equal to two right ones.
Again, no Government allows abfolute Liberty. The
idea oi'Government being the eftablifhment of Socie-
ty upon certain rules or laws, which require con-
formity to them ; and the idea of abfolute Liberty,
being for any one to do whatever he pleafes, I am
as capable of being certain of the truth of this Pro-
pofition, as of any in Mathe;naticks.

What has given the advantage to the ideas of
.'v, and made them thought more capable of
Certainty and Demonfhation, is,

Fir'}, That they can be reprefented by fenfible

( 173 )

marks, which have a nearer correspondence with
them, than any Words or Sounds. Diagrams
drawn on paper, are copies of the ideas, and not li-
able to the uncertainty that words carry in their fig-
nification. But we have no fenfible Marks that re-
femble our moral iJe as, and nothing but words to
cxprefs them by ; which tho', when written, they
remain the fame ; yet the ideas they fhnd for, may
change in the fame man j and it is very feJdom
that they are not different in different perfons.

Secondly, moral ideas are commonly more com-
plex than figures : whence thefe two inconvenien-
cies follow: Firfl, That their names are of more
uncertain Signification ; the precife collection of
fimple ideas they ftand for, not being fo eafily a-
greed on, and fo the Sign that is ufed for them in
Communication always.and in thinking often, does
not fteadily carry with it the fame idea. Second'
ly, The Mind cannot eafily retain thofe precife
combinations fo exactly and perfectly as is necef-
fary ; in the examination of the Habitudes and
Correfpondencies, agreements or difagreements of
feveral of them one with another, efpecially where
it is to be judged of by Jong deductions, and the In-
tervention of feveral other complex ideas, to fhew
the agreementor difagreement of two remote ones.

Now one part of thefe difadvantages in moral i-
dejs, which has made them be thought not capable
of Demonftration, may in a good meafure be reme-

( 174 )
died by Definitions, fitting down that collection of
fimplc ideas which every term (hall (land for, and
then ufmg the terms fteadily and conltantly for
that precifc collection.

As to the fourth fort of Knowledge, viz. Of the
real aclual Exiftence of things, we have an intuitive
Knowledge of our own Exiftence: a demonftrative
Knowledge of the Exiftence of God; and z/enfitive
Knowledge of the ObjeCis that prefent thernfelves
to our Serifs.

From what has been faid we may difcover the
Caujes of our Ignorance, which are chiefly thefc
three, Firft, Want of ideas ; Secondly, Want of a
difcoverable connection between the ideas we
have : Thirdly, Want of tracing and examining
our ideas.

Firft, There are fome things we are ignorant of
for want of ideas. All the fimplc ideas we have,
are confined to the Obfervation of our Senfes,
and the Operations of our own Minds, that we are
confeious of in our felvcs. What other ideas it is
pofTible other creatures may have, by the afliftance
of other fenfes and faculties more or perfecter
than we have, or different from ours, it is not for
us to determine ; but to fay or think, there are no
fuch, becaufe we conceive nothing of them, is no
better an argument, than if a blind man (hould be
pofitive in it, that there was no fuch thing as fight
and colours, becaufe he had no manner of idea

( 175 )

of any flich thing. What faculties therefore other
fpecies of creatures have to penetrate into the na-
ture and inmoft conftitutions of things, we know
not. This we know, and certainly fir. J, that we
want other views of them, befides thofe we have
to make difcoveries of them more perfect. The in-
tel/e final and fenfible world are in this perfectly a-
Jike, that the parts which we Ice of either of them,
hold no proportion with that we fee not ; and
whatfoever we can reach with our eyes, or our
thoughts of either of them, is but a point, almoft
nothing, in comparifon of the reft.

Another great caufe of Ignorance, is the want of
ideas that we are capable of. This keeps us in ig-
norance of things we conceive capable of being
known. Bulk, Figure and Motion we have ideas
of: yet not knowing what is the particular bulk,
motion and figure of the greatefl part of the bo-
dies of the Univeife, we are ignorant of the feve-
ral Powers, Efficacies and Ways of Operation,
whereby the Effects we daily fee, are produced.
Thefe are hid from us in fome things, by being too
remote, in others by being too minute.

When we confider the vaii diitance of the
known and vifible parts of the world, and the rea-
fons we have to think that what lies within our
ken, is but a fmall part of the immenfe Univerfe ;
we (hall then difcoveran huge Abyfs of Ignorance.
What are the particular fabricks of the great maf-

C 176 )

fes of Matter, which make up the whole ftupcn-
duous frame of corporeal Beings, how far they are
extended, and what is their motion, and how con-
tinued, and what influence they have upon one a-
nother, are contemplations that at firft glimpfe our
thoughts lofe themfelves in. If we confine our
thoughts to this little Canton, I mean this Syftem
of our Sun, and the gtofler Mattes of Matter that
vifibly move about it •, what feveral foits of Ve-
getables, Animals, and Intellectual corporeal Be-
ings, infinitely different from thofe of our little
fpot of Earth, may probably be in other Planets,
to the knowledge of which, even of their outward
figures and parts, we can no way attain, whilft we
are confined to this Earth, there being no natural
means, either by Senfation or Reflection, to convey
their certain ideas into our minds?

There are other Bodies in theUniverfe, no lefs
concealed from us by their minulenefs. Thefe in-
fenfible Corpufcles being the active parts of Mat-
ter, and the great infhuments of Nature, on which
depend all their fecondary Qualities and Operati-
ons, our want of precife diftindt ideas of their pri-
mary Qualities, keeps us in incurable Ignorance of
what we defire to know about them. Did we know
the mechanical affections of Rhubarb or Opium,
we might as eafily account for their Operations
of Purging and caufmg Sleep, as a Watch-maker
can for the motions of his watch. The diflblving

( 177 )
of Silver in Aqua Fortis, or Gold in Aqua Regia,
and noxviceverfa, would be then perhaps no more
difficult to know, than it is to a Smith, to undcr-
ftand why the turning of one key will open a
lock, and not the turning of another. But whilft
we are deltitutc of fenfes, acute enough to difi.o-
vcr the minute particles of Bodies, and to give us
ideas of their mechanical affections, we mult be
content to be ignorant of their Properties and O-
peiations ; nor can we be allured about them any
farther, than fome few trials we make, are able to
reach : but whether they will fucc-ed again ano-
ther time, we cannot be certain. This hinders our
certain knowledge of univerfal truths concerning
natural Bodies : and our reafon carries us herein
very little beyond particular matter of fact. And
therefore I am apt to doubt, that how iar focver
human Induftry may advance ufeful and experi-
mental Philofophy in phyfical things, ytifcientifi-
cal will (till be out of our reach ; becauie we want
perfect and adequate ideas of thofe very Bodies
which are nearcft to us, and molt under our com-
mand.

This at firft fight fhews us how difproportton-
ate our knowledge is to the whole extent, even of
material Beings: to which, if we add the confide-
ration of that infinite number of Spirits that may
be, and probably are, which are yet more remote
from our Knowledge, whereof we have no cogni-
Z

( 178 )

zance : we fhall find this caufe of Ignorance, con-
ceal from us in an impenctraMeoblcurity, almoft
the whole intellectual world : a greater certainly
and a more beautiful world than the Material. For
bating fome very few ideas of Spirit, we get from
our own mind by n flection, and from thence the
bell we can collect, of the Father of all Spirits, the
Author of them, and us, and all things: we have
no certain Information, (b much as of the Exiftence
of other Spirits but by Revelation : much lefs
have we diftinct ideas of their different Natures,
States, Powers, and feveral Conftitutions, where-
in they agree or differ one from another, and from
us. And therefore in what concerns their different
Species and Properties, we are under an abfolute
Ignorance.

The fecond Caufe of Ignorance is the "want of
difcover able connexion between thofe ideas we have ;
where we want that, we are utteily incapable of u-
niverfal and certain Knowledge; and are, as in the
former cafe, left only to Objervation and Experi~
ment. Thus the mechanical affections of Bodies,
having no affinity at all with the ideas they produce
in us, we can have no diftinct Knowledge of fuch
Operations beyond our Experience ; and can rea-
fon no otherwife about them, than as the effects
or appointment of an infinitely wife Agent, which
perfectly furpafs our comprehenfions.

The Operation of our minds upon our bodies, is

( *79 )

as unconceivable. How any Thought fhould pro=
ducc a motion in Body, is as remote from the na-
ture of our ideas, as how any Body IhouJd produce
any thought in the mind. That it isfo, if experi-
ence did not convince us, the confederation of the
things themfelves, would never be ableln the leaft
to difcover to us.

In fome of our ideas there are certain Relati-
ons, Habitudes, and Connexions, fo vifiuly in-
cluded in the nature of the ideas themfelves, that
we cannot conceive them feparable from them by
any power whatfoever : in thefe only we are cap-
able of certain and univerfal knowledge. Thus the
ideaofa. right- lined Triangle,necc(Tm\y carries with
it an Equality of its Angles to two right ones. But
the coherence and continuity of the parts of mat-
ter ; the production of Senfition in us, of Colours
and Sounds, Sec. by Impulfe, and Motion, being
fuch wherein we can difcover no natural Con-
nexion with any ideas we have, we cannot but
afcribe them to the arbitrary will and good plea-
sure of the wife Architect.

The tilings that we obferve conltantly to pro»
ceed regularly, we may conclude do act by a law
fetthem; but yet by a law that we know not;
whereby, tho' caufes work fteadily, and effects
conftantly flow from them ; yet their connexions
and dependencies being not difcoverable in our
ideas, we can have but an experimental know-

Z 2

C i So )
krlge of them. Several creels come every day
within the notice of our Sen/es, of which we have
fo far fenfitlve Knowledge. But the Caufcs, Man-
ner, and Certainty of their Production, we mud for
the foregoing reafons be content to be ignorant
of. In ihefe we can go no farther than particular
Experience informs us of matter of fact, and by
bat effects the like Bodies are u-
pon other Trials like to produce. But as to per-
fect fciencc of natural Bodies (not to mention /pi-
ritual Being?) we are, I think, fo far from being
capable of any fucli thing, that I conclude it loft
labour to feck after it.

The third caufe of Ignorance is our want of
tracing thofs ideas we have, or may have ; and
finding out thofe intermediate ideas Which may
fhew u* what Habitu Je of Agreement or Difagrce-
nieni they may have one with another : and thus
many are ignorant of mathematical Truths, for
want of application in enquiring, examining, and
by due ways comparing thofe ideas.

Hitherto we have examined the Extent of our
Knowledge, in refpect of thefeveral forts of Beings
that are. There is another Extent of it, in refpect
o[Univcr/ality, which will alfo deferve to be con-
fiJered ; and in this regard our Knowledge follows
the Nature of our ideas, if the ideas arc abflraft,
whofe agreement or difagreement we perceive,
our Knowledge is univerfcl. For what is known

( 181 )

of fuch general ideas, will be true of every parti-
cular tiling in which that Ejfence, that is, that ab-
ftraft idea is to be found: and what is once known
of fuch ideas, will be perpetually, and for ever
true. So that as to all general Knowledge, we muft
fcarch and find it only in our own minds : and it
is only the examining of our own ideas, that fur-
nifhes us with that. Truths belonging to EfTences
of things (that is, to abflratt ideas) ate eternal,
and are to be found out by the Contemplation on-
ly of thofe ElTenees ; as the Exigence of things is
to be known only from Experience. But I (hall
fay more of this in the following Chapters, where
I ihall fpeak of general, and real Knowledge.

CHAP. IV.
Of the Reality of cur Knowledge.

I Doubt not but my Reader by this time, may be
apt to think that I have been all this while on-
ly building a Ca/tle in the Air; and be ready to
object, If it be true, that all Knowledge lies only
in the perception of the agreement or difagree-
ment of our own ideas, the vifions of an Entbufiafl,
and the reafonings of a. fiber man will be equally
certain : it is no matter how things are, Co a man
obfirve but the agreement of his own imaginati-
on^, and talk conformably, It is all Truth, all Cer-

( i8i )
tainty. That an Harpy is not a Centaur, is by this
way as certain Knowledge, and as much Truth, as
that a Square is not a Circle. But of what ufe is all
tins Knowledge of mens own Imaginations, to a
man that enquires after the reality of things ?

To which / anfwer, That if our Knowledge of
our idtas fhould terminate in them, and reach no
farther, where there is fomething farther intended,
our molt fetious thoughts would be of little more
ufe, than the Reveries of a crazy brain. But I hope,
before I have done, to make it evident, that this
way of Certainty by the Knowledge of our own /'-
deas, goes a little farther than bare Imagination :
and that all the Certainty of general Truths a man
has, lies in nothing elfe but this Knowledge of our
ideas.

'Tis evident that the mind knows not things im-
mediately, but by the intervention of the ideas it
has of them. Our Knowledge therefore is real,
only fo far as there is a conformity between our
ideas, and the reality of things. But how fhall we
]cnow when our ideas agree with things them-
felves? I anfwer, there be two forts of ideas that
we may be allured agree with things : thefe arc,

Fir ft, Simple ideas ; which lince the mind can by
no means make to it felf, mult be the effect of
things operating upon the mind in a natural way;
and producing therein thofe perceptions, which by
the will of our Maker, they are ordained and a-

( i83 )

dapted to. Hence it follows, that fimple ideas are
not fictions of our fancies, but the natural and re-
gular productions of tilings without u«, really ope-
rating upon us; which carry with them all the
conformity our (late requires, which is to repre-
fent things under thofe appearances they are fit-
ted to produce in us. Thus the idea oflVhitenefs, as
it is in the mind, exactly anfwers that power which
is in any body to produce it there. And this con-
formity between out fimple ideas, and the exiftence
of things is fufficient for real Knowledge.

Secondly, All our complex ideas, except thofe of
Sublbnces, being Archetypes of the mind's own
making, and not referred to the exiftence of things
as to their originals, cannot want any conformity
nccelTary to real Knowledge. For that which is
not defigned to reprefent any thing but it felf, can
never be capable of a wrong reprefentation. Here
the ideas themfelves are confidered as Archetypes,
and things no otherwife regarded, than as they are
conformable to them. Thus the Mathematician
confiders the Truth and Properties belonging to a
Reel angle ox Circle only, as they are ideas in his
own mind, which poflibly he never found exilting
mathematically, that is, precifely true : yet his
knowledge is not only certain, but real; becaufe
real things are no farther concern'd nor intended
to be meant by any fuch propofitions, than as
things really agree to thofe Archetypes in his

( 1 34 )

mind. It is true of the idea of a Triangle, that its
three Angles are equal to two right ones ; it is true
alfo of a Triangle whcrc-ever it exijli : what is
true of thofe Figures, that have br.icly an ideal ex-
igence in his mind, will hold true of them alfo,
when they conic to have a real exigence in Mat-
ter.

Hence it follows, that moral Knowledge is as
capable of real Certainty as Mathematicks. For
Certainty being nothing but the Perception of the
agreement or disagreement of our ideas, and De-
monflration nothing but the Perception of fuch a-
greement by the intervention of other ideas; our
moral ideas as well as mathematical, being Arche-
types themfelves, and fo adequate or complete /'-
deas, all the agreement or difagreement we mail
fu.d in them, will produce real Knowledge as well
as in mathematical Figures. That which is requi-
fite to make our Knowledge certain, is the clcar-
nefs of our ideas ; and that which is required to
make it real, is, that they anlwer their Arche-
types.

But it will here be faid, that if moral Knowledge
be placed in the Contemplation of our own moral
ideas; and thofe be of our own making, what
ftrange notions will there be of Juflice and Tem-
perance? What confufion of Virtues and Vices, if
every man may make what ideas of them he plea-
fes ? 1 on/wer, No confufion nor diforder at all,

( i»5- )

in the things themfelves, nor the reafbnings about
them, no more than there would be a change in
the properties of Figures, and their Relations one
to another, if a man mould make a Triangle with
four Corners, or a Trapezium with four Right An-
gles ; that is, in plain Engliftl, change the names
of the Figures, and call that by one name, which
is called ordinarily by another. The change of
name will indeed at firft difturb him, who knows
not what idea it Hands for : but as foon as the Fi-
gure is drawn, the confequences and demonftra-
tion are plain and clear. Juft the fame is it in mo-
ral Knowledge : let a man have the idea of tak-
ing from others, without their confent, what they
are juftly poflefled of, and call this Juftice if he
pleafes ; he that takes the name here, without the
ides put to it, will be miftaken by joining another
idea of his own to that name ; but flrip the idea
of that name, or take it fuch as it is in the Speak-
er's mind ; and the fame things will agree to it, a3
if you called it Injultice.

One thing we are to take notice of, That where
God, or any other Law-maker, has defined any
moral names, there they have made the Elfcnce of
that Species to which that name belongs : and
there it is not fafe to apply, or ufe them otherwife.
But in other cafes it is bare impropriety of Speech,
to apply them contrary to the common ufage of
the country they arc ufed in.
• A A

( iS<5 )
Thirdly, But the complex ideas which xvc refer
to Archetypes without us, may differ from them,
an I fo our Knowledge about them may come fliort
of being real : and fuch are our ideas of" Subjlances.
Thefe mult be taken from fomething, that docs or
has exiftcd, and not be made up oiideai arbitrarily
put together, without any real Pattern. Herein
therefore is founde i the Reality of our Knowledge
concerning Subflar.ces, that all our complex ideas
of I hem mult be fuch, and fuch only, as are made
up of fuch fimple ones, as have been difcovcrcd to
co-exift in Nature. And our ideas being thus true,
tho'not perhaps very exact Copies, arc the Subjects
of real Knowledge of them. Whatever ideas we
have, the agreement we find they have with others
will be Knowledge. If thole ideas be abftract, it
will be general Knowledge : but to make it real
concerning Sub fiances, the ideas m uft be taken from
the real Exigence of things. Where-ever there-
fore we perceive the agreement or dila:;iecment
of our ideas, there is certain Knowledge: and
where-ever we are fure thofe ideas agree with the
Renlity of Things, there is certain real A~now~
ledge.

( T-27 )

CHAP. V.

Of Truth in General.

TRUTH in the- proper import of the word,
lies the joining or feparating of ";
a; the things fignitied by them, do agree or difa-
gee one with another. The joining or feparating
of figns, is what we call Propofitions ; fa that Truth
properly belongs only to Propofitions ; whereof
there are two Sorts, Mental and Verbal, as there
are two (bits of Signs commonly made ufe of, /-
deas and Words.

'Tis difficult to treat of w^/fl/Propofitions with-
oxxtverbal : becaufe in fpeaking of mental, we muft
make ufe of Words, and then they become verbal.
Again, monly in their thoughts an

fonings, ufe-cyjr^inlteadof/iifjx; efpecialiy if the
: of their meditation contains in it complex i-
deas. If we have occafion to form mental Propofi-
tions about White, Black, Circle, &c. we can, and
often d ), frame in our minds the ideas themfclves,
without reflecting on the Names. But when we
would confider, or make Propofitions about the
more complex ideas, as of a Man, Vitriol, Fortitude
Glory, &c. we ufually put the name for the idea ;
becaufe the idea thefe names Hand for, being for
t'.j njoft part confuted, imperfecT, and undeter-

A A 2

( iSS )

mined ; we reflect on the names themfelves, as be-
ing more clear, certain, and diftincl, and readier to
occur to our thoughts, than pure ideas : and fo we
make ufe of thefe words inftcad of the ideas them-
felves, even when we would meditate and reafon
within our felves, and make tacit menial Propor-
tions.

We mud then obferve two forts of Propofitions,
that we are capable of making. Firfl, mental Pro-
pofitions, wherein the ideas in our Understandings
are put together, or feparated by the mind, per-
ceiving or judging of their agreement or difagree-
ment. Secondly, Verbal Propofitions, which are
words put together, or feparated in affirmative or
negative Sentences : fo that Proportion confifts in
joining or feparating Signs : and Truth confifts in
putting together, or feparating thefe Signs, accord-
ing as the things they (land for agree or difagree.

Truth as well as Knowledge may well come un-
der the DiftincYion of Verbal and Real; that being
only verbal Truth, wherein Terms are joined ac-
cording to the agreement or difagrcement of the i-
deas they ftand for, without regarding whether our
ideas are fuch as really have, or are capable of hav-
ing an Exiftence in Nature. But then it is they
contain real Truth, when thefe Signs are joined, as
our ideas agree ; and when our ideas arc fuch as we
know, are capable of having an Exiftence in Na-
ture s which in Sub/lances we cannot know, but by

( i8p )

knowing that fuch have exifted. Truth is the
marking down in words the agreement or difagree-
ment of ideas, as it is. Faljhood is the marking
down in words the agreement or difagi cement of
ideas, otherwife than it is ; and fo far as thefe /'-
deas thus marked by Sounds, agree to their Arcbe*
types, fo far only is the Truth real. The Know-
ledge of this Truth coniiits in knowing what ideas
the words ftand for, and the Perception of the a-
greement or difagreement of thole ideas, accord"?
ingas it is marked by thoic word--..

Befides Truth taken in the itricl Senfe before-,
mentioned, there are other ibrts of Truths : as,
\ft, Moral Truth, which is, {peaking things ac-
cording to the perfuafion of our own minds, idly.
Metaphyseal Truth, which is nothing but the
real Exiftcnce of things conformable to the ideas
to which we have annexed their names.

Thefe Confiderations of Truth either having
been before taken notice of, or not being much to
our prefent purpofe, it may fuffice here only to
have mentioned them.

V

C 190 )

CHAP. VI.

Of umverfal Proportions, their Truth and Cer-
tainty.

THE prevailing cuftom of ufing Sounds for ;'-
deas,even when men think and reafon with-
in their own breafts, makes the coniideration of
Words anJ Proportions fo neceflarty a part of the
Treatile of Knowledge, that it is very bard to ("peak
intelJigibly of the one, without explaining the o-
ther. AnJ fince general Truths, which with rca-
fon are moft fought after, can never be WcJJ made
known, and are feldom apprehended, but as con-
ceived and exprelfed in words ; it is not out of our
Way in the exam nation of our own Knowledge,
to enquire into the Truth and Certainty of univer-
sal Proportions. But it mud be ojferved, that
Certainty is two-fold, Certainty of Truth, and
Certainty of Knowledge.

Certainty of Truth is, when words are fo put to-
gether in Proportions, as exactly to exprefs the a-
greement or disagreement of the ideas they fhnd
for ; as really it is. Certainty of Knowledge, is to
perceive the agreement or difagreement of ideas as
exprefied in any Proportions. Thus we ufually
call Knowing, or being certain of the Truth of any
Propofttion.

( 191 )

Kow becaufc we cannot be certain of the Truth
of any general Proportion, unlefs we know the
preafe bounds and extent of the Species its terms
{land for; it is neccflary we fhouid know the Ef-
fence of each Species, which is that which confti-
tutes and bounds it. This in ?\\ fimple ideas and
modes is not hard to do : for in thefe the real and
nominal Eflence being the fame, there can be no
doubt how far the Species extends, or what things
arc comprehended under each Term : which it is
evident are all that have an exact Conformity
with the ideas it Hands for, and no other. But in
fubflances wherein a real Effcnce, difiincl from the
nominal, is fuppofed to conltitute, and bound the
Species, the extent of the general word is very un-
certain ; becaufc not knowing this real Eifence,
we cannot know what is, or is not of that Species,
and confequenily what may, or may not with Cer-
tainty be affirmed of it.

Hence we may fe.- that the names of Subftan-
ces, when made to Hand for Species, fuppofed to
beconilitutL-dbyr^/ZT/Ttv/rif.f, which we know not,
are not capable of conveying Certainty to the Un-
derhand ing. Of the truth of general Proportions
made up of fuch Terms, we cannot be lure. For
how can we be fure that this or that Quality is in
Gold, 'or inftance, when we know not what is, or
is not Gold; that is, what has, or has not the real
EJfence of Gold, whereof we have no idea ai all.

( 192 )

On the other fide, the names of Subftances when
made ufe of for the complex ideas men have in their
minds ; tho' they carry a clear and determinate Sig-
nification with them, will not yet ferve us to make
many univcrfal Propofitions, of whofe truth we can
be certain : becaufe the fimple ideas, out of which
the complex are combined, carry not with them any
difcoverahle Connection or Repugnancy, but with
a very few other ideas. For inftance, All Gold is
fixed, is a Propofition we cannot be certain of, how
univerfally foever it be believed : for if we take
the term Gold to ftand for a realEJJence, it is evi-
dent we know not what particular Subftances are of
that Species, and fo cannot with Certainty affirm a-
ny thing univerfally of Gold. But if we make the
term Gold ftand for a Species, determined by its
nominal EJfence, be its complex idea what it will ;
for inftance, a body Yellow, Fufible, Malleable,
and very heavy ; no Quality can with Certainty be
denied or affirmed univerfally cf it, but what has
a difcoverable connection, or inconfiftency with
that nominal EJfence : Eixednefs, for inftance, hav^
ing no neceffary connection that we can difcover
with any fimple idea that makes the complex one,
or with the whole combination together •, it is im-
poflible that we fhould certainly know the truth of
this Propofition, All is Gold fixed.

But is not this an univcrfil certain Propofition,
All Gold is malleable ? I anfwer, it is fo, if Malic-

( »93 )

ebJenefs be a part of the complex idea, the word
GWftands for : but then here is nothing affirmed
of Gold, but that, that Sound ftands for an idea, in
which Malleablenefs is contained. And fuch a fort
of Truth and Certainty it is, to fay, a Centaur is
four-footed. I imagine amongft all the fecoru'ary
Qualities ofSubftances, and the Powers relating to
them, there cannot any two be named, whofe ne-
cefTary Co-exiftence or Repugnance to co-exift
can be certainly known, unlefs in thofe of the
fame Senfe, which neceflarily exclude one ano-
ther. Thus by the Colour we cannot certainly
know what Smell, Tafte, &c. any body is of. 'Tis
no wonder then that Certainty is to be found but in
very few general Propofitions concerning Subftan-
ces : our Knowledge of their Qualities and Pro-
perties goes very fcldom farther than our Scnfes
reach, or inform us. Inquifitive and obferving
men may by Strength of Judgment, penetrate
farther -, and on Probabilites taken from wary Ob-
fervations, and Hints well laid together, often guefs
right at what Experience has not yet difcovered
to them : but this is but gueffmg ftill ; it amounts
only XoOpinion; and has not that Certainty which
is requifite to Knowledge.

To conclude : general Proportions of what

kind foever, are then only capable of Certaintv,

when the Terms ufed in them, ftand for fuch i-

deas, whofe agreement or difagreement, as there

Bb

( »94 )

exprcflTcd, is capable to be difcovcrcd by us. And
we are then certain of their Truth or Falfhood,
when we perceive the ideas they Hand for, to a-
grce or not agree, according as they arc affirmed or
denied one of another; whence we may take no-
tice, that general Certainty is never to be found
but in our ideas. Whenever we go to feck it elfe-
where in Experiment or Obfcrvations without us,
our Knowledge goes not beyond particulars.

CHAP. VII.
Of Maxim.

THERE are a fort of Propofitions, which
under the name of Maxims and Axioms,
have palled for Principles of Science : and becaufe
they are felf-cvident, have been fuppofed innate.
It may be worth while to enquire into the rcafon
of their Evidence, and examine how far they in-
fluence our other Knowledge.

Knowledge being but the Perception of the a-
grecment or difagreement of ideas, where that a-
grcement or difagreement is perceived immediate-
Jy by it felf, without the Intervention or Help of
nhy other ideas, there our Knowledge is felf-evi-
dent : which being fo, not only Maxims, but an in-
finite number of other Propofitions partake equal-
ly with them in this Self-evidence. For,

( ipsr )

In refpecT: of Identity and Diverfity, we may
have as many felf-evident Propofitions as we
have di(tin<ft ideas. 'Tis the firft adt of the mind,
to know every one of its ideas by it felf, and di-
ftinguifh it from others. Every one finds in him-
felf, that he knows the ideas he has ; that he knows
alfo when any one is in his Underftanding, and
what it is ; and that when more than one are there,
he knows them diftinftly and unconfufedly, one
from another ; fo that all affirmations, or negati-
ons concerning them, are made without any poffi*
bility of Doubt or Uncertainty-, and muft necef-
farily be afiented to as foon as underftood : that
is, as foon as we have in our minds the ideas clear
and diftinct, which the Terms in the Propofition
fland for. Thus a Circle is a Circle, Blue is not
Red, are as felf-evident Propofitions, as thofe ge-
neral ones, What is is, 3nd 'tis impojfible for the
fame thing to be and not to be ; nor can the Con-
federation of thefe Axioms add any thing to the
Evidence, or Certainty of our Knowledge of
them .

As to the agreement or difagreement ofCo-exif
fence, the mind lias an immediate Perception of
this, but in very few. And therefore, in this fort
we have very little intuitive Knowledge : tho', in
fome few Propofitions we have. Two Bodies can-
not be in the fame Place, I think is a felf-evident
Propofition. The idea of fitting a place equal to

BB2

( 196- )

the contents of its fuperficies being annexed to
our idea of BoJy.

As to the Relations of Modes, Mathematicians
have framed many Axioms concerning that one
Relation of Equality, as Equals taken from Equals,
the Remainder -will be equal, &c. which however
received for Axioms, yet I think, have not a clear-
er felf-evidence than thefe, that One and One are
equal to Two : that if from the five Fingers of one
Han J, you take two, and from the five Fingers of
the other Hand two, the remaining Numbers will
be equal. Thefe and a thoufand other fuch Pro-
portions may be found in Numbers, which carry
with them an equal, if not greater clearncfs than
thofe mathematical Axioms.

As to real Exiftence, fince that has no connec-
tion with any other of our ideas, but that of our
fclves, and of a j?>y? Being • we have not fo much
as a demonstrative, much lefs a felf-evidcnt Know-
ledge, concerning the real Exijlence of other Be-
ings.

In the next place let us confider what influence
thefe Maxims have upon the other parts of our
Knowledge. The rules eftablifaed in the fchools,
tliat all reafpnings are expraecognitis etpraeconcef
fis, feem to lay the Foundation of all other Know-
ledge in thefe Maxims, and to fuppcfe them to be
praecognita ; whereby I think is meant two things :
if, That thefe Axioms are thofe truths that are

( 197 )

ftrft known to the mind : idly, That upon them
the other parts of our Knowledge depend.

Firfi, That thefe Axioms are not the truths firft
known to the mind, is evident from experience ;
for who knows not that a child perceives that a
ftranger is not its mother, long before he knows,
that it is impoiTible for the fame thing to be and
not to be. And how many truths are there about
Numbers, which the mind is perfectly acquainted'
with, and fully convinced of, before it ever thought
on thefe general Maxims? Of this the Reafon is
plain ; for that which makes the mind afTenr to.fuch
Propoiltions, being nothing but the Perception it
has of the agreement or difagreeraent of its ideas,
according as it finds them affirmed or denied in
words one of another; and every idea being known
to be what it is, and every two diftmct ideas not to
be the fame, it mult neceflarily follow, that fuch
felf-evident truths muft be fit ft known, which con-
aft of ideas, that are firft la the min J ; and the /-
deas firft in the mind, it is evident, are thofe of
particular things ; from whence, by flow degrees
the Underftanding proceeds to lome few general
ones, which being taken from the ordinary and fa-
miliar objects of Senfe, are fettled in the mind,
with general names to them. Thus particular;^.?
are firft received and diftinguifhed, and fo Know-
JcJgc got about them; and next to them the lefs

( i*8 )

general or fpecifick, which are next to particular
ones.

For abftracl ideas are not fo obvious or eafy to

Children, or the yet unexercifed mind, as particular
ones. If they feem fo to grown Men, 'tis only be-
caufe by conltant and familiar ufe they are made
fo.

Secondly, From what has been faid, it plair.Iy
follows, that thefe magnified Maxims are not the
principles and foundations of all our other Know-
ledge : for if there be a great many ether truths,
as felf-evident as they, and a great many that we
know before them, it is impoflible that they mould
be the Principles, from which we deduce all other
Truths. Thus, that One and Two are equal to Three,
is as evident, and eafier known than that the
Whole is equal to all its Parts. Nor after the
Knowledge of this Maxim, do we know that One
and Two are equal to Three, better, or more cer-
tainly than we did before. For if there be any odds
in thefe ideas, the ideas of Whole, and Parts, are
more obfeure, or at leaft more difficult to be fet-
tled in the mind, than thofe of (2/;?, Two and Three.
Either therefore all Knowledge does not depend on
certain Praecognita, or general Maxims, called
Principles; or elfe, fuch as thefe, (That One and
One are Two, that Two and Two are Four, &c.)
and a great part of Numeration will be fo. To
which if we add all the felf-evident propofitions

( 199 )

that may be made about all our diftincl ideas ;
Principles will be almofl; infinite, at leaft innume-
rable, which men arrive to the Knowledge of, at
different ages j and a great many of thofe innate
Principles, they never come to know all then-
lives. But whether they come in view early or
later, they are all known by their native evidence,
and receive no light, nor are capable of any proof
one from another ; much lefs the more particular,
from the more general ; or the more fimple from
the more compounded : the more fimple and lefs
abftradt, being the molt familiar, and the eafier
and earlier apprehended.

Thefe general Maxims then, are only of ufein
difputes, to flop the mouths of wranglers ; but not
of much ufe to the difcovery of unknown Truths ;
or to help the mind forwards in its fearch after
Knowledge. Several general Maxims, are no more
than bare verbal Propofitions ; and teach us no-
thing but the refpect and import of names, one
to another -, as, The Whole is equal to all its Parts :
what real Truth does it teach us more, than what
the fignification of the word Totum or -whole does
of it felf import ?

But yet, Mathematician; do not without reafon
place this, and fome other fuch amongft their Ma-
xims; that their fcholars having in the entrance
perfectly acquainted their thoughts with thefe Pro-
pofitions made in fuch general Terms, may have

( 200 )

them ready to apply to all particular cafes : not
that if they be equally weighed, they are more
clear and evident, than the particular inflances
they are brought to confirm; but that being more
familiar to the mind, the very naming them is c-
nough to fatisfy tha Undcrftanding. But this I
fay, is more from our cuftom of uflng them, than
the different evidence of the things.

So that, if rightly confider'd, I think we may
fay, that where our ideas are clear and d:(lincl,
there is little, or no ufe at all of thefe Maxims, to
prove the agreement or difagreement of any of
them. He that cannot difcern the truth, or falf-
hood offuchPropofitions, without the help of thefe
and the like Maxims, will not be helped by thefe
Maxims to do it. He that needs any proof to make
him certain, and give his afllnt to this Propofition,
that Two are equal to Two, or that White is not
Black, will alfo have need of a proof to make him
admit that, What is, is, or, That it is impojfible for
the fame thing to be and not to be.

And as thefe Maxims are of little ufe, where wo
have clear and diftincl: ideas; fo they are of dan-
gerous ufe, where our ideas are confufed, and
where we ufe words that are not annexed to clear
and diftincl ideas; but to fuch as are of a loofe
and wandering fignification, fometimes (landing
for one, and fometimes for another idea, from
which follows Mifteke and Error, which thefe Ma-

( 201 )

xims (brought as proofs to eftablilh Propofitions
wherein the terms ftand for confufed and uncer-
tain ideas') do by their authority confirm and rivet.

CHAP. VIII.

Of trifling Propofitions.

THERE are univerfal Propofitions, which
tho' they be certainly true, yet add no
light to our Underftandings, bring no increafe to
our Knowledge : fuch are,

Firfl, All purely identical Propofitions. Thefe
at firft blujh, appear to contain no Induction in
them : for when we affirm the fame term of it felf,
it (hews us nothing but what we muft certainly
know before, whether fuch aPropofition be either
made by, or propoled to us.

Secondly, Another fort of trifling Propofitions is,
when Apart of the complex idea is praedicated of the
name of the whole; a part of the definition, of the
word defined, as, Lead is a Metal, Man an Animal.
Thefe carry no information at all, to thofe who
know the complex ideas, the names Lead, and
Man ftand for : indeed to a man that knows the
fignification of the word Metal, and not of the word
Lead, it is a fhorter way to explain the fignifica-
tion of the word Lead, by faying it is a Metal,
Cc

( 202 )

than by enumerating the fimple ideas one by one,
which make up the complex idea of Metal.

Alike trifling it is to pracdicate any one of the
fimple ideas of a complex one, of the name of the
whole complex idea ; as all Gold is fufible ; for
fufibility being one of the fimple ideas that goes to
the making up the complex one, the found Gold.
Hands for ; what can it be but playing with founds,
to affirm that of the name Gold, which is compre-
hended in its received fignification ? What indruc-
tioncan it carry, to tell one that which he is fup-
pofed to know before ? for I am fuppofed to know
the fignification of the word another ufes to me,
or clfe he is to tell me.

The general Propofitions that are made^bout
Subdances, if they are certain, are for the molt part
but trifling ; and if they are indruclive, uncer-
tain •, and fuch as we have no Knowledge of their
real truth, how much foever condant Obferva-
tion and Analogy may afllft our Judgments in
Guetfing. Hence it comes to pafs, that one may
often meet with very clear and coherent difcourfes,
that amount yet to nothing. For names of fub-
ftantial Beings, as well as others, having fettled
Significations affixed to them, may with great
truth be joined negatively and affirmatively in
Propofitions, as their Definitions make them fit to
be fo joined ; and Propofitions confiding of fuch
terms, may with the fame clearnefs be deduced

( 203 )

one from another, as thofe that corivey the mofi:
real truths ; and all this without any Knowledge of
the nature or reality of things cxilting without us.
Thus he that has learnt the following words, with
their ordinary acceptations annexed to them, viz.
Subflance, Man, Animal, Form, Soul, Vegetative,
Senjitive, Rational, may make feveral undoubted
Proportions about the Soul, without any Know-
ledge at all of what the Soul really is. And of
this fort a man may find an infinite number of
Propofitions, Reafbnings and Conclufions in books
of Metaphyficks, School-Divinity, and fome part of
Natural Philofophy ; and after all, know as little-
of Cod, Spirits, or Bodies, as he did before he fet
out.

Thirdly, The worft fort of Trifling is, to ufe
words loofely and uncertainly, which fets us yet far-
ther from the certainty of Knowledge we hope to
attain to by them, or find in them. That which
occafions this, is, that men may find it conveni-
ent to fhelter their ignorance or obftinacy, under
the obfeurity or pcrplexednefs of their terms ; to
which, perhaps, inadvertency and ill cuftom does
in many men much contribute.

To conclude, barely verbal Propofitions may be
known by thefe following marks.

Fir/}, All Propofitions, wherein two abltradl
terms are affirmed one of another, are barely about
the fignification of Sounds. For fince no abftraft
Cc 2

( 204 )

idea can be the fame with any other, but it felf;
when its abRracl name is affirmed of any other
term, it can fignify no more but this, that it may
or ought to be called by that name ; or that thefe
two names fignify the fame idea.

Secondly, All Proportions, wherein a part of
the complex idea, which any term Hands for, is
predicated of that term, are only verbal : and
thus all Propofitions wherein more comprehcnfive
terms called Genera, are affirmed of fubordinate,
or lefs comprehenfive, called Species, or Indivi-
duals, are barely verbal. When by thefe two
rules we examine the Propofitions that make up
the difcourfes we ordinarily meet with, both in
and out of books; we {hall, perhaps find, that a
greater part of them, than is ufually fufpected, are
purely about the Signification of words, and con-
tain nothing in them but the ufe and application
of thefe Signs.

CHAP. IX.

Of cur Knowledge of Exigence.

HItherto we have only confider'd xhtEJJen-
ces of things, which being only abjfrafi i-
deas, and thereby removed in our thoughts from
particular Exiftence, give us no Knowledge of
Exijlence at all. We proceed now to enquire con-

( 20J )

cerning our Knowledge of the Exigence of things
and how we come by it.

I fay then, that we have the Knowledge of our
own Exiflence, by Intuition ; of the Exijlence of God,
by Demonjlration ; and of other -Things, by Senfa-
tion. As for our own Exiflence, we perceive it fo
plainly, that it neither needs, nor is capable of any
proof. Ithink.Ireafon; I feel pleafure and pain :
can any of thefe be more evident to me than my
own Exijlence ? If I doubt of all other things, that
very Doubt makes me perceive my own Exijlence,
and will not fuffer me to doubt of that. If I know
I doubt, I have as certain a Perception of the Thing
Doubting, as of that Thought which I call Doubt.
Experience then convinces us that we have an in-
tuitive Knowledge of our own Exijlence ; and an in-
ternal infallible Perception that we are. In every
act of Senfation, Reafoning or Thinking, we are
confcious to our felves of our own Being, and in
this matter come not fhortof the higheft degree of
Certainty.

CHAP. X.

Of our Knowledge of the Exijlence of a God.

TH O' God has given us no innate ideas of
himfelf, yet having furnifhed us with thofe
faculties our minds are endowed with, he hath not
left himfelf without a witnefs, fince we haveSenfe,

( 206 )

Perception, and Rcafon, and cannot want a clear
proof of him, as long as we carry ourfelves about
us : nor can we juftly complain of our ignorance
in this great point, fincehe has Co plentifully pro-
vided us with means to difcover, and know him, fb
far as is nccelTary to the end of our Being, and the
great concernment of our Happinefs. But tho' this
be the mod obvious truth that Reafon difcovers,
yet it requires Thought and Attention; and the
mind muft apply it ftlf to a regular deduction of it,
from fome part oC oar intuitive Knowledge ; or elfe
we fhall be as ignorant of this as of other Propofi-
tions which are in themfelves capable of clear De-
monftration. To fhew therefore, that we are cap-
able of knowing, that is, being certain, that there
is a God; and how we may come by this cer-
tainty, I think we need go no farther than our
felves, and that undoubted Knowledge we have
of our own Exijlence. I think it is beyond quef-
tion, that man has a clear perception of his own
being: he knows certainly that he exifts, and
that he is fomething. In the next place, man
knows by an intuitive Certainty, that bare nothing
can no more produce any real being, than it can be e-
aual to two right Angles. If therefore we know
there is fome real Being, it is an evident Dc-
monftration, that from Eternity there has been fome-
thing ; fince what was not from Eternity, had a
beginning ; and what had a beginning, mult be

( 207 )
produced by fometliing elfe. Next it is evident,
that what has its being from another, mufl alfo have
all that -which is in, end belongs to its being from an~
other too : all the powers it has muft be owing to,
and received from the fame fource. This eternal
fource then of .ill Being mult be alfo the fource and
original of all Power -, and fo this Eternal Being
muft be alfo the mofl Powerful.

Again, man finds in himfelf Perception and
Knowledge : we are certain then that there is not
only fome Being, but fome knowing, intelligent
B,eing in the world. There was a time then, when
there was no knowing Being, or elfe there has
been a knowing Being from Eternity. If it be
faid, there was a time when that Eternal Being
had no Knowledge ; I reply, that then itisimpof-
fible there Ihould have ever been any Knowledge.
It being as impolfible that things wholly void of
Knowledge, and operating blindly, and without
any Perception, Ihould produce a knowing Being,
as it is th it a Triangle Ihould make it felf three
Angles, bigger than two right ones.

Thu; from the confideration ofourfclves, and
what we infallibly find in our own conftitutions,
our reafon 1 Is us to the knowledge of this cer-
tain and evident Truth, that there is an eternal,
mofl powerful, and knowing Being, which, whe-
ther any one will call God, it matters not. The
thing is evident, and from this idea duly confide-

( 208 )

red, will eafily be deduced all thole other Attri-
butes we ought to afcribe to this eternal Being.

From what has been (aid, it is plain tome, we
have a more certain knowledge of the Exiftence
of a God, than of any thing our fenfes have not
immediately difcovered to us. Nay, I prefume I
may fay, that we more certainly know that
there is a God, than that there is any thing elfe
without us. When I fay, we know, I mean, there
is fuch a Knowledge within our reach, which we
cannot mifs, if we will but apply our minds to that,
as we do to feveral other Enquiries.

It being then unavoidable for all rational Crea-
tures to conclude, that Jomething has exi/fed from
Eternity ; let us next fee what kind of Thing that
mult be. There are but two forts of Beings in the
world, that man knows or conceives: \fl, Such
as are purely material, without fenfeor perception,
as the clippings of our beards, and parings of our
nails, idly, Senfible perceiving Beings ; fuch as
we find our felves to be. Thcfe two forts we fhall
hereafter call Cogitative and Incogitative Beings :
which to our prefent purpofe are better than mate'
rial and immaterial.

If then there muft be fomething Eternal, it is
very obvious to Reafon, that it mult necelfarily be
a Cogitative Being ; becaufe it is as impoflible to
conceive that ever bare Incogitative Miner mould
produce a thinking intelligent Being, as thatnothing

C 209 )

fhould of it fc!f produce Matter. Let lis fuppofe
any parcel of matter Eternal, we Hull find it in it
felf unable to produce any thing. Let us fuppofe
its parts firmly at reft together : if there were no
other Being in the world, rauft it not eternally re-
main fo, a dead unactive iump? Is it poffible to
conceive it can add motion to it fell, or produce ar
By thing r Matter then by its own ftrength cannot
produce in it felf, lb much ns Motion* The motion
it has, mult alfo be from Eternity, or elfe added to
Matter by fome other Being, more powerful than
Matter. But let u 1 fuppofe Motion eternal too, yet
Matter, Incogilative Matter and Motion could ne-
ver produce Thought: Knowledge will (till be ns
far beyond the power of motion and matter to pro-
duce, as matter is beyond the power of Nothing
to produce. Divide matter into as minute parts as
you will, vary the figure and motion of it, as much
as you pleafe, it will operate no otherwiie upon o-
ther Bodies of proportionable bulk, than it did be-
fore this divifion. The minuteft particles of Mat-
ter, knock, impel, and refill one another, juft as
the greater do, and that is all tbey can do, lb that
if we will fuppofe Nothing Eternal, Matter can
never begin to be. If we fuppofe bai e Matter with-
out Motion Eternal, Motion can never begin to be.
If we fuppole only Matter and Motion EterM,
Thought can never begin to be: for it is impolfible
to conceive, that Matter, either with or without
Dd

C 2IO )

Motion, could have originally in and from it idf,
S-.nfe, Perception, and Knowledge, as is evident
from hence, that then Scale, Perception, and Know-
ledge, mult be a Property eternally infeparable
from Matter, and every particle of it. Since there-
fore whatsoever is the firtt eternal being, mult nc-
cciurily be Cogitative : and whatfoever is iirit of
all thing?, mult ncceffarily contain in it, and ac-
tually have, at lealt, all the perfections that can
ever after cxift.it nccelnrily follows, that the Firft
Eternal Being canmt be Matter.

If therefore it be evident that fomethingnecelTa-
rily mud cxift from Eternity, it is alio as evident
that, that Some 1 1 cejj'arily be a cogitative

Being. For it isasimpofliblcthat incogitative Mat-
ter fhouU produce a cogitative Being, as that no-
thing, or the negation of all Being mould produce
a politive B< iatter.

This difcovery of the neceiTary Exigence of an
eternal Mind, does fuiilcieiitly Lad us into the
of God. For it will heuce follow, that
all other knowing Beings, that have a beginning,
mult depend on him, and have no other ways of
Knowledge or extent of Power, than what he gives
he nude thole, hemadealfo
the leis excellent pieces of this Universe, all inani-
mate Bodies, whereby his Gmnifcience, Power, and
Providence will be eftablilh'd ; and from thence
: other attributes ncceflarily follow.

( 211 )

C PI A P. XI.

Of 'oar Knowledge of 'theExijlence of other Things,

THE Knowledge of our own Being we have
by Intuition : the Exiftence of a God, Rea-
fon clearly makes known to us, as has been (hewn :
the Knowledge of the Exiltence of any other thing,
we can have only by Senfation ; for there being no
neceflary Connection of real Exijlence with any /-
deaz man hath in his memory; nor of any other
Exiftence, but that of God, with the Exiftence of
any particular man ; no particular man can know
the Exiftence of any other Being, but only, when
by actually operating upon him, it makes it felf
be perceived by him. The having the idea of
any thing in our mind, no more proves the Exif-
tence of that thing, than the picture of a man e-
vidences his being in the world, or the vifions
of a dream, make thereby a true hiftory. It is
therefore the actual receiving of ideas from with-
out, that gives us notice of the Exiftence of other
things, and makes us know that {bmething doth
cxift at that time without us, which caufes that /'-
dea in us, tho' perhaps we neither know nor con-
sider how it docs it ; for it takes not from the Cer-
tainty of ourSenfes, and the ideas we receive by

DD2

( 212 )

them, that we know not the manner wherein
they are produced. This Notice we have by our
Senfes of the exifting of things without us, tho' it
be not altogether lb certain as Intuition and De-
monflration, defcrves the name of Knowledge, if we
pcrfuadc our (elves that our faculties act and in-
form us right, concerning the Evidence of thofc
objects that arreift them. But betides the allurance
wc have from our Senfes ihcmftJves, that they do
not err in the Information they give us of the Exif-
tence of things wit; out us, wc have other concur-
rent Rcafons : a?, Fir/}, It is plain thole Percepti-
ons are produced in us, by exteriour C.ufes affec-
ting our Senfes, becaufc thole that want the Or-
gans of any fenfe, never can have the ideas be-
longing to that fenfe produced in their minds.
Tl -is is too evident to be doubted, and therefore
we cannot but bo allured, that they come in by
the Organs of that Senfe, and no other way.

Secondly, Becaufc we find fometimes that we can-
not avoid the having thole ideas produced in our
minds ; when my eyes are (hut, I can at pleafurs
recall to my mind the ideas of Light or the Sun,
which former Sen fations had lodge! in my me-
mory ; but if I turn my eyes towards the Sun, I
cannot avoid the ideas which the Light or the Sun
then produces in mc : which (hews a manifelt dif-
ference between thofc ideas laid up in the memo-
ry, and fuch as force thcmfclvcs upon us, and we

( »B )

cannot avoid having. And therefore it muft needs
be fome exterior caufe, whole efficacy 1 cannot
refill, that produces thofe ideas in my mind, whe-
ther I will or no.

Befi ies, there is no body who doth not perceive
the difference in himfelf, between actually looking
upon the Sun, and contemplating the idea he has
of it in his memory ; and therefore he hath certain
Knowledge, that they are not both memory or
fancy; but that actual feeing has a caufe without.

Thirdly, Add to this, that many ideas are pro-
duced in us with pain, which we afterwards re-
member without the leaf! offence. Thus the pain
of Heat or Cold, when the idea of it is received in
our minds, gives us no dilturbance; which when
felt was very troublefome ; and we remember the
pain of Hunger, Thir'l, Head-Ach, &c. without
any pain at all; which would either never difturb
us, or elfc conftantly do it, as often as we thought
of it, were there nothing more but /Vm floating in
our minds, and appearances entertaining our fan-
cies, without the real Exigence of things affecting
us from abroad.

Fourthly, Our fenfes in many cafes bear witnefs
to the truth of each others report, concerning the
Exigence of fenfible things without us: he that
doubts when he fees a Fire, whether it be real,
may, if heplcafe, feel it too ; and by the cxquilite

( 2I4 )

pain he will be convinced, that it is not a bare /•
dea ox phantom.

If after all this, any one will be Cofcepticaf, as to
diftruft his fenfes, ami to queftion theExiftenceof
all things, or our Knowledge of any thing; let him
confiV.cr that the Certainty of things cxilting in re-
rum natura, when we have the tcfiimony of our
fenfes for it, is not only as great as our frame can
attain to, but as our condition needs. For our fa-
cutties being not fuited to the full Extent of Being,
nor a clear comprehenfivc knowledge of all things,
but to the prefervation of us, in whom they are,
and accommodated to the ufeoflife ; they ferve
our purpofc well enough, if they will but give us
certain notice of thofe things, that are convenient
or inconvenient to us. For he that fees a Candle
burning, and has experimented the force of the
flame, by putting his finger in it, will little doubt,
that this is fomething exilting without him, which
does him harm and puts him to pain, which is af-
furance enough ; when no man requires greater
certainty to govern his actions by, than what is as
certain as his actions themfelves : fo that this evi-
dence is as great as we can defirc, being as certain
to us as our pleafure or pain, that is, Happ'tnefs
or Mifery, beyond which we have no concernment
either of Knowing, or Being.

In fine, when our fenfes do actually convey into

C »U )

our Underftandings any idea, we are afTured that
there is fomething at that time really exifling with-
out us. But this Knowledge extends only as far
as the prefent testimony of our fenfes, employed
about particular Objects, that do then affect them,
and no farther. My feeing a Man a minute fince,
is no certain argument of his prefent Exigence.

As when our fenfes are actually employed about
any Object, we know that it does exift ; [o by our
memory we may be allured, that heretofore things
that affected our fenfes, have exifled; and thus wc
have the Knowledge of the paft Exigence of feve-
ral things; whereof our fenfes having inform'd us,
our memories fiill retain the ideas : and of this
we are pall all doubt, fo long as we remember
well.

As to the Exigence of fpirits, our having ideas
of them, does not make us know, that any fuch
things do exift without us ; or that there are any
finite fpirits ; or any other Spiritual beings but the
Eternal God. We have ground from Revelation,
and feveral other reafons, to believe with affu-
rance, that there are fuch Creatures : but our fenfes
not being able to difcover them, we want the means
of knowing their particular Exiftence ; for we can
no more know that there are finite fpirits really
exilting, by the idea we have of fuch Beings, than
by the ideas any one has of Faries or Centaurs, he

( ai« )

can come to know that things anfwering thofe |«
(leas, do really exiit.

Hence we may gather, that there are two forts
of Propofitions, One concerning the Exigence of
any thing an fwerable to fuch an idea; as that of an
Elephant, Phoenix, Motion, or Angel, viz. Whe-
ther fuch a thing does any where cxilt : and this
Knowledge is only of Particulars, and not to be
had of any thing without us, but only of God, any
other way than by oar fen/es.

Another fort of Propofition is, wherein iscxprcf-
fed the agreement or difagreement of our abjlratt
ideas, and their dependence one on another. And
thefemay be univerfal and certain : fo having the
idea of God, an.! my felf, of Fear and Obedience,
I cannot but be lure that God is to be feared and
ebeved by me ; and this Proportion will be certain
concerning Man in general; if I have made an
abflracl idea of fuch a. /pedes, whereof I am one
particular. But fuch a Propofition, how certain
foever, proves not to me the Exigence of men in
the world ; but will be true of all fuch Creatures,
whenever they do exilt : which Certainty of fuch
general Propofitions, depends on the agreement or
difagreement difcoverable in thofe abjlraft ideas.
In the former cafe, our Knowledge is the confe-
quence of the Exigence of things, producing ideas
in our minds by our fenfes : in the latter, the con-

( 217 )

fequence of the ideas that are in our minds, and
producing thcfe general Propofitions, many where-
of are called Eternae veritat'es ; and all of them
indeed are lb, not from being written all, or any of
them in the minds of all men, or that they were
any of them Propofitions in any ones mind, till
he having got the abflraft ideas, joined or feparat*
ed them by affirmation or negation : but v.liere-
foever we can fuppofe fuch a Creature as Man is,
endowed with fuch faculties, and thereby furnifh-
ed with fuch ideas as we have ; we mult conclude,
he muft needs, when he applies his thoughts to
the confideration of his ideas, know the truth of
certain Propofitions, that will arife from the agree-
ment or difagreement he will perceive in his own
ideas. Such Propofitions being once made about
abjlraci ideas, {o as to be true, they will, when-
ever they can be fuppoled to be made again, at any
time pari, or to come, by a mind having thofc ideas,
always be true. For names being fuppoled toftanci
perpetually for the fame ideas; and the fame i-
deas having immutably the fame habitudes one
to another; Propofitions concerning any abjlraCi
ideas that are once true, muft needs be eternal Ve-
rities.

Ee

( m€ )

C H A P. XII.
Of the Improvement of our Knowledge.

IT being the received opinion amongfl: men of
letters, that maxims are the foundations of all
Knowledge, and that Sciences are each of them
built upon certain Praecognita, from whence the
Underltanding was to take its rife, and by which it
was to conduct itfelf in its inquiries in the matters
belonging to that feience, the beaten road of the
fchools has been to lay down in the beginning one
or more general Propofitions, called Principles, as
foundations whereon to build the Knowledge, that
was to be had of that fubject.

That which gave occaiion to this way of pro-
ceeding, was, I fuppofc, the good fuccefs it feemed
to have in Mathematicks, which of all other fcicn-
ces, have the greateit certainty, clearnefs, and evi-
dence, in them. But if we confider it, wc fhall find
that the great advancement and certainty of real
Knowledge men arrived to in xhekfeiences, was not
owing to the influence of thefe Principles, but to
the clear diftinft and compleat ideas their thoughts
were employed about; and the relation of Equali-
ty and Excel), f) clear between fome of them, that
they had an intuitive Knowledge ; and by that a

C 219 )

way to difcover it in others : and this without the
help of thofe maxims. For I afk, Is it not poflible for
a lad to know that his whole body is bigger than-
his little finger, but by virtue of this Axiom, the
vjhole is bigger than the part ; nor be affined of it,
till he has learned that maxim ? Let any one con*
fidcr from what has been elfewhcrc find, which is
known firft and cleareft by molt people, the par-
ticular infbnce, or the general rule; and which
it is that gives life and birth to the other. Thcfe
general rules are but the comparing our more ge-
neral and abftratt ideas, which ideas are made by
the mind, and have names given them, for the
eafier difpatch in its reafonings : but Knowledge
began in the mind, and was founded on Particu-
lars, tho' afterwards perhaps no notice be taken
thereof : it being natural for the mind, to lay up
thofe general notions, and make the proper ufe of
them, which is to disburthen the memory of the
cumberfomc load of Particulars.

The way to improve in Knowledge, is not to
fwallow Principles, with an Implicit Faith, and
without Examination, which would be apt to
miflead men, inftead of guiding them into truth ;
but to get and fix in our minds, clear and complete
ideas, as far as they are to be had, and annex to
them proper and conjlant names : and thus barely
by confidering our ideas, and comparing them to-
gether, obferving their agreement or difagreemer.::,
EE3

C 2*° >

their habitudes and relations, we fliall get more
true and clear Knowledge by the conducl of this
one Rule, than by taking up Principles, and there-
by putting our minds into the difpofal of others.

We mud therefore, if we will prqeced as Rea-
fon adviics, adapt our methods of Inquiry, to the
nature of the ideas we examine, and the truth we
fearch after. General and certain Truths, arc only
founded in the habitudes and relations of abflraEl
, Therefore a fagacious methodical applica-
tion of our thoughts for the finding ouf thefe Re-
lations, is the only way to difcovcr all that can
with Truth and Certainty be put into general
Propofitions. By what lleps we are to proceed in
thefe, is to be learned in the fchools of the Ma-
iciaas, who from very plain and eafy begin-
nings, by gentle degrees, and a continued chain of
Reafonings, proceed to the difcovcry and demon-
ftxation of Truths, that appear at firlr. fight beyond
humane Capacity. This, I think I may fay, that
if other ideas, that arc real as we[l as nominal Ef-
fences of their /pedes, were purfued in the way fa-
miliar to Mathematicians, they would carry our
thoughts farther and with greater Evidence and
Clearncfs, than poffibly we are apt to imagine.
This gave me the Confidence to advance that
Conjecture, which I fugged, Chapter the Third,
viz. that Morality is capable of Demon]} rat ion, as
| MaiAematicJu : for moral ideas being real

( 221 )

EfTences, that have a difcoverable Connexion and
Agreement one with another, fofar as we can find
their Habitudes and Relations, fo far we (hall be
poffefled of real and general Truths.

In our Knowledge of Subflances, we are to pro-
ceed after a quite different method : the bare Con-
templation of their abflraft ideas (which are but
nominal EfTences) will carry us but a very little
way, in the fcarch of Truth and Certainty. Here
Experience mult teach us what Reafon cannot :
and it is by trying alone, that we can certainly
know, what other Qualities co-exift with thofe of
our complex idea ; (for inftance) Whether that Tel-
low heavy fufible Body, I call Cold, be malleable, or
no; which Experience (however it prove in that
particular body we examine) makes us not certain
that it is fo in all, or any other yellow, heavy, fufible
Bodies, but that which wc have tried ; becaufe it is
noconfequence one way or the other from our com-
plex idea: the necefhty or inconfiftence of Mal-
leability, hath no vifible Connexion with the com-
bination of that Colour, Weight, and Fufibility in
any Body. What I have here faid of the nominal
Eifence of Gold, fuppofed to confifl: of a Body of
fuch a determinate Colour, Weight, and Fufibility,
will hold true, if other Qualities be added to it.
Our Reafonings from thofe ideas, will carry us
but a little way in the certain Difcovery of the o-
ther Properties t in thofe Mafles of Matter where-

( 222 )

in all thole are to be found. As fir as our Experi-
ence reaches, wc may have certain knowledge, and
no farther.

I deny not, but a man accuftomcJ to rational
and regular Experiments, mail be able to fee far-
ther into the nature of Bodies, and their unknown
Properties, than one that is a {hanger to them.
But this is but Judgment and Opinion, not Know-
ledge and Certainty. This makes me fufpect that
Natural Philofophy is not capable of being made a
fcience : from Experiments and hiftorical Obfer-
vations we may draw Advantages of Eafe and
Health, and thereby increafe our flock of Conve-
niences for this Life: but beyond this, I fear our
Talents reach not ; nor are our faculties, as I guefs,
able to advance.

From whence it is obvious to conclude, that fince
our faculties are not fitted to penetrate the real
Effences of Bodies, but yet plainly to difcover to
us the Being of a God, and the Knowledge of our
felves ; enough to give us a clear Difcovery of our
Duty, and great Concernment ; it will become us
as rational Creatures, to employ our Faculties, a-
bout what they are mod adapted to, and follow
the Direction of Nature, where it feems to point
us out the way. For it is rational to conclude,
that our proper Employment lies in thofe Inqui-
ries, and that fort of Knowledge which is moft
fuited to our natural Capacities, and carries in it

( 223 )

our greateft intereft, that is, the condition of our tf-
ternal State : and therefore it is, I think, that /Ka-
ra//// is the proper fcience and bufinefs of mail'
kind in general (who are both concerned and fit-
ted to fearch out their Summum Bonum) as feveral
Arts converfant about the feveral parts of nature,
are the lot and private talent of particular men,
for the common ufe of human life, and their own
particular Subfiftence in this World.

The ways to enlarge our Knowledge, as far as
we are capable, feem to me to be ihefe two : the
firjl is to get and fettle in our minds, as far as
we can, clear, diftincl, and confbnt ideas of thofe
things we would confider and know. For it being
evident that our Knowledge cannot exceed our i-
deas; where they are either imperfect, confufed,
or obfeure, we cannot expect to have certain, per-
fect, or clear Knowledge. The other is the art of
finding out the intermediate ideas, which may
fhew us the Agreement or Repugnancy of other i-
deas, which cannot be immediately compared.

That thefc two (and not the relying on ma-
xims, and drawing confluences from fbme general
Propofitions) arc the right method of improving
our Knowledge, in the ideas of other modes, be-
fides thofe of Quantity, the Confideration of ma-
thematical'Knowledge will eafily inform us. Where
Firjl, we fhall find that he that has not clear 3nd
perfect ideas of thofe Angles or Figures, of which he

( 224 )

defires to know any thing, is utterly thereby in-
capable of any Knowledge about them. Suppofe
a man not to have an exact idea of a right Angle,
Scalenum, or Trapezium, and it is clear, that he
will in vain feek any Demon ftration about them.
And farther it is evident, that it was not the in-
fluence of maxims or principles, that has led the
matters of this Science into thofe wonderful Difco-
veries they have made. Let a man of good parts
know all the maxims of IMathematicks never fo
well, and contemplate their Extent and Confe-
quences as much as he pleafes, he will by their af-
fiftance, I fuppofe, fcarce ever come to know,
that the fquare ot the Hypotenufe, in a right-angled
Triangle, is equal to the fquares of the tix>o other
fides. This, and other mathematical Truths have
been difcovered by the Thoughts, otherwife ap-
plied. The mind had other objects, other views
before it, far different from thofe maxims which
men well enough acquainted with thofe received
Axioms, but ignorant of their method, who firlt
made thefe Demonftrations, can never fufficient-
]y admire.

.

22J )

CHAP. XIII.

Sotne further Conjiderations concerning Know*
ledge.

OUR Knowledge, ns in other things, Co In
this, has a great Conformity with our fight,
that it is neither wholly neceffary, nor wholly vo-
luntary. Men that have fenfes cannot chufe but
receive fome ideas by them ; and if they have me-
mory, they cannot but retain fome of them ; and
if they have any diitinguifliing Faculty, cannot but
perceive the Agreement or Difagreement of fome
of them, one with another. As he that has Eyes,
if he will open them by day, cannot but fee fome
Objects, and perceive a difference in them; yet he
may chufe whether he will turn his Eyes towards
an Object; curioufly furvcy it, and obferve accu-
rately all that is vilible in it. But what he does
fee, he cannot Cce otherwife than he docs : it de-
pends not on his Will, to fee tbat Black which ap-
pears Yelloiu. Juft thus it is with our Unlerfland-
ing : all that is voluntary in our Knowledge, is
the employing or with-holding any ofourFacul-
ties from this or that fort oCObjetts ; and a more
or lefs accurate Survey of them : but they being
employed, our Will hath no power to determine
Ff

( 11G >

the Knowledge of the mind, one way or other.
That is done only by the Objefls thcmfclves, as
far as they arc clearly difcovered.

Thus he that has got the ideas of Numbers, and
hath t-.ken the pains to compare One, Two and
Three, to Six, cannot chufe but know that they
are equal. He alfo that hath the idea of an intel-
ligent, but weak and frail Being, made by, and de-
pending on another, who is Eternal, Omnipotent,
perfectly wife and good, will as certainly know,
that man is to honour, fear, and obey God, as that
the Sun fhincs when he fees it. But yet thefe
Truths, being never lb certain, never fo clear, he
may be ignorant of either or both of them, who
will not take the pains to employ his Faculties as
he Ihould, to inform himfelf about them.

CHAP. XIV.

Of Judgment.

TH E Underftanding Faculties being given to
man, not barely for Speculation, but alfo
for the Conduct of his Life : a man would be at
a great lofs if he had nothing to direct him but
what has the Certainty of true Knowledge. He
that will not eat till he has Demonftration that it
will nourifll him; nor///Y, till he is infallibly af-

< 227 )

fured of fucccfs in his bufincfs, will have little
elfc to do but fit Jlill and perijh.

Therefore as God hath fet fome things in broad
Day-light ; as he has given us fome certain Know-
ledge, tho' limited to a few things, in comparifon,
(probably as a talte of what intellectual creatures
are capable of, to excite in us a defire and endea-
vour after a better State) fo in the greatelt part
of our Concernment, he has afforded us only tho
Twilight, as I may fo fay, of Probability, fuitable
to that ftate of Mediocrity and Probationer/hip, he
has been pleafed to place us in here.

The Faculty which God has given mart to en-
lighten him, next to certain Knowledge, is Judg-
ment, whereby the mind takes its idea to agree or
difagree, without perceiving a demonflrative Evi-
dence in the Proofs. The mind exercifes this
Judgment, fometimes out of NeceJ/ity, where de-
rnonltrativc Proofs, and certain Knowledge are
not to be had ; and fometimes out of Lezine/s,
Unikilfulnefs, or Haite, even where they are to
be had.

This Faculty of the Mind when it is exercifed
immediately about things, is called Judgment;
when about truths delivered in words, is moll
commonly called Ajfent, or Diffent. Thus the mind
has two Faculties converfant about Truth and Falf-
hood : lft, Knowledge, whereby it certainly per-
ceives, and is undoubtedly fathfied of the Agree-
F F 2

( 223 )

mcnt or Difagrecment of any ideas, idly, Judg-
ment, which is the putting ideas together, or fepa-
rating them from one another in the mind, when
their certain Agreement or Difagreemcnt is not
perceived, but prefumed to be fo. And if it fo u-
nites or feparates them, as in reality things are,
it is right Judgment.

C H A P. XV.

Of Probability.

PRobability is nothing but the appearance of
the Agreement or Difagreement of two i-
deas, by the Intervention of Proofs, whofe Con-
nexion is not conftant, and immutable \ or is not
perceived to be fo; but is, or appears for the moil:
part to be fo, and is enough to induce the mind
to judge the Proportion to be true or falje, rather
than the contrary.

Of Probability there are degrees from the neigh-
bourhood of Certainty and Demonftration, quite
down to Improbability and Unlikelinefs, even to the
confines of Impofibility : and alfo degrees of Aj]er,t
from certain Knowledge and what is next it, full
Aflurance and Confidence, quite down to Conjec-
ture, Doubt, Diltrull, and Disbelief.

( 229 )

That Propofition then is probable, for which
there are arguments or proofs to make it pafs, or
be received for true. The Entertainment the mind
gives to this fort of Propolitions, is called Belief,
Affent, or Opinion. Probability then leing to fup-
ply the defect of our Knowledge, is always con-
verfant about Propolitions, whereof we have no
Certainty, but only fome Inducements to receive
them for true. The Grounds of it are in fhort thefe
two following.

Firfl, The Conformity of any thing with our
own Knowledge, Experience, or Oblervation.

Secondly, The Teflimony of others, vouching
their Obfervation and Experience. In the Tejli-
mony of others, is to be confidered ; \fl, The Num-
ber ; idly, The Integrity ; idly, The Skill of the
Witneilcs ; ^thly, The Defign of the Author, if it
be a Teitimony cited out of a Book ; $tbly, The
Confiftency of the Parts andCircumfhnccs of the
Relation ; 6tbly, Contrary Teftimonies.

The mind before it rationally ajfents or dijfents
to any probable Propofition, ought to examine all
the grounds of Probability, and fee how they make,
more or lefs, for or againftit ; and upon a due ba-
lancing of the whole, reject or receive it, with a
more or lefs firm Ajjent, according to the Prepon-
derancy of the greater Grounds of Probability, on
cne ftde or the other.

( 230 )

CHAP. XVI.
Of the Degrees of Afj'ent.

TH E Grounds of J laid down in the

foregoing Chapter, as they are the founda-
tions on which our Affent is built, fo are they alio
the meafurc whereby its fcveral Degrees are (or
ought) to be regulated. Only we are to take notice,
that no grounds of Probability operate any farther
on the mind, which fearches after Truth, and en-
deavours to judge right, than they appear •, at lcaft
in the nrft Judgment, or Search that the mind
makes. It is indeed in many cafes impofTible, and
in mod very hard, even for thofe who have ad-
mirable memories, to retain all the Proofs, which
upon a due Examination, made them embrace that
fide of the queftion. It fufnees that they have once
with care and fairnefs, fiftcd the matter as far as
they could; and having once found on which
fide the Probability appeared to them, they lay up
the Conclufion in their memories, asa7V«//; they
have difcovered ; and for the future remain fatif-
fied with the Teftimony of their memories, that
this is the Opinion, that by the Proofs they have
once feen of it, deferves fuch a Degree of their
Affcnt as they afford it.

( 231 )

It is unavoidable then that the memory be re-
lied on in this cafe, and that men be perfuaded of
fcveral Opinions, wheicof the Proofs are not actual-
ly in their thoughts, nay, which perhaps they are
not 4We actually to recal : without this the grcatefr.
part of men, muft be cither Seep ticks, or change e-
very moment, when any one offers them argu-
ments, which for want of memory, they are not
prefently able to anfwer.

It muft be owned that mens flicking to paft
Judgments, is often the caufe of great Ohjlinacy
in Error and Miftake. But the fault is not, that
they rely on their memories for what they have
before well judged, but becaufe they judged before
they had well examined. Who almoft is there that
hath the Leifure, Patience, and Means to collect
together, all the Proofs concerning mofl of the O-
pinions he lias, fo as fifcly to conclude that he has
a clear and full view, and that there is no more to
be alledged for his better Information ? And yet
we are forced to determine our felves on one fide
or other : the conduct of our Lives, and the ma-
nagement of our great Concerns, will not bear De-
lay. For thofe depend for the moft part on the
determination of our Judgment in points wherein,
we are not capable of certain Knowledge, and
wherein it is neceffary for us to embrace one fide
or the other.

The Proportions we receive upon inducements

( 232 )

of Probability, are of two forts : Fir/}, Concerning
fome particular Exifter.ee, or matter of Fact, which
falling under 0!)fervation, is capa! Je of human TeJ-
timony. Secondly, Concerning things, which being
beyond the difcovcry of our Senfes, are not cap-
able of human Teftirnony.

Concerning the fait of thefe, viz. Particular
matter of Fail.

Firjl, Where any particular thing, confonant
to the conftant Obfervation of our f.lves and o-
thers in the like cafe, comes attefted with the con-
current Reports of all that mention it, we receive
it as eafily, and build as firmly upon it, as if it
were certain Knowledge. Thus, if aJJ Englijhrr.en
who have occali-in to mention it, fliould report,
that it froze inEnglandhft Winter, or the like, I
think a man would as little doubt of it, as that Se-
ven and Four are Eleven.

The Firjl, and highejl Degree of Probability
then is, when the general confent of all men, in all
ages, as far as can be known, concurs with a man's
own conftant Experience in the like cafes, to con-
firm the truth of any particular matter of Fad, at-
tefted by fair Witnelfes: fuch are the ftated Con-
futations and Properties of Bodies, and the regu-
lar Proceedings of Caujes and Effetts in the ordi-
nary courfe of Nature; this we call an Argument
from the nature of things themfelves. For what
we and others always obierve to be after the fame

( m )

manner, wc conclude with Reafon, to be the ef-
fects of (teddy and regular Caufes, tho' they come
not within the reach of our Knowledge. As that
Fire warmed a man, or made Lead fluid ; that Iron
funk in water, fwam in quick-filver. A relation
affirming any fuch thing to have been, or a prae-
dication that it will happen again in the fame man-
ner, is received without doubt or hefitation : and
our Belief thus grounded, rifes to Ajjurance.

Secondly, The next degree of Probability, is
when by my own Experience, and the agreement
of all others that mention it, a thing is found to
be for the molt part i'o ; and that the particular
inftance of it is atteited by many and undoubted
•witnejjes. Thusi^///(?7^givingusfuch an account of
men in all ages, and my own Experience confirm-
ing it, that molt men prefer their own private Ad-
vantage, to the Publick. If all Hiftorians that writ
of Tiberius, fay thai he did i'o, it is extreamly pro-
bable : and in this cafe, our Afient rifts to a degree
which we may call Confidence.

Thirdly, In matters happening indifferently, as
that a Bird Ihould fly this or that way : when
any particular matter of Fact comes atteited ly
the concurrent Teftimony of imfufpected Wit-
nejfes, there our Afi'ent isalfo unavoidable. Thus,
that there is in Italy fuch a city as Rome ; th
bout One thoufand and (even linn, 'red yeai
there lived fuch a man in it as J\
G G

( 234 )
A man can as little doubt of this, an J the like, as
he docs of the Being and Actions of his own Ac-
quaintance, whereof he himfclf is a witnefs.

Probability, on thefe grounds, carries fb much
Evidence with ir, that it leaves us as little liber-
ty to believe or disbelieve, as Demonltration does,
whether we will know or be ignorant. But the dif-
ficulty is, when Testimonies contradict com-
mon Experience, and the Reports of Witneffcs
claih with the ordinary courfe of Nature, or with
one another. Here diligence, attention, and exacl-
nefs is required to form aright Judgment, and to
proportion the Affent to the Evidence and Proba-
bility of the thing, which rifes and falls, according
as the two foundations of Credibility favour, or
contradict it. Thefe are liable to fuch variety of
contrary Obfervations, Circumihnces, Reports,
Tempers, Defigns, Overfights, <bc- of Reporters,
that it is impoflibleto reduce to precife rules, the
various degrees wherein men give their AJfent.
This in general may be faid, that as the Proofs
upon due Examination, fhall to any one appear in
a greater, or lefs degree, to preponderate on either
fide, fo they are fitted to produce in the mind,
fuch different Entertainments, as are called Be-
lief, Conjecture, Gue/s, Doubt, Wavering, Diflrufl,
Disbelief, &c.

It is a Rule generally approved, that any Tefi:-
oaony, the further off it is removed from the ori-

C 115 )
ginal truth, the lefs force it has : and in traditional
truths, each remove weakens the forceof the Proof.
There is a Rule quite contrary to this, advanced
by fome men, who look on Opinions to gain force
by growing older. Upon this ground, Propofitions
evident-ly falfe or doubtful in their firft beginning,
come by an inverted Rule of Probability, to pais
for authentick Truths ; and thole which defervcd
little Credit from the mouths of their firft Relators,
are thought to grow venerable by Age, and are ur-
ged as undeniable.

But certain it is, that no Probability can rife a-
bove its firjl Original. What has no other evidence
than the fingle Teltimony of one JVitnefs, mull
ftand or fall by his only Teltimony, tho' after-
wards cited by Hundreds of others ; and is fo far
from receiving any ftrength thereby, that it be-
comes the weaker. Becaufe Paflion, Intereft, In-
advertency, Miftake of his Meaning, and a thou-
fand odd Keafons, which capricious mens minds
areadted by, may make one man quote another's
words or meaning wrong. This is certain, that
•what in one age was affirmed upon flight grounds,
can never after come to be more valid in future
ages by being often repeated.

The Second fort of Probability, is concerning
things not falling under the reach of our fenfes,
and therefore not capable of Teltimony : and
fuch are,

G G 2

( ^,6 )

Fi;/}, The Exiftence, Nature, and Operations
of finite, immaterial Beings without us, as Spirits,
Angels, Sec. or the Exigence of material Beings,
fuch as for their fmallncfs or remotenefs, our Sen-
fes cannot take notice of: as whether there be any
Plants, Animals, Be:, in the Planets, and other
manfions of the va(t Univerfe.

Secondly, Concerning the manner of Operation
in mod parts of the woiks of Nature ; wherein,
tho' we fee the fenfible Effects, yet their Caufes
are unknown, and we perceive not the ways, and
manner how they are produced. We fee Animals
are generated, nourifhed, and move \ the Load-
filone draws Iron, &c. but the Caufes th3t operate,
and the manner they arc produced in, we can on-
ly guefs, and probably conjecture. In thefe mat-
ters Analogy is the only help we have; and it is
from that alone we draw all our grounds of Pro-
bability. Thus obferving, that the bare rubbing of
two Bodies violently upon one another, produces
Heat and very often Fire ; we have reaion to think
that what we call Heat and Fire, confifts, in a cer-
tain violent agitation of the imperceptible minute
parts of the burning Matter. This fort of Probabi-
lity, which is the belt conduct of rational Experi-
ments, and the rife ofHypothefes, has alio its ufc and
influence. And a wary reafoning from Analogy leads
us often into the difcovery of Truths, and ufeful
Deduction:, which would otherwife lie concealed.

( 237 )

Tho' the common experience, and the ordinary
courfc of things, have a mighty influence on the
minds of men, to make them give or refufe credit,
to any thing propofed to their belief; yet there is
one cafe wherein the ftrangenefs of the facl iefTens
not the Affent to a fair Teftimony given of it.
For where fuch fupcmatural Events arc fuitahle
to ends aimed at by him, who lias the pqwer to
change the courfc of Nature ; there under fuch
circumftances they may be the fitter to procure be-
lief, by how much the more they are beyond, or
contrary to ordinary obfeivation. This is the pro-
per cafe of miracles, which well attefted, do not
only find credit themfelves, but give it aifo to o-
thcr truths.

There are Proportions that challenge the high-
eft degree of our Affent upon bare Teftimony,
whether the thing propofed agree or difagiee with
common Experience, and the ordinary courfe of
things or no: the reafon whereof is, becaufe the
Teftimony is of fuch an one, as cannot deceive
nor be deceived ; and that is God himfelf. This
carries with it Certainty beyond Ddu t, Evidence
beyond Exception. This is called by a peculiar
name, Revelation, and our affent to it, Faith ;
which has as much Certainty in ir, as our Know-
ledge it felf ; and we may as well doubt of our own
Being, as we can, whether any Revelation from

God Le true. So that Faith is a fettled and furc

C 238 )

Principle of djfent and Ajfurance, and leaves no
Manner of Room for Doubt or Hcfitation ; only
we mult be fure, that it be a divine Revelation,
and that we underftand it right ; elfe we fhnll ex-
pofe our fclves to all the extravagancy oiEnthu-
ftafm, and all the error of wrong Principles if we
have Faith and Ajfurance, in what is not divine
Revelation.

CHAP. XVII.

OfReafon.

TH E word Reafon in Englif, has different
Significations. Sometimes it is taken for
true and clear Principles : fometimes for clear and
fair Deductions from thofe Principles : fometimes
for the Caufe, and particularly for the final Caufe;
but the Consideration I (hall have of it here, is, as
it flanks for a Faculty, whereby Man is fuppofed to
be diftinguiihed from Beajls -, and wherein it is e-
vident, he much furpafles them.

Reafon is necefTary, both for the enlargement of
our Knowledge, and regulating our Affcnt: for it
hath to do both in Knowledge and Opinion, and is
necefTary and affifting to all our other intellectual
Faculties ; and indeed, contains two of them, viz.
Firfi, Sagacity, whereby it finds intermediate ideas.
Secondly, Illation, whereby it fo orders and difpo-
fes of them, as to difcover what connexion thefc

( 239 )
is in each link of the Chain, whereby the cxtreams
are held together, and thereby, as it were, to draw
into view the Truth fought for ; which is that we
call Illation or Inference : and confiits in nothing,
but the Perception of the Connection there is be-
tween the ideas, in each ftep of the Deduction,
whereby the mind comes to fee, either the certain
agreement or difagreement of any two ideas, as in
Demonjlration, in which it arrives at Knowledge :
or their probable Connexion, on which it gives or
with-holds its Ajfent, as in Opinion.

Senfe and Intuition reach but a little way : the
greatcit part of our Knowledge depends upon De-
ductions and intermediate ideas. In thofe cafes
where we mult take Proportions for true, without
being certain of their being fo, we have need to
find out, examine, and compare the grounds of
their Probability : in both cafes, the faculty which
finds out the means, and rightly applies them to dis-
cover Certainty in the one, and Probability in the
other, is that which we call Reafon. So that in
Rtafon we may confider thefe four Degrees ; i/?,
The difcovering and finding out of Proofs, idly,
The regular and methodical Difpofition of them,
and laying them in fuch order, as their Connexion
may be plainly perceived. Thirdly, The perceiv-
ing their Connexion, qth/y, The making a right
Conclufion.

There is one thing more which I (hall di.fire to be

( 240 )

conf! IcreJ concerning Reafon, and that is, whether
Syllogifm, as is generally thought, be the proper
inftrument of it; anJ the ufefulleft way ofexer-
this faculty. The Caufes I have to doubt
of it, are thefe.

Fir/l, Bccaufc Syllogifm ferves awe Reafon but ia
one only of the fore-mentioned parts of it, and that
is to fhew the Connexion of the Proofs of any one
Inftance, and no more : but in this it is of no
great ufe, hnce the mind can perceive fuch Con-
nexion, where it really is, as eafily, nay, perhaps
better without it. "Wc may obfeivc that there are
many men that reafon exceeding clear and right-
ly, who know not how to make a Syllogifm : and
I believe fcarce any one makes Syllogifm: in rea-
foning within himfelf. Indeed, fometimes they
may fcrve to discover a fallacy, hid in a rhetorical
Flourifh ; or by dripping an abfurdity of the co-
ver of Wit and good Language, fhew it in its na-
ked Deformity. But the Weaknefs or Fallacy of
fuch a loofe Difcourfe it Ihews, by the artificial
form it is put into, only to thofe whohavethrough-
ly ftudied Mode and Figure, and have fo examin-
ed the many ways, that three Propofitions m :y
be put together, as to know which of them does
certainly conclude right, and which not, and upon
what grounds it is that they do fo. But they who
have not fo far look'd into thofe forms, are not
fure by virtue of Syllogifm that the Conclusion cer-

C 241 )

tainly follows from the Premilfcs. The mind is
not taught to rcafon by thefc Rules ; it has a na-
tive faculty to perceive the Coherence or Incohe-
rence of ils ideas, and can range them right, with-
out any fuch perplexing Repetitions.

And to (hew the weaknefs of an argument, there
needs no more but to ltrip it of the fupcrfluous /•
decs, which blended and confounded with thofcon
which the Inference depends, fecm to fhew a Con-
nexion where there is none, or at lead do hinder
theDifcovery of the want of it ; and then to lay
the naked ideas on which the force of the Argu-
mentation depends in their due order; in which
pofition the mind taking a view of them, fees
what Connexion they have, and lb is able to judge
of the Inference without any need of Syllogifin
at all.

Secondly, Becaufe Syllogifins arc not left liable
to Fallacies than the plainer ways of Argumenta-
tion : and for this I appeal to common Obferva-
tion, which has always found thefc artificial me-
thods of Reafoning more adapted to catch and en-
tangle the mind, than to inuruct and inform the
Underftanding. And if it be certain that Fallacy
can be couch'd inSyllogifms, as it cannot be de-
nied, itmuftbe fomethingclfe, and notSyllogifm,
that mud difcovcr them. But if men IkilPd in,
and us'd to Syllogifins, find them aflifting to their
Reafon in the Difcovery of Truth, I think they

H H

c »r* )

ought to make ufe of them. All that I aim at ]:■,
that they fhould not afcribe more to theft Forms
than belongs to them ; and tliink that men have
no ofe, or not fo full a ufe of their reafoning fa-
culty without them.

But however it he in Knowledge, I think it is of
far lefs, or no ufc at all in Probabilities : for the Af-
fent there being to be determined by the Picpon-
dcrancy, after a due weighing of all the Proofs on
both fides, nothing is fo unfit to affi(t the mind in
that, as Syllogifm; which running away with one
affumcd Probability, purfuts that till it has led the
mind quite out of fight of the thing under conli-
dcration.

But let it help us (as perhaps may be faid) in
convincing men of their errors or mi/lakes ; yet Hill
it fails our rcafon in that part, which if not its
higheft perfection, is yet certainly its hardeft talk ;
and that which we molt need its help in, and that
is, The finding out of Proofs, and making nezu DiJ-
coveries. This way of Reafoning difcovcrs no
new Proofs, but is the art of marlhalling and ran-
ging the old ones we have already. A man knows
firft, and then he is able to prove fyllogi flic ally ; fo
that Syllogifm comes after Knowledge ; and then a
man has little or no need of it. But it is chiefly
by the finding out thofe ideas that (hew the Con-
nexion of diftant one?, that our flock of Knowledge
is encreafed ; and that ufeful arts and fcienccs are
advanced.

C 243 )

Reafin, tho' of a very large extent, fails us in
frveral Inltances : as, iji, Where our ideas fail.
idly, It is often at a lofs, becaufe of the Obfcurity,
Confulion, or Imperfection of the ideas it is cm-
ployed about. Thus having no perfect idea of tho
Jealr. Extenfion of matter, nor of Infinity, we are at
a lofs about the divilibility of Matter. 3^, Our
Reafon is often at a ftand, becaufe it perceives not
thole ideas which would ferve to Ihcw the certain
or probable agreement or dilagreement or any
two other ideas, $tbly, Our Reafon is often en-
gaged in abfurdities and difficulties, by proceeding
upon falle Principles, which being followed, lead
men into Contradictions tothemfelves, and Incon-
fiftency in their own Thoughts. 5//^, Dubious
words, and uncertain ligns often puzzle mens Rea-
fon, and bring them to a Non-plus.

Tho' the deducing one Propolition from ano-
ther be a great part of Reafon, and that which
it is ufually employed about : yet the principal
act of Ratiocination is the rinding the agreement
or dilagreement of two ideas one with another, by
the intervention of a third. As a man, by a yard,
finds two houfes to be of the fame length, which
could not be brought together to mcafuie their
Equality by juxta-pofition. Words have their con-
fequences as the ligns of fuch ideas : and things
agree, or difagree, as really they are j but we ob-
fcvvQ it only by our ideas.
Hh 2

( 244 )

In Rcafoning men ordinarily uCcfour forts of
Arguments.

The Firjf, is to allcdge the Opinions of men,
whofe parts, learning, emineocy, power, or fome
other caufe, ha? gained a name, and fettled their
Reputation in the common elteem with fome kind
of Authority. This may be called Argumentum
ad Verecundiam.

Secondly, Another way is, to require the Adver-
fary to admit what they alledgc as a Proof, or to
affign a better, This 1 call Argumentum ad Igno-
ranticim.

A Third way, is to prefs a man with confe-
qnences drawn from his own Principles or Con-
ceffions. This ib already known under the name
of Argumentum ad hominem.

Fourthly, The ufing of Proofs drawn from any
of the foundations of Knowledge or Probability.
This I call Argumentum ad Judicium. This alone
of all the four, brings truelnitruftion with it, and
advances us in our way to Knowledge, For ift, It
argues not another man's Opinion to be right, bc«
caufe I, out of refpect, or any other confederation
but that of Conviction, will not contradict him.
idly, It proves not another man to be in the right
way. nor that I ought to take the fame with him,
becaufe I know not a better. %dly, Nor does it fol-
low, that another man is in the right way, be-
caufe he has (hewn me that I am in the wrong.

( 24? )
This may difpofe me perhaps for the Reception of
truth, but helps me not to it ; that mult come
from Proofs and Arguments, and Light arifing from
the Nature of Things themfelves •, not from my
Shame-facednefs, Ignorance, or Error.

By what has been faid of Reafon, we may be
able to make fome guefs at the diltinclion of
thing?, into tho<e that are according to, above,
and contrary to Reafon. According to Reafon,
are fuch Proportions, whofe truth we can dif-
cover, by examining and tracing thofe ideas
we have from Senfation and Refleftion, and by
natural deduction find to be true or probable.
Above Reafon, are fuch Propofitions, whofe Truth
or Probability we cannot by Reafon derive from
thofc Principles. Contrary to Rea/on, are fuch Pro-
pofitions as are inconfiUent with, or irreconcile-
able to, our clear and diftinft ideas. Thus the Exi-
gence of one God, is according to Reafon : the Exi-
gence of more than one God, contrary to Reafon;
the Refurreftion of the Body after death, above
Reafon. Above Reafon, may be alfo taken in a
double fenfe, viz. Above Probability, or, above Cer-
tainty. In that large fenfe alio, Contrary to Reafon,
is, I fuppofe, fomctimes taken.

There is another ufc of the word Reafon, where-
in it is oppoled to Faith ; which, though authori-
zed by common ufe, yet is it in it felf a very im-
proper way of fpeaking : for Faith is nothing but

( *46 )
a. firm Affent of the mind ; winch if il be regulated
as is our duty, cannot be afiurded to any thing but
upon good Reafon, and fo cannot be oppofite to it.
He that believes without having any Reafon for
Believing, may be in love with his own fancies ;
but neither feeks Truth as he ought, nor pays the
Obcliencc due to his Maker, who would have him
ufe thofe difcerning faculties he has given him, to
keep him out of Miftake and Error. But fince Rea-
fon and Faith are by fome men oppofed, wc will
Co confider them in the following Chapter.

CHAP. XVIII.
Of Faith and Reafon, and their diflintf Provinces.

REASON, as contra-diftinguifhed to Faith, I
tike to be the difcovery of the Certainty or
Probability of fuch Propofitions or Truths which
the mind arrives at by deductions made from Inch
ideas, which it has got by the ufe of its natural fa-
culties, <viz. by Sen/ation or Reflection.

Faith on the other fiJe, is the alien t to any pro-
pofition, upon the credit of the propofer, as com-
ing immediately from God; which we call Reve-
lation: concerning which we mult obferve,

Firjl, That no man infpired by God, can by any
Revelation communicate to others, any new Jim pie i-
deas, which they bad not before from Senfation or

( =47 )
Refection : becaufe words, by their immediate ope-
ration on us, cannot caufe other ideas, but of their
natural founds, and zsfigns of latent ideas they can
only recal to our Thoughts thofe ideas, which to
us they have been wont to be figns of; but cannot
introduce any new, and formerly unknown fimple
ideas. The fame holds in all other figns, which
cannot fignifietous thing-, of which we have never
before had any idea at all. For our fimple ideas we
mult depend wholly on our natural faculties, and
can by no means receive them from traditional
Revelation ; I fay traditional, in diltinclion to ori-
ginal Revelation. By the one, I mean that impref-
iion which is mad: im mediately by God on the
mind of any man, to which we cannot fet any
bounds. And by the other, thofe impreffions deli-
vered over to others in words, and the ordinary
ways of conveying our Conceptions one to ano-
ther.

Secondly, I lay, that the fame Truths may he dif-
toverediy Revelation, which are dif cover able to us
by Reafon; but in fuch there is little need or ufe
of Revelation; God having furnifhed us with na-
tural means to arrive at the Knowledge of them :
and Truths difcovcred by our natural faculties, are
more certain, than when conveyed to us by tradi-
tional Revelation. For the Knowledge we have,
that this Revelation came at firlt from God, can ne-
ver be fo fu:e as the Knowledge we have from the

( 248 )

clear and diftintfr Perception of the agreement and
difagrecment of our own ideas. This alfo holds
in matters of fa<5t, knowable by our fenfes : as
the hiflory of the Deluge is conveyed to us by
Writings, which had their original from Revela-
tion; and yet no body, I think, will fay he has
as certain and clear Knowledge of the Flood, as
Noah that faw it, or that he himfelf would have
had, had he then been alive an. I feen it. For he
has no greater Aflurance, than that of his Senfes,
that it is writ in the Book, fuppofed to be writ by
Mofes mfpired. But he has not fo great an Aflu-
rance that Mofes writ that Book, as if he had feen
Mofes write it; fo that the Aflurance of its being
a Revelation, is (till lefs than the Aflurance of his
Senfes.

Revelation cannot be admitted againfl: the clear
evidence of Reafon. For fince no evidence of our
faculties, by which we receive fuch a Revelation,
can exceed, if equal, the Certainty of our intuitive
Knowledge ; we can never receive for a Truth any
thing that is directly contrary to our clear and di-
ftinct Knowledge. Thus the ideas of one body and
one place do fo clearly agree, that we can never af-
fenrto a Propoiition that affirms the fame body to
be in tiuo dijlintl places at once ; however, it fliould
pretend to the authority of a divine Revelation:
fince the evidence, Fuji, That we deceive not our
felves in afcribing it to Cod: Secondly, That we

C 249 )

undertone! it right, can never be 10 great as the
evidence of our own intuitive Knowledge, where-
by we difcern it importable for the fame body to be
in two places at once.

In Propofitions therefore, contrary to our di-
ftinct and clear ideas, it will be in vain to urge than
as matters oiFaith. For Faith can never convince
us of any thing that contradicts our Knowledge.
Becaufe, though Faith be founded upon the Tefti-
mony oiGod, who cannot lie, yet we cannot have
an AfTurance of the Truth of its being a divine
Revelation, greater than our own Knowledge. For
if the mind of man can never have a clearer evi-
dence of any thing to be a divine Revelation, than
it has of the principles of its own Reafbn ; it can
never have a ground to quit the clear evidence of
its Realbn, to give place to a Propolition, whole
Revelation has not a greater evidence than thofe
principles have.

In all things therefore where we have clear evi-
dence from our ideas, and the principles of Know-
Jedge above-mentioned, Reafon is the proper
Judge ; and Revelation cannot in fuch cafes inva-
Jidate its decrees ; nor can we be obliged, where we
have the clear and evident fentence of Reafon, to
quit it for the contrary Opinion, under a pretence
that it is Matter of Faith, which can have no au-
thority againft the plain and clear dictates of Rea-
Jon, But,

Ii

( 25*0 )

Thirdly, There being many tilings of which We
hive but imperfect notions, or none at all ; and
other things, of whore paft, prefent, or future Exi-
ftence, by the natural ufe of our faculties, we can
have no Knowledge at all : thefe being beyond the
difcovery of our faculties, and above Reafon, when
revealed, become the proper Matter of Faith.
Thus, that part of the angels rebelled againfl: God;
that the bodies of men fhall rife and live again, and
the like, are purely Matters of Fait/), with which
Reafon has diredtly nothing to do.

Fir/} then, "Whatever Propofition is revealed, of
whofc truth our mind, by its natural faculties and
notions cannot judge, that is purely Matter of
Faith and above Reafon.

Secondly, All Propofitions, whereof the mind by
its natural faculties, can come to determine and
judge from natural acquired ideas, are Matter of
Reafon ; but with this difference ; that in thole con-
cerning which it has but an uncertain evidence,
and fo is perfuaded of their Truth only upon pro-
bable grounds : in fuch, I fay, an evident Revela-
tion ought to determine our Affent, even againfl:
Probability. Bccaufc the mind, not being certain
of the Truth of that it does not evidently know,
is bound to give up its Affent to fucli a Teflimony,
which it is fatisfied comes from one, who cannot
err, and will not deceive. But yet it flill belongs
to Reafon to judge of the Truth of its being a Re-

( 2f| )

velation, and of the Signification of the Words
wherein it is delivered.

Thus far the dominion of 'Faith reaches ; and
that without any violence to Reafon, which is not
injured or diltuibed, but aflitted and improved by
new difcoveries of Truth, coming from the eternal
Fountain of all Knowledge. Whatever God hath
revealed is certainly true ; no doubt can be made
of it. This is the proper Object of Faith : but
whether it be a divine Revelation or no, Reafon
mull judge; which can never permit the mind to
reject a greater Evidence, to embrace what is
lefs evident, nor prefer lefs Certainty to the grea-
ter. There can be no Evidence, that any traditio-
nal Revelation is of divine original, in the words
we receive it, and the fenk wc underftand it, fo
clear and Co certain, as that of the Principles of
Reafon : and therefore, Nothing that is contrary to
the clear and felf-evideni dittates of Reafon, has a
right to be urged or affented to, as a matter of Faith,
wherein Reafon has nothing to do. Whatfoever is
divine Revelation, ought to over-rule all our Opi-
nions, Prejudices, and Interefts, and hath a right ta
be received with a full Affent. Such a fubmifiion
as this, of our Reafon to Faith, takes not away,
the Land-marks of Knowledge : this (hakes not
the foundations of Reafon, but leaves us that ule
of our faculties, for which they were given uc.
Il 2

C 2J2 )

CHAP. XIX.

Of Entbujlafm.

HE that would ferioufly fet upon the fcarch
of Truth, ought in the firlt place to pre-
pare his mind with a Love of it. For he that loves
it not, will not take much pains to get it, nor be
much concern'd when he mifles it. There is no
body who does not profefs himfclfa lover of truth,
and that would not take it amifs to be thought o-
thcrwife of. And yet for all this, one may truly
fay, there are very few lovers of truth for Truth's
fake, even amongft thofe who perfuade themfelves
that they are fo. How a man may know whether
he be fo in earned, is worth Enquiry : and I think
there is this one unerring mark of it, viz. The not
entertaining any Propofition with greater affurance
than the proofs it is built upon will warrant.
Whoever goes beyond this meafure of AfTenr,
*tis plain receives not Truth in the Love of it.
For the evidence that any Propofition is true (ex-
cept fuch as are felf-evident) lying only in the
proofs a man has of it, whatever decrees of Affent
lie affords it beyond the degrees of that Evidence,
'tis plain all that furplufage of Affurance is owing
to fome other affection, and not to the love of

( 253 )

Truth. Whatfoever credit we give to any Pro-
pofition more than it receives from the principles
and proofs itfupportsit felf upon, is owing to our
inclinations that way, and is fo far a derogation
from the Love of Truth as fuch : which as it can
receive no evidence from our Paflions or Interefts,
fo it fhould receive no tincture from them.

The afluming an Authority of dictating to o-
thers, and a Forwardnefs to prefcribe to their o-
pinions, is a conftant concomitant of this bias
and corruption of our Judgments. For how can it
be otherwife, but that he fhould be ready to im-
pofe on others Belief, who has already impos'd on
his own ?

Upon this occafion I fhall confider a third
ground of AfTent, which with fome men has the
fame Authority as either Faith or Reafon, I mean
Enthtifiafm; which laying by Reafon, would fefc
up Revelation without it. Whereby in effect it
takes away both Reafon and Revelation, and fub~
flitutes in the room of it, the ungrounded fancies
of a man's own brain, and affumes them for a
foundation both of Opinion and Conduct.

Immediate Revelation being a much eafier
way for men to eftablifh their Opinions, and re-
gulate their Conduct, than the tedious labour of
ftrict Reafoning, it is no wonder that fome have
been very apt to pretend to it, efpecially in fuch
of their Actions and Opinions as they cannot ac-

C »** )

count for by the ordinary methods of Knowledge,
and principles of Rcafon. Hence we Ice that in.
all ages, men, in whom .Melancholy has mixed
with Devotion, or whofe Conceit of themfelves
has railed them into an Opinion of a greater fami-
liarity with God than is allowed others, have often
flatter'd themfelves with a perfuufion of an imme-
diate Intcrcourie with the Deity, and frequent
Communications from the divine Spirit. Their
minds being thus prepared, whatever grou.
Opinion comes to fettle itfelf ftrongly upon their
fancies, is an Illumination from the Spirit of God ;
and whatfoever odd action they find in themfelves
a ftrong Inclination to do, that Impulfe is con-
cluded to be a Call or Direction from Heaven,
and mult be obeyed. This I take to be properly
Enthnfiafm, which tho' rifing from the Conceit of
a warmed or overweening Brain, works, where it
once gets footing, more powerfully on the per-
fuafions and actions of men, than either Reafon
or Revelation, or both together-, men being moll
fbrwardly obedient to the Impulfcs they receive
from themfelves. Strong Conceit, like a new Prin-
ciple, carries all eafily with it, when got above
Common Senfc, and freed from all reftraint of
Reafon, and check of Reflection, it is heighten'd
into a divine Authority, in concurrence with our
own Temper and Inclination.
When men are once go; into this way of imme*.

( ifS )

diate Revelation, of Illumination without Search,
and of Certainty without Proof, 'tis a hard matter
to get them out of it. Reafon is loft upon them,
they are above it : they fee the Light infus'd in-
to their Underftandings, and cannot be miftaken ;
'tis clear and vifible there, like the light of bright
Sun-fhine, (hews it felf, and needs no other Proof,
but its own Evidence : they feel the hand of God
moving them within, and the Impulfes of the
Spirit, and cannot be miltaken in what they
feel.

This is the way of talking of thefe men : they
are fure becaufe they arc fure : and their perfua-
fions are right, only becaufe they are flrong in
them. For when what they fay is ltrip'd ofthe me-
taphor of feeing and feeling, this is all it amounts
to. Thefe men have, they fay, clear light, and
they fee; they have an awaken'd fenfe, and they
feel : this cannot, they are fure, be difputed them.
But here let me ask : this feeing is it the percep-
tion of the Truth of the Propofition, or of this,
that it is a Revelation from God? This feeling is
it a Perception of an Inclination to do fomething,
or of the Spirit of God moving that Inclination ?
Thefe are two very different Perceptions, and mult
be carefully diftinguilh'd. I may perceive the
Truth of a Propofition, and yet not perceive that
it is an immediate Revelation from God. Nay, I
may perceive I came not by it in a natural way,

( *56 )

without perceiving that it is a Revelation from
God. Becaufe there be Spirits, which without be-
ing divinely commiflion'J, may excite thofe ideas
in me, and make their Connexion perceiv'd. So
that the Knowledge of any Propofition coming in-
to my mind I know not how, is not a Perception
that it is from God. But however it be call'd Light
and Seeing ; I frppofe it is at mod but Belief and
Affurance. For where a Propofition is known to
be true, Revelation is needlefs. If therefore it be
a Propofition which they are pcrfuaded, but do not
know to be true, it is not feeing but believing.
What I fee, I know to be fo by the Evidence of
the thing it felf : what I believe, I take to be fo
upon the Teftimony of another: but this Tefti-
mony I mult know to be given, or elfe what
grounJ have I of believing ? I mud fee that it is
God that reveals this to me, or elfe I fee nothing.
If I know not this, how great foever my Affurance
is, it is groundlefs : whatever Light I pretend to,
it is but Etitbufiafm.

In all that is of divine Revelation, there is need
of no other Proof, but that it is from God : for
he can neither deceive nor be deceived. But how
fhall it be known that any Propofition in our minds
is a Truth revealed to us by God ? Here it is that
Enthufiafm fails of the Evidence it pretends to.
For men thus poffefs'd boaft of a Light, whereby
they fay they are brought into the Knowledge of

( 257 )

this or that Truth. But if they know it to be a
Truth, they muft know it to be fo, either by its
own felf-evidence or by the rational Proofs that
make it out to be fo. If they know it to be a
Trutli cither of theft two ways they in vain fup-
pofe it to be a Revelation. For thus all Truths of
what kind foever, that men uninfpircd are enligh-
ten'd with come into their minds. If they fay
they know it to be true, becaufe it is a Revela-
tion from God, the Rcafon is good : but then it
will be demanded, how they know it to be a Re-
velation from God. If they fay by the Light it
brings with it, I befeech them to confider, whether
this be any more, than that it is a Revelation be-
caufe they ftrongly believe it to be true. For all
the Light they fpeak of, is but a ftrong perfuafion
of their own minds that it is a Truth, which is a
very unfafe ground to proceed on, either in our
tenets or actions.

True Light in the mind is nothing elfe but the
Evidence of the Truth of" any Proportion : and if
it be not felf-eviJent, all the Light it can have is
from Clearncfs of thofe Proofs upon which it is re-
ceived. To talk of any other Light in the Under-
standing, is to put ourfelvcs in the dark, or in the
power of the Prince of Darknefs. For if ftrength
of perfuafion be the Light which muft guide us,
how fhall any one diftinguifh between theDelu-
fions of Satan, and the Infpirations of the Holy

K K

( 1*8 )

Gbojt? He therefore tint will not give up him-
felf to Delulion and Error, mull: bring this guide
of his Light within to the trial. God when he
makes the Prophet, does not unmake the Man.
He leaves his faculties in their natural flare, to e-
nable him to judge of his Infpirations, whether
they be of divine Original or no. If he would have
us aflent to the Truth of any Propofition, he ei-
ther evidences that Truth by the ufual methods
of natural Reafon, or elfe makes it known to be a
Truth which he would have us afTent to by his
Authority •, and convinces us that it is from him,
by fome marks, which Reafon cannot be miftaken
in. Reafon mull: be our laft Judge and Guide in e-
very thing. I do not mean that we muftconfult
Reafon, and examine whether a Proportion re-
veal'd from God can be made out by natural
Principles, and if it cannot, that then we may re-
ject it : but confult it we mud, and by it examine,
whether it be a Revelation from God or no: and
if Reafon finds it to be revealed from God, Reafon
then declares for it, as much as for any other
Truth, and makes it one of her Dictates. Every
conceit that throughly warms our fancies muit
pafs for an Infpiration, if there be nothing but
the flrtngth of our perfuafions whereby to judge
of them : if Reafon mufl not examine their Truth
by fomething extrinfical to the perfuafions them-
felves, Infpirations and Dclufions, Truth and

( 2)9 )

Falfliood, will have the fame meafurc.and will not
be poflible to be diltinguilhcd.

Thus we fee the holy men of God, who had
Revelations from God, had fomething elfe bcfides
that internal Light of AfTurancc in their own
minds, to teftifie to them, that it was from God.
They had outward figns to convince them of the
Author of thofe Revelations. And when they
were to convince others, they had a power given
them to jultifie the truth of their Commiflion from
Heaven ; and by vifibJe ligns to alfert the divine Au-
thority of the mefTagc they were fent with. MofeS
faw the Bufh burn without being confumed, and
heard a voice out of it. God by another miracle
of his rod turn'd into a Serpent, affured him Jike-
wife of a power to teftifie his million by the fame
Miracle repeated before them, to whom he was
fent. This, and the like Initances to be found a-
mong the Prophets of old, are enough to (hew,
that they thought not an inward feeing or per-
fualion of their own minds a fufficicnt Evidence
without any other proof, that it was from God,
tho' the Scripture does not every where men-
tion their demanding or having fuch proofs.

I do not deny that God can, or doth fometimes en-
lighten mens minds in the apprehending of certain
Truth?, or excite them io good actions by the im-
mediate influence and aflilhnce of the Holy Spirit,
without any extraordinary Cgns accompanying it.
K K 2

( 200 )

But in fuch cafes too we have Reafon and the
Scripture, unerring rules to know whether it be
from God or no. Where the Truth embraced is
confonant to the Revelation in the written Word
of God •, or the Action conformable to the Dic-
tates of Right Reafon, or Holy Writ, wc run no
rifque in entertaining it as fuch ; becaufc tho'
perhaps it be not an immediate Revelation from
God, extraordinarily operating on our minds, yet
we are fure it is warranted by that Revelation
which he has given us n[ Truth. Where Reafon
or Scripture is exprefs for any Opinion or Action,
we may receive it as of divine Authority : but 'tis
not the ftrcngth of our own perfuafions which
can by itfclf give it that ftamp. The bent
of our own minds may favour it as much as we
pleafe •, that may fhew it to be a fondling of our
own, but will by no means prove it to be an Ojfi
firing of Heaven, and of divine Original.

C 261 )

CHAP. XX.

Cf wrong Jffent or Error,

ERROR is a Miftake of our Judgment, giv-
ing Ajfent to that which is not true. The
Reafons whereof may be reduced to thcfeyoar:
Firft, Want of Proofs. Secondly, Want of Ability
to ufe them. Thirdly, Want of Will to ufe them.
Fourthly, Wrong Meafures of Probability.

Firft, Want of Proofs ; by which I do not mean
only the want of thofe Proofs which are not to
be had, but alfo of thofe Proofs which are in be-
ing, or might be procured. The greateft part of
mankind want the conveniences and opportuni-
ties of making Experiments and Obfervations
thcmfelves, or of collecting the Teftimonies of 0-
thers, being enflaved to the neceffity of their mean
Condition, whofe lives are worn out only in the
Provifions for living. Thefemen are by the Con-
ftitution of human Affairs, unavoidably given over
to invincible Ignorance of thofe Proofs, on which
others build, and which are neceffary to eftablifh
thofe Opinions. For having much to do to get
the means of living, they are not in a Condition

( 262 )

to look after thofe of learned and laborious En-
quiries.

It is true, that God has furnifhed men with fa-
culties fufficicnt to direct them in the way they
mould take, if they will but fcrioufly employ them
that way, when their ordinary vocations allow
them lcifure. No man is fo wholly taken up with
the attendance on the means of living, as to have
no fpare time at all to think on his Soul, and in-
form himlelf in matters of Religion, were men as
intent on this, as they are on things of lower con-
cernment. There are none fo enflaved to the ne-
cefTity of life, who might not find many vacan-
cies, that might be husbanded to this advantage of
their Knowledge.

Secondly, Want of Ability to ufe them. There
be many who cannot carry a Train of Confe-
quences in their heads, nor weigh exactly the
prepondcrancy of contrary Proofs and Teftimo-
nies. Thefe cannot difcern that iide on which the
ftrongelt Proofs lie ; nor follow that which in it
felf is the molt probable Opinion. It is certain,
that there is a wide difference in mens Undemand-
ing?, Apprehenfions and Rcafonings, to a very
great Latitude, Co that one may, without doing
Injury to mankind, affirm, that there is a greater
d'dtance between fome men and others in this re-
fpecl, than between fome men and fome beajls : but
how this comes about is a Speculation, though of

( a<*3 )
great Confequence, yet not neceflary to our pre-
fent Purpofe.

Thirdly, For want of Will to ufe them. Some,
tho' they have opportunities and leifure enough,
and want neither parts nor learning, nor other
helps, are yet never the better for them, and ne-
ver come to the Knowledge of feveral Truths
that lie within their reach ; either upon the ac-
count of their hot purfuit of Pleafurc, conftant
drudgery in Bufinefs, Lazinefs and Ofcitancy in
general, or a particular averfioa for Books and
Study : and fome out of fear that an impartial In-
quiry would not favour thofe Opinions, which
belt fuit their Prejudices, Lives, Defigns, Interefts,
<bc. as many men forbear to cart: up their Ac-
counts, who have reafon to fear that their Affairs
are in no very good Porturc.

How men, whofe plentiful fortunes allow them
leifure to improve their Underftandings, can fatisfic
tbemfelvcs with a lazy Ignorance, I cannot tell :
but methinks they have a low Opinion of their
Souls, who lay out all their Incomes in Provifi-
ons for the Body, and employ none of it to pro-
cure the Means and Helps of Knowledge. 1 will
not here mention how unreafonable this is for men
that ever think of a future State, and their Con-
cernment in it, which no rational man can avoid
to do fometimes : nor mall I take notice what a
fhame it is to the grcateft. Contemners of Know-

( 264 )

ledge, to be found ignorant in things they are con-
cerned to know. But this, at Icaft, is worth the
Confederation of thole who call themfel ves Gentle-
men; that however they may think Credit, Re-
fpeit, and Authority, the concomitants of their
Birth and Fortune; yet they will find all thefe
ftill carried away from them by men of lower
Condition, who furpafs them in Knowledge. They
who arc blind, will always be led by thofe that fee,
or elfi fall into the Dirch: and he is certainly
the mod fubjetfed, the molt enllaved, who is fo
in his Under (landing.

Fourthly, Wrong meafures of Probability ; which
are,

Firft, Proportions that are not in them/elves cer-
tain and evident, but doubtful and falfe, taken for
Principles. Proportions looked on as Principles,
have fo great an Influence upon our Opinions,
that is ufually by them we juJge of Truth, and
what is inconfident with them, is fo far from paf-
fing for probable with us, that it will not be allowed
pojfible. The Reverence born to thefe Principles is
fo great, that the Teftimony, not only of other
men, but the Evidence of our own Senfes are of-
ten rejected, when they offer to vouch any thing
contrary to thefe efhbiiihed Rules. The great Ob-
ftinacy that is to be founJ in men, firmly believ-
ing quite contrary Opinions, though many times
equally abfurd, in the various Religions of man-

( 265 )

kind, are as evident a proof, as they are an un-
avoidable confequence of this way of Reafoning
from received traditional principles : fo that men
will disbelieve their own eyes, renounce the Evi-
dence of their Scnfes, and give their own Expe-
rience the Lye, rather than admit of any thing
difagrceing with thefe facred Tenets.

Secondly, Received H) pot hefes. The difference
between thefe and the former, is, that thofe who
proceed by thefe, will admit of matter of fact, and
agree with Dillenters in that ; but differ in align-
ing of Rcafons, and explaining the manner of O-
peration. Thefe are not at that open defiance
with their Senfes as the former : they can en-
dure to hearken to their Information a little more
patiently; but will by no means admit of their
Reports in the Explanation of things ; nor be pre-
vailed on by Probabilities which would convince
them, that things arc not brought about juft af-
ter the fame manner that they have decreed with-
in themfelves that they are.

Thirdly, Predominant PaJ/ions or Inclinations :
let never fo much Probability hang on one fide of
a covetous man's Reafoning, and money on the o-
ther, it is eafie to forcfee which will prevail. Tho'
men cannot always openly gain-fay, or re ii ft the
force of manifdl Probabilities, that make againft
them, yet yield they not to the Argument. Not
Ll

( 266 )
but that it is the Nature of the Underflanding,
conUantly to clofe with the more probable fide :
but yet a man hath power to fufpend and reftrain
its Enquiries, and not permit a full and fatisfaftory
Examination. Until that be done, there will be
always thefe two ways left of evading the molt ap-
parent Probabilities-

Firft, That the Arguments being brought in
Words, there may be Fallacy latent in them ; and
the confequences being perhaps many in train, may
be fome of them incoherent. There are few difcour-
fes fo fhort and clear, to which men may not,
with fati.->fa(ftion enough to thcmfelves raife this
doubt, and from whofe Conviction they may not
without reproach of Difingcnuity or Unrcalbn-
abJencfs fct themfelvcs free.

Secondly, Manif.fl: Probabilities may be evaded
upon this SuggeUion, that / know not yet all that
may be /aid on the contrary fide : and therefore, tho'
a man be beaten, it is not necefTary he mould
yield, not knowing what Forces there are in re-
serve behind.

Fourthly, Authority, or the giving up our Af-
fent to the common received Opinions, either of our
Friends or Party, Neighbourhood or Country.
How many men have no other ground for their
Tenets, than the fuppofed Honcfty or Learning,
or Number of thofc of the fame Profeffion? as if

( 2d7 )

honed or bookifh men could not err ; or Truth
were to be eftablilhed by the Vote of the Multi-
tude. Yet this with molt men ferves the Turn.
All men are JiaL>Je to Error, and molt men are in
many points by PaJJion or Interejl under tempta-
tion to it. This is certain, that there is not an O-
pinion fo abfurd, which a man may not receive
upon this Ground. There is no Error to be named,
which has not had its Profeflbrs. And a man lhall
never want crooked Paths to walk in, if he thinks
that he is in the right Way, where-ever he has
the Footltcps of others to follow. But, notwith-
standing the great Noife is made in the World a-
bout Errors and Opinions, I mult do Mankind
that Right as to fay, there arc not fo many men in
Errors and wrong Opinions as is commonly fuppofed:
not that I think they embrace the Truth, but in-
deed, becaufe, concerning thofe Doctrines they
keep fuch a Stir about, they have no Thought., no
Opinion at all. For if any one mould a little ca-
techife the greatelt part of the Partifans of molt
of the Seels in the World, he would not find con-
cerning thofe Matters, they are fo zealous for,
that they have any Opinions of their own : much
Icfs would he have Reafon to think, that they
took them upon the Examination of Arguments,
and Appearance of Probability. They are refol-
ved to (tick to a Party, that Education or Intereft

( a<58 )

ha- engaged them in ; and there, like the com-
mon Soldiers of an Army, (hew their Courage and
Warmth, as their Lea .crs direct, without evet
examining, or fo much as knowing the Caufethey
contend for.

CHAP- XXL
Of the Divijion of the Sciences.

ALL that can fall within the compafs of Hu-
/i man Underftanding, being either, i/7, The
Mature of Things, their Relations, and their Man-
ner of Operation : Or, zJlj, That which Man.
himfelf ought to do as a rational and voluntary
Agerit, for the attainment of any End, efpecially
Happinefs : Or, ~dly, The Ways and Means where-
by the Knowledge of both of thefe are attained and
communicated. I think Science may be properly
divided into thefe three Serfs.

Fir/}, The Knowledge of Things, their Confti-
tutions, Properties, and Operations, whether mate-
rial or immaterial : this, in a little more enlarged
fenfe of the Word, I call <bwjix.», or Natural Phi'
lofophy. The End of this is bare fpecidative Truth,
and whatfoever can afford the mind of man any
fuch, falls under this Branth : whether it be God

( 2*9 )
himfelf. Angels, Spirits, Bodies, or any of their
Affections, as Number, Figure, &c.

Secondly, Tlqcc/liw, the Skill of right-applying
our own Powers and Actions for the attainment
of things good and ufeful. The molt confider-
able under this head, is E thicks, which is the feek-
ing out thofe Rules and Meafures of humane Ac-
tions, which lead to Happinefs, and the Means to
practife them. The End of this is not bare Specie
lation; but ./?/£/;/, and a Conduct Suitable thereto.

Thirdly, ^yi/ueio/jiKri, or the Doclrine of Signs :
the molt ufual being Words, it is aptly enough
term'd Logick: the bufinefs whereof is to confl-
dcr the Nature of Signs, which the mind makes
ufe of for the understanding of things, or convey-
ing its Knowledge to others. Things are repre-
fented to the mind by ideas: and mens ideas are
communicated to one another, by articulate Sounds,
or Words. The Consideration then of ideas and
words, as the great Instruments of Knowledge
makes no defpicable part of their Contemplation,
who would take a view of human Knowledge in
the whole Extent of it.

This feems to me the firfl and mojl general, as
well as natural Divifion of the Objects of our Un-
derltanding. For a man can employ his thoughts
about nothing, but either the Contemplation of
Things themfelves for the Difcovery of Truth,

( 270 )
or about the Things in his own power, which are
his Aft'ions, for the attainment of his own Ends;
or the Signs the mind makes ufe of, both in the
one and the other, and the right ordering of them,
for its clearer Information. All which Three, viz.
Things as they are in thcmfelvcs Knowable : Ac~
tions, as they depend on us in order to Happinefs,
and the right ufe of Signs, in order to Knowledge,
being Toto Coelo different, they feemed to me to
be tine three great Provinces of the intellectual
World wholly feparate, and diftindt one from a-
n other.

THE END.

The Contents of the Second Book.

X HE Introduction. Page 7

Chap. i. Of Ideas in General, and their Original. 12

Chap. 2. Of Simple Ideas. 16

Chap. 3. Of Ideas of one Senfe. 17

Chap. 4. Of Solidity. 13

Chap. y. Of Simple Ideas of divers Senfes. 21

Chap. 6. Of Simple Ideas of Reflection. ib.

Chap. 7. Of Simple Ideas of Scniation and Reflection, ib.
Chap. 8. Some farther Confiderations concerning

Simple Ideas. 2c

Chap. 9. Of Perception. 30

Chap. 10. Of Retention. 33
Chap. 11. Of Difcerning, and other Operations of the

Mind. 3y

Chap. 12. Of Complex Ideas. 33
Chap. 13. Of Simple Modes, and firit of the Simple

Modes of Space. 4*
Chap. 14. Of Duration and its Simple Modes. 43
Chap. i>. Of Duration andExpanfton confidered to-
gether. 47
Chap. id. Of Numbers. 48
Chap. 17. Of Infinity. jo
Chap. 18. Of other fimple Modes. 53
Cnap. 19. Of the Modes of Thinking. 54
Chap. 20. Of the Modes of Pleafure and Pain. 55
Chap. 21. Of Power. 57
Chap. 22. Of Mixed Modes. 63
Chap. 23. Of our Complex Ideas of Subftances. 67
Chap. 24. Of Colleaive Ideas of Subflances. 72
Chap. 25-. Of Relation. 73
Chap. 26. Of Caufe and Effect, and u .. r Relations. 74
Chap. 27. Of Identity and Divcrfity. 77
Chap. 28. Of other Reh pons. 83
Chap. 29. Ofrlear,obfcur-,di(linci, and confufed Ideas. 89
Chap. 30. Of Real and Fantaflical Ideas. 93
Chap. 31. Of Ideas Adequate or Inadequate. 95-
Chap. 32. Of True nd rife Ideas. 97
Chap. 33. Of the Allocation of Ideas. 102

The Contents of the Third Book.

Chap. i. Of Words or Language in General. p. 108
Chap. 2. Of the Signification of Words. no
Chap. 3. Of General Terms. n4
Chap. 4. Of the Names of Simple Ideas. 121
Chap. j. Of the Names of Mixed Modes and Relations. 124
Chap. 6. Of the Names of Subftances. 127
Chap. 7. Of Particles. 134
Chap. 8. Of Abftraftand Concrete Terms. 136
Chap. 9. Of the Imperfection of Words. j 37
Chap. 10. Of the Abufe of Words. 14I
Chap. 11. Of the Remedies of the foregoing Imper-
fections and Abufes. i;o

The Contents of the Fourth Book.

Chap. 1. Of Knowledge in General. x^e

Chap. 2. Of the Degrees of our Knowledge. 1^9

Chap. 3. Of the Extent of Human Knowledge. 166

Chap. 4. Of the Reality of our Knowledge. 181

Chap. 5. Of Truth in General. 187
Chap. 6. Of Univerfal Propofitions, their Truth and

Certainty. 190

Chap. 7. Of Maxims. 194

Chap. 8. Of trifling Propofitions. 201

Chap. 9. Of our Knowledge of Exigence. 204
Chap. 10. Of our Knowledge of the Exiftence of a

God. 20j
Chap. 1 1 . Of our Knowledge of the Exiftence of o-

ther Things. 211

Chap. 12. Of the Improvement of our Knowledge. 218
Chap. 13. Some farther Confidcrations concerning

Knowledge. 22e

Chap. 14. Of Judgment. 225

Chap. 1 j. Of Probability. » 228

Chap. 16. Of the Degrees of AfR-nt. 230

Chap. 17. OfReafon. 238
Chap. 18. Of Faith and Reafon, and their diflinft

Provinces. 246

Chap. 19. Of Enthufiafm. 2J2

Chap. 20. Of wrong AdentOT Error. 261

Chap. 21. Of the Divifion of the Sciences. 268